




Deanne Bird   Editors
Impacts for Population and Place
The Demography of Disasters
Dávid Karácsonyi • Andrew Taylor •
Deanne Bird
Editors
The Demography of Disasters




Geographical Institute, Research Centre
for Astronomy and Earth Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary
Deanne Bird








ISBN 978-3-030-49919-8 ISBN 978-3-030-49920-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49920-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021. This book is an open access publication.
Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adap-
tation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to
the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if
changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons
license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s
Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publi-
cation does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the
relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard
to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Foreword
It is my honor to introduce the present book titled The Demography of Disasters,
Impacts for Population and Place to the reader. While the title suggests a social
science inquiry on disasters from the angle of demography, the subtitle of the book
clearly reflects that the geographer’s perspective is inevitable when analyzing
disasters. Geography plays an important role in understanding complex interactions
of human–earth systems. Geography also bears the potential to help and coordinate
policy-making, addressing the challenges of growing entropy in our technological
society. These advantages of geography come from the holistic understanding of the
world which enables geographers to see the disaster in a spatial perspective. That
perspective is particularly helpful in addressing issues of global climate change.
The climate emergency impacts Australia immensely, as it is facing longer and
more intensive bushfire seasons. Nevertheless, climate change recently affects less
disaster-prone nations, such as Hungary as well. Landslides, floods, extreme rain-
falls along with desertification in certain areas of Hungary constitute a major hazard
risk affecting the livelihood of several thousand people. We have experienced over
a long period of time the floods of the Tisza river, the second major waterway of
Hungary after the Danube. The floods damaged entire villages or even sometimes
cities located on the floodplains, altering the regional prospects of Alföld
(The Great Hungarian Plain). Engineering design failures and poor technical
maintenance often interplay with extreme rainfall, making the casualties even more
serious. This was the case in 2010, when the Ajka alumina plant reservoir accident
happened, which was the most significant technological disaster in the recent his-
tory of Hungary. The disaster caused a red mud spill, killed ten people, injured
hundreds, and contaminated significant area with the caustic substance. The
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and in particular the Geographical Institute played
an important role in investigating these disasters and providing mitigation strate-
gies, which explains our interest in a broader international cooperation of disaster
studies.
The volume you have in your hands is the first result deriving from that coop-
eration between the Geographical Institute of the Research Centre for Astronomy
and Earth Sciences (Hungary) and the Northern Institute of Charles Darwin
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University. A large international team came together to present this book including
scholars from Asia-Pacific, the USA, and the post-Soviet countries providing a
broad spectrum of understandings on disasters. The thirteen chapters of the book
range from theoretical studies on demography of disasters to discussions of tech-
nological accidents such as Chernobyl. The present volume includes two chapters
on the 2011 Tohoku earthquake considered the most significant disaster impacting
Japan since World War II. Hurricane Katrina in 2005, bush and forest fires in
California and in Russia, heat waves in Australia are also discussed in the book,
each of which directly can be linked to climate change.
Each author has demonstrated their commitment to this unique and valuable
book project for better understanding the disaster–demography interaction. I would
like to acknowledge in particular the role Andrew Taylor played in this project.
From the very beginning, he invested tremendous energy arranging the academic
cooperation between our institutions, securing financial resources and managing the
preparation of the manuscripts. I sincerely look forward to the future prospects in
the disaster–demography study field in which the present volume will probably be
considered as a significant step forward.
Dr. Károly Kocsis
Academician
Director of the Geographical Institute
Research Centre for Astronomy
and Earth Sciences




The present book is the result of a collaboration between the Geographical Institute
of the Research Centre for Astronomy and Earth Sciences, Hungary, the Northern
Institute of Charles Darwin University, Australia, and the Faculty of Life and
Environmental Sciences, University of Iceland. The book was first proposed some
time ago by fellow editor Andrew Taylor when we discussed demographic issues
around disasters following a seminar talk I gave during my first visit to Darwin.
Since then Andrew has put a lot of energy and enthusiasm into making this book
happen. Along with his contributions as editor and author, he also generously
supported the cooperation between our institutions, particularly my visit to Darwin
when we reviewed and discussed the chapter manuscripts provided by authors from
various backgrounds. In the meantime, Deanne Bird, who is currently commuting
between Reykjavík and Melbourne with responsibilities in disaster mitigation, also
joined our editorial team and helped us with her experience in the disaster study
field and in negotiating with Springer, the publisher of this volume. She also helped
to get additional authors on board and with reviewing their submissions.
This book discusses a new and broadening field which links demography and
disaster studies. Traditionally, people have viewed disasters as shocks to everyday
routines, the result of an unanticipated natural hazard event or as engineering
failures and therefore the domain of technological rather than social sciences. Under
these paradigms, the links between disasters and demography seem relatively
simplistic and unidirectional, with the focus on estimating post-disaster populations,
measuring mortality or understanding out-migration impacts. Nevertheless, disas-
ters have the capacity to fundamentally alter population profiles at local and
regional levels. Impacts vary according to the type, rapidity, and magnitude of the
disaster, but also according to the pre-existing population profile and its relation-
ships to the economy and society. In all cases, the key to understanding impacts and
avoiding them in the future is to understand the relationships between disasters and
population change, both prior to and after a disaster.
The aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive discussion on the demog-
raphy of vulnerability and resilience in the face of disasters, the demography of risk
from disaster impacts for vulnerable groups. Demographic methods can help in
vii
post-disaster population estimation and in managing and mapping people. In many
cases, human migration is a common response to disaster, and hence, there is a link
to spatial population dynamics as well. The demography of policy and practice
around disaster mitigation is also an important part of the present volume along
with profiling future risks and opportunities. The demography of climate change
highlights the disaster–demography link in a specific way. In line with the multi-
farious nature of the disaster–demography nexus, our book takes an interdisci-
plinary approach, with chapters ranging from geography to gendered understanding
of disaster resilience.
The Demography of Disasters seeks to advance both practical and theoretical
insights into our understanding of the role of demography in planning for and
mitigating impacts from disasters in developed nations. We hope that the book will
provide policy-makers, disaster recovery experts, planners, and academics in the
field with a wide range of examples demonstrating the importance of the interplay
between demography and disasters in regions and spatially. This book will be of
interest to social scientists across a range of fields. The book is also helpful for
policy-makers, planners, practitioners of disaster management, and environmental
agencies who are interested in a demographer’s perspective on disaster. Academics
and students in areas such as demography, disaster management, climate change,
social policy, and human studies are also the targeted audience.
Most of the contributors to this book have come from academia, spanning a
broad range of countries, including but not limited to Japan, Germany, USA,
Sweden, Ukraine, and Russia. It has at times been a difficult task to coordinate such
a broad and diverse team with different perspectives and scientific backgrounds. It
is the editors’ hope that through this book project, the team of authors will become
part of an academic community which will in the future further contribute to our
understanding of the disaster–demography nexus.
The editors have taken the view that human geography is closely related to the
disaster–demography nexus, and hence, we have made extensive use of maps, the
most common communication language of geographical science. Special attention
has been paid to presenting a uniform cartographic design and layout throughout
the book which I hope will make this volume more visually appealing to the reader.
I would like to acknowledge here the tremendous help given by Shelly (Shell)
Worthington who assisted us tirelessly in proofreading and editing all the chapter
manuscripts. Special thanks also go to Ferenc Probáld, Professor Emeritus of
Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest, Hungary), my former Ph.D. supervisor, who
was always ready to check and comment on my work. Also many thanks to
Kang-tsung (Karl) Chang for his rigorous but helpful review comments, along with
all the other reviewers of each chapter including Tony Barnes, Sigurd Dyrting, Kat
Haynes, Richie Howitt, Anita Maertens, Jane Mullet, and Jan Salmon. This project
would not have been possible without the support of Károly Kocsis, Director of the
Geographical Institute in Budapest, and László Kiss, General Director of the
Research Centre for Astronomy and Earth Sciences who also arranged funding
from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to cover some of the costs related to the
present volume. Thanks also go to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
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(JSPS) for the one year I spent at the International Research Institute of Disaster
Science at Tohoku University in Japan which helped me greatly in gaining a better
understanding of disaster science as a distinguished academic field.
I hope you enjoy reading this book on the various perspectives of the disaster–
demography nexus. There are inevitably more approaches than what we were able
to include in the following chapters some of which raise more questions than
answers. However, I believe the collaborations featured in this project will push
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Conceptualising
the Demography of Disasters
Dávid Karácsonyi and Andrew Taylor
Abstract Understanding and documenting intersects between disasters and human
demographic change is an emerging academic field. Both the study of disasters and
demographic issues are broad constructs in their own rights. While it may seem
obvious to link the two, as we have in this book, disasters can impact on populations
and population change in multifarious, obtuse and complex ways. Our aim in this
book is to extend the nascent work to improve disaster policy and planning processes
through enhancing knowledge about the demography-disaster nexus. In this chapter,
we overview contemporary debates and paradigm shifts within the field of disaster
studies to provide conceptual links between these and the field of demography. To
conclude, we outline the topics and case studies which form the basis for individual
chapters in this book.
Keywords Disaster-demography nexus · Hazard · Vulnerability · Social
embeddedness · Non-routine event
1.1 Introduction
Understanding and documenting intersects between disasters and human demo-
graphic change is an emerging scientific field. This demography-disaster nexus is
growing in importance as efforts to build structured and cohesive planning to prevent
and mitigate disasters grow in line with the anticipated and realised increases in
extreme events (Coleman 2006; Eshghi and Larson 2008; Okuyama and Sahin 2009).
According to Donner and Rodríguez (2008, p. 1090), the contemporary growth in
D. Karácsonyi (B)
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population densities in vulnerable areas and regions, and especially mass urbanisa-
tion in developing nations, is themost important factor that has increased population-
related hazard exposure. In addition to this, the increased frequency and intensity
of extreme weather events due to climate change (Katz and Brown 1992; Easterling
et al. 2000; Frich et al. 2002; Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012; Jakab et al. 2019) have
already contributed and soon will more significantly contribute to increased popula-
tion vulnerabilities. Furthermore, global entropy has increased through technological
change (Ellul 1964) and as a result of complex and systemic issues where nuclear,
chemical, biotech industries and artificial intelligence along with ‘traditional’ threats
such as pandemic, violence, war and famine bear the potential to trigger catastrophic
events (Quarantelli et al. 2007). Each of these factors have the potential to alter
demographic profiles and negatively affect people’s lives through disasters.
The demographic make-up of populations at the time of disaster determines who
is impacted and the extent of impacts on residents and others. Improving technolo-
gies, improved warning systems, investments in disaster mitigating infrastructure
and improving community preparedness and response in the face of disasters are
examples of attempts to reduce disaster impacts. While a range of studies have
looked at demographic impacts from individual disasters, these are generally short-
term focused and concentrated on post-event analysis and evaluation. Our aim in
this chapter and generally in the book is to extend the nascent work to improve
disaster policy and planning process through the growing knowledge about the
demography-disaster nexus.
Both the study of disasters and demographic issues themselves are broad
constructs in their own rights. While it may seem obvious to link the two, as we
have in this book, disasters can impact on populations and change populations in
multifarious, obtuse and complex ways. Populations may be the root cause of a
localised disaster or indeed be themain ‘victims’. Disasters can speed up pre-existing
demographic changes or create new population profiles through immediate impacts
and human reactions to such events (as we learn in Chap. 2 by Karácsonyi et al.,
in Chap. 5 by Carson et al. and in Chap. 7 by Bird and Taylor). Their impacts on
demographic change can occur on a complex time–space continuum which may
involve feedback loops. Most obvious are deaths and injuries, out-migration and
the temporary relocation of residents and others from affected areas which rapidly
and noticeably alter the pre-existing demographic profile of a town or region. More
vulnerable cohorts (like the elderly) are often disproportionately impacted. Disas-
ters may also affect the gendered demography of places, as discussed in Chap. 9
by Barnes. Disasters may encourage populations not immediately affected by the
disaster at hand to adjust their demographic behaviours, such as around fertility
or migration. Such feedback loops may be complex, unknown and unpredictable,
altering not only the population profile but the economies and social fabric of towns
and regions well into the future (see for example, Chap. 5 by Carson et al., Chap. 6
by King and Gurtner, or Chap. 8 by Zander et al.).
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This introductory chapter discusses paradigm shifts in the field of disaster studies.
This provides important theoretical context to posit our examination of the disaster-
demography nexus which is the core theoretical contribution of the book. In the
latter part of this chapter, we outline the structure of the book to facilitate a digestible
overview for the reader.
1.2 Disaster Studies: From ‘Acts of God’
to a Distinguishable Scientific Field
In the face of the conventional perception of disasters as ‘acts of God’ (Robinson
2003) that are chaotic and random situations with anarchy and panic (Quarantelli and
Dynes 1972; Webb 2007), the majority of disaster experts now perceive disasters are
never ‘accidental’ (Quarantelli et al. 2007; Lavell and Ginnetti 2013). Thus, there is
a need for systematic research and analysis to enhance the potential for the preven-
tion of disasters. Samuel Prince’s doctoral thesis (Prince 1920) on the 1917 Halifax
explosion1 is recognised by many as the first systematic disaster study (Drabek and
McEntire 2003; Perry 2007). However, the real flourishing in disaster studies started
during the early Cold War era with studies on the impact of bombings on civilian’s
morale in World War II (see United States Strategic Bombing Survey 1947). Many
of these studies attempted to address how American communities might react to a
possible nuclear war. Consequently, they had strong strategic-military origins and
aims along with consummate funding provided by the armed forces (Bolin 2007;
Perry 2007; Rodríguez et al. 2007). A notable step forward in the institutionalisation
of civilian disaster studies was the establishment of the Disaster Research Centre
at Ohio State University, the first of such schools, in 1963. The School published
several synthesising works on disaster studies and played a pioneering role in devel-
oping theoretical frameworks rooted in the field of social sciences (see for example,
Dynes 1970; Mileti 1975; Quarantelli 1978; Oliver-Smith 1979; Drabek 1986). This
nascent adjunction between disasters and social sciences more than half a century
ago was arguably the beginnings of the field we recognise today.
Although early links were evident between disaster studies and social sciences,
disaster studies are multifarious and are strongly multidisciplinary by nature (Quar-
antelli 2006). Because of this, disaster studies are not ontologically limited to a
clearly defined field (see for example the debate summarised in Perry andQuarantelli
2005). Alexander (2005, p. 24) proposed, for example, that disaster studies encom-
pass the fields of geography, anthropology, sociology, social psychology, develop-
ment studies, health sciences, geophysical sciences and engineering. Consequently,
members of risk, hazard and disaster study communities with various backgrounds
have often taken very different approaches which Cutter (2005) proposed made it
1A cargo ship loaded with munition exploded during the World War killing approximately 2000
people.
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difficult to develop a recognisable and distinctive academic field with a universally
understood inner logic and framework.
As such, the field of disaster studies is constantly emerging and reshaping. This
brings many benefits. Not least, the knowledge and understanding about the risks
of and impacts from disasters can be sourced and considered from a wide range of
disciplines; including those reflected on here. The theoretical and applied ‘stock’ of
knowledge is, therefore, not constrained to ontological paradigms, and its evolving
nature protects disaster studies from the dangers of received wisdom which may be
pervasive in singular and more focused fields. Disaster studies are, therefore, plural
in a conceptual, theoretical and applied sense. While the benefits are many, this
also brings challenges, as we will now discuss in relation to the debate on defining
precisely what constitutes a disaster and therefore disaster studies.
1.3 Disaster: A Non-routine Phenomenon or Embedded
in Society?
To meaningfully consider the disaster-demography nexus, it is necessary to plot the
debate and literal discussion on what constitutes a disaster. As an illustration, Dynes
(1970), Rodríguez et al. (2007) and Webb (2007) stressed that disaster is understood
by many as an agent for bad luck to be bought to bear on the physical environment,
human system and society in general. However, disasters are now widely recognised
as complex events with society and populations intricately linked to the causes and
consequences of individual disasters, rather than simply as victims or passive actors.
Two seminal books have sought to address the definition of a disaster; What is
a disaster? by Perry and Quarantelli (2005) and At risk, by Blaikie et al. 1994 (its
newer edition is Wisner et al. 2004). In the former, most contributors emphasised
that a disaster can oftentimes be understood as ‘departure from normal’, a ‘non-
routine event’, as echoed by Kreps (1989) and Drabek (1989). In Wisner’s work,
authors understood disasters as being embedded in the ‘normal’ functioning of the
society and in particular rooted in social inequalities. The main criticism on this
‘non-routineness’ position is that, if disaster occurs when society cannot function
normally under severe environmental change, then members of society are usually
able to cope with everyday problems and needs when there is no external hazard
stress on them (Donner and Rodríguez 2008, p. 1092).
McEntire (2013) distinguished two main schools in disaster studies, the social
vulnerability school (emphasising social, political and economic structures) and the
holistic school (in which disasters are seen as non-routine events, related to non-
routine social problems). In the holistic school, for example, disaster definitions can
be related to the scale and speed of disasters. The scale is emphasised by Quarantelli
(1998, 2006) who distinguished a catastrophe from disaster and by Bissel (2013)
who distinguished an emergency, hazard, disaster and catastrophe from each other
based on the size of the impacted area and population. A further element in the
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definitional quandary is based on the different speeds of disaster impacts (Alexander
2001; Robinson 2003; Quarantelli 2006; Bissel 2013); those slowly emerging (such
as sea level rise, industrial pollution, landscape degradation—seeKertész andKřeček
2019) and rapid onset disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes and floods).
Furthermore, in the holistic school (non-routineness perspective), the definitional
debate has focused on the root causes of disasters including that they may be sudden,
unexpected and unwanted events (Gencer 2013) and a result of natural or human
made catastrophes (Robinson 2003). Alexander (2001) categorised disasters based
on the geophysical agent, such as earthquake, volcanic eruption, desertification and
soil erosion. Alexander (2001) and others, such as Kapuchu and Özerdem (2013),
also stressed that natural and man-made disasters are usually very different. They
highlighted that a disaster is a situation where people are confronted with a sudden
and uncontrollable catastrophic change caused by natural phenomena or external
human action. Hence, Kapuchu and Özerdem (2013, p. 12) pointed out that disasters
induced by natural hazards can be predicted to some extent, but that it is impossible
to prevent them.
In contrast to the stance on disasters by Alexander, Kapuchu and Özerdem, the
majority of disaster experts (e.g. Quarantelli et al. 2007) agree that each disaster is
influenced by humans and can therefore be prevented. This viewpoint stresses that
human actions have the potential to reduce disaster impacts. Conversely, poor or
wrong decisions can worsen the situation. In support of this, Perry (2007) bought
to the fore definitional differences between the terms hazard and disaster. In his
view, a disaster occurs when a hazard (an extreme physical event, such as extreme
rainfall, heatwave or earthquake) intersectswith the social system (vulnerable human
population). In a practical sense, therefore, a landslide in a remote, uninhabited area
is just a geological phenomenon if there is no injury, loss of life or property damage. It
is important to emphasise that only a very small fraction of hazards lead to a disaster
(Quarantelli et al. 2007) because usually there is no impact on human population
(see Alexander 2001 on the 1964 Sherman debris avalanche in sparsely populated
Alaska).
Robinson (2003), Wisner et al (2004) and Cutter (2005) argued that a disaster
is an interplay between human–social root causes and hazard event and hence can
lead to a combination of multiple events (e.g. conflict causing hunger, disease and
displacement). Blaikie et al. (1994) and Wisner et al. (2004) used the ‘pressure
and release model’ to show how disasters can occur when natural hazards affect
vulnerable populations. In the model, vulnerability and natural hazards are seen as
intersecting forces generating systemic pressure which are released in the form of a
disaster. The pressure and release model suggests that, even if the triggering event
is natural, the root causes are always society-based. This view helped shift attention
to the vulnerability of human–social systems. As Cutter (2005, p. 39) stated, the
question is not about a disaster but about vulnerability to environmental threats and
extreme events. Cutter underlines that vulnerability is embedded in human, natural
and technological systems, which are interconnected, and this interaction is of utmost
importance in grasping vulnerability.
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Alexander (2001) surmised that human vulnerability has often been a result of
underestimating the limited degree to which technology and economic systems
are able to mitigate natural disasters. In other words, natural hazard events have
the power to exert a substantial and consistent influence on modern society (ibid.
p. 3). Hence, in Alexander’s perception, disasters induced by these events are in fact
‘natural’ disasters. Alexander’s view is further supported by the recent cultural turn
in disaster studies (see Webb 2007, Ekström and Kverndokk 2015). Consistent with
that paradigm, there are some studies on how communities living in hazard-prone
areas have been influenced through their continuous disaster experiences, including
in Japan (Bajek et al. 2008; Kitagawa 2016) and the Philippines (Bankoff 2003). A
cross-cultural study by Paton et al. (2010) comparing Japan and New Zealand (two
disaster-pronenations) revealed someuniversal similarities onhowhazardbeliefs and
social characteristics interact despite the fundamental cultural differences between
the two countries.
In spite of the earth science-based criticisms by Alexander and the findings by
recent cultural studies, Wisner’s ‘social embeddedness’ view is widely accepted by
disaster study experts with a sociology background. Hence, these scholars tend to
avoid the use of the term ‘natural disaster’ (see O’Keefe et al. 1976; Cannon 1994;
Cohen and Werker 2008). Despite this, the term ‘natural disaster’ is still common
particularly in the economic, demographic and geographic literature (see for instance,
UN General Assembly 1989; Cavallo and Noy 2011; Cavallo et al. 2013). Some
authors have concluded that the ‘natural disaster’ events they studied have different
impacts for developing nations (Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Loayza et al.
2012; Chen et al. 2013), for women (Enarson 2000; Neumayer and Plümper 2007) or
for low-income people (Masozera et al. 2007). These all emphasise that the severity
of a disaster is related to social, rather than natural characteristics, in support of
Wisner and his colleague’s (2004) view that disasters are rooted in ‘social’ rather
than in ‘natural’ causes.
Wisner et al. (2004, p. 92) went further to suggest a more ‘radical’ social embed-
dedness view, stating even nature itself can be considered as a part of the resources
that are allocated by social processes, such that, under routine social functioning,
people become more or less vulnerable to hazard impacts. Hence, vulnerability to
natural hazards is a social construct (Lavell et al. 2012). According toWisner, vulner-
ability describes a set of conditions that people derive from their historical, cultural,
social, environmental, political and economic contexts, as well as socio-economic
status. In Wisner’s definition (ibid. p. 11), vulnerability is ‘the characteristics of a
person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope
with, resist and recover from the impact of natural hazard events’.
Wisner’s assumption has been further elaborated on by Oliver-Smith (2009) who
argued that “social systems generate the conditions that place people differentiated
along axes of class, race, ethnic, gender or age, at different levels of risk from the
same hazard and subject to different forms of suffering from the same event” (p. 120).
Such perspectives were the first tomark direct links to population and their character-
istics according to demographic traits such as age, race, gender and socio-economic
status. Hence, vulnerable groups are not only at risk because they are exposed to
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a hazard but as a result of their marginality, of everyday patterns of social interac-
tion and organisation and their constrained access to resources (Cardona et al. 2012,
p. 71). Further, Wisner et al. (2004) accentuated that levels of vulnerability change
during the life-course (e.g. partner formation, child bearing and later years) such that
vulnerability for individuals may be temporary or in flux based on a range of factors
in their lives including changes in occupation, immigration status or residence and
again, the links to the field of demography become evident.
Of course, in the academic discourse, disasters are not only approached through
root causes and triggering events, but also in terms of consequences.While the ‘social
embeddedness’ approach accentuates social conditions as both the root cause and
consequence from disasters, the ‘non-routineness’ perspective has a strong social
science emphasis regarding consequences, which are understood as ‘non-routine’
social conditions generated by the disaster. These consequences may include signifi-
cant loss of resources and threats to life (Frankenberg et al. 2014, p. 3), causing severe
physical injuries, emotional distress and substantial property damage (Flanagan et al.
2011). According to Robinson (2003) and Smith (2005, p. 233), disasters change
social and human life and livelihood in a negative way for certain groups hit directly
or indirectly by the event, leading to serious disturbances and disruptions to the func-
tioning of a society. In addition, Lindell (2013) summarised disaster consequences
into two main groups, physical impacts (e.g. casualties, damage) and social impacts
(psychological, demographic, economic and political impacts).
In summary, analysing literature inwhich disasters are defined, debated and under-
stood highlights some successive paradigm shifts in disaster science (Fig. 1.1), the
move away from seeing disasters as non-routine cyclic events, meaning simply a
departure from, then a return to ‘normal’. Even the ‘normal’ is often a different,
deteriorated or improved situation compared to the initial stage. Hence, the disaster
life cycle, a fundamental framework for disaster studies (Coetzee and Niekerk 2012;
Lavell et al. 2012), which was proposed by Mileti (1975), Baird et al. (1975) and
Drabek (1986, 1999), was broadly used by key institutions such as UN Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2009) and Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) of the USA has been criticised as being overly simplistic (see Lewis
1999). Disasters are complex, multidimensional events where root causes and conse-
quences are embedded in the functioning of society, and they are related to policy and
politicalmanagement failures, social injustice and exclusion.Ultimately, this concep-
tion of disasters focuses attention on the relevance of the disaster-demography nexus
in understanding, managing and recovering from disasters.
1.4 Method and Structure of the Book
The book consists of eleven, mostly multiple-authored chapters which aim to
compare jurisdictions and provide insights fromdifferent cases. The cases range from
technological to natural hazard events and population vulnerabilities. It is important
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Fig. 1.1 Paradigm shifts in disaster studies
to highlight that several other shock events, other than natural hazards, technolog-
ical accidents, infectious diseases or climate change could also unfold vulnerabilities
and hence lead to disastrous demographic consequences for populations. Unrest, war
and ethnic cleansing could be also understood as part of demography of disasters
(see Drabek 1999; Wisner et al. 2004) along with pandemics or economic crises
because they change the demographic profile of the impacted populations and lead
to mass displacements. Global disasters (nuclear war, climate change) are part of the
disaster literature dialect as well (see Giddings 1973), and hence, the concepts of
‘risk society’ or ‘global risk society’ have been introduced by Wisner et al. (2004)
and Cutter (2005). In addition, Wisner et al. (2004) suggested disasters caused by
natural hazards are not the greatest threat to humanity in comparison with violent
conflicts or famines which interact with each other, making disaster impacts worse.
Of course, the cases presented in this volume are limited in scope. That is why we
summarised other ways of disaster-demography nexus in Chap. 13. Hence, the final
chapter is not only summarising the learnings from the present volume but also serves
as an extended literature review.
This volume contains significant spatial-geographical analysis, and this is the
basis for its subtitle ‘impacts for population and place’. For example, Chap. 2 has a
strong emphasis on spatiality through permanent mass displacements. Chap. 3 and
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Fig. 1.2 Locations and triggering events of the disasters represented in this book
the comparative example in Chap. 4 draws attention to how bushfires impacted popu-
lation migration in California while in Chap. 4 we learn of the contributing effects of
a lack of forest maintenance to catastrophic forest fires in Russia. Geography is also
represented by the spatial variation of case study areas in this book (Fig. 1.2) covering
Europe, Asia, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Altogether 13 disaster
cases are discussed in this volume with the majority occurring in the twenty-first
century.
The following chapters aim to broaden links between demography and disasters.
Chapters 2–8 focus on holistic population-disaster linkages where hazard events alter
population trends (disaster-induced mass displacements, migration as heat adapta-
tion strategy, long-term impact of disasters in sparsely populated areas) or population
change generates disaster risks. Chapters 9–11 focus on issues related to demog-
raphy more broadly, such as the disruption of lifeline networks as key infrastruc-
ture elements, gender aspects of resilient urban design and the role of communities
in disaster recovery. Chapter 12 is about international collaboration in the field of
disaster studies and highlights, through the author’s personal experiences, how scien-
tific ideas and approaches can be exchanged and newconnections can be built through
case studies across nations.
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The Main Demographic Consequence
of Nuclear Disasters?
Dávid Karácsonyi, Kazumasa Hanaoka, and Yelizaveta Skryzhevska
Abstract Human history has witnessed several major disasters that have affected
the economic, social and environmental conditions of their respective regions. The
nuclear disaster of Chernobyl (1986, Ukraine, that time the Soviet Union) and
Fukushima (2011, Japan) appears to be the most significant disasters in terms of
negative outcomes produced for their population over a long time. Despite this, the
analysis of the socio-economic outcomes of these disasters has attracted much less
scientific attention than health or radiation-related issues (UNDP 2002a; Lehman and
Wadsworth 2009, 2011). Although nuclear accidents are deemed to be rare events,
the Fukushima disaster occurred only 25 years after Chernobyl. These disasters high-
lighted the need for a detailed long-term socio-economic analysis of these accidents to
acquire sufficient knowledge to be applied when considering new construction sites
for nuclear power facilities (Lehman and Wadsworth 2011). This chapter focuses
on the problem of permanent resettlement resulting from nuclear disasters and its
effects on regional demographic trajectories and spatial shifts. Based on the results
of this study we argue that mass displacement after a nuclear disaster rather than the
radiation itself has a much more significant impact on deteriorating health, natural
reproduction and economic performance of the affected population. Furthermore,
given the differences in radio-ecological conditions, reconstruction policy and the
time framework, Fukushima may demonstrate demographic consequences that are
different from the Chernobyl case.
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2.1 Introduction
Human history haswitnessed severalmajor disasters that have affected the economic,
social and environmental conditions of their respective regions. The nuclear disaster
of Chernobyl (1986, Ukraine, that time the Soviet Union) and Fukushima (2011,
Japan) appears to be the most significant disasters in terms of negative outcomes
produced for their population over a long time. Despite this, the analysis of the
socio-economic outcomes of these disasters has attracted much less scientific atten-
tion than health or radiation-related issues (UNDP 2002a; Lehman and Wadsworth
2009, 2011). Although nuclear accidents are deemed to be rare events, the Fukushima
disaster occurred only 25 years after Chernobyl. These disasters highlighted the need
for a detailed long-term socio-economic analysis of these accidents to acquire suffi-
cient knowledge to be applied when considering new construction sites for nuclear
power facilities (Lehman andWadsworth 2011). This chapter focuses on the problem
of permanent resettlement resulting from nuclear disasters and its effects on regional
demographic trajectories and spatial shifts, while Chap. 11 studies the community
involvement during and after evacuation and resettlement process in two nuclear
disaster cases.
At first glance, Chernobyl and Fukushima may not be comparable, given the
tremendous difference in their socio-economic conditions. The geographic, cultural
and socio-economic distances can hardly be greater between any two points on
Earth than between Japan during the 2010s and the Soviet Union during the 1980s.
However, according to Oliver-Smith (2013), geographically and culturally distanced
societies present analogous issues during similar disaster events. For instance, Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima both deployed similar policies to manage mass population
displacements. An initial emergency evacuation was followed by organised or spon-
taneous resettlement of the vulnerable population to avoid further radiation risks.
The radiation threat should be considered as both a rapid-onset disaster because of
the urgent need of evacuation and a slow-onset disaster because of its long-lasting
effect, making a return difficult or even impossible over time.
TheChernobyl and Fukushima disasters illustrate how long-term emergencymass
displacement triggers demographic shifts. They are not the largest evacuations in
human history; however, they are among the largest permanent resettlements in
peacetime caused by a previously unforeseen, unplanned situation.
Geographically detailed data is necessary to understand spatial turbulences caused
by mass displacement after the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters. In this study,
data series spanning over three decades was used to provide insights into long-term
population shifts after Chernobyl based on census populations. In the Fukushima
case, mobile phone location data was used alongside the census data in spatially
fine-scale to interpret population changes. This provides short-term but spatially and
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structurally detailed data about the effect of mass displacement. This detail is used
to explore the difference between de facto and de jure populations which could be
significant during the post-disaster evacuation phases. Thus, the findings derived by
analysing the two data sets can complement each other.
The core analysis used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) based on detailed
spatial units that included the territories of Belarus, Ukraine, nine western provinces
of Russia and the Tohoku area located on the northern part of Honshu the main island
of Japan.
2.2 Spatial Demography Impact of Mass Displacements
Relocation or resettlement of disaster-stricken populations is a common strategy
applied within disaster mitigation policy (Oliver-Smith 1996). Generally speaking,
displacement is the impact of a disaster which results from the vulnerability of
people to shocks or stresses, compelling them to relocate just for survival (Lavell
and Ginnetti 2013). Migration has always been one of the most important survival
strategies adopted by people facing natural hazards or human-caused disasters
(Hugo 2008).
Along with the demographic loss (death tolls and injuries) caused directly during
the disaster event, it could be argued that population displacement can be viewed
as the other demographic consequence of a disaster. Mass displacement also has
direct effects such as death, injury, disease (Robinson 2003) and could cause social
insecurity and disrupted life prospects. Displacement, the demographic and social
impacts of which are oftentimes underestimated, can be an even more significant
consequence of a disaster than the direct death toll.
A large number of studies on the health and natural reproduction consequences
of Chernobyl mostly explained the demographic losses resulting exclusively from
radiation.However, theyoften neglected the impact ofmass displacement itself. In the
30-year period after the Chernobyl disaster, the number of indirect victims (deaths
caused by cancer, cardiovascular diseases, etc.) is still widely debated (TORCH
2006, 2016; Peplow 2006 or see Greenpeace 2006) because the linkage between
radiation and cancer cannot be proven due to its stochastic occurrence within the
population (see WHO 2006, 2016; IAEA-WHO-UNDP 2005; IAEA 2006). The
only two exceptions are the increase of thyroid cancer cases among those who were
young and adolescent during the disaster (4000 cases by 2002 according to IAEA
2006; OECD 2002) and leukaemia that occurred after 1990 among former on-site
emergency clean-up workers (likvidators) (Hatch et al. 2005; Balonov et al. 2010;
European Commission 2011).
Despite there being a large number of health studies, science still lacks full, final
and objective information about the medical and biological consequences of Cher-
nobyl (UNDP 2002b; Hatch et al. 2005; Baverstock and Wiliams 2006 and others).
Studies investigating health issues resulting from nuclear disasters are limited as a
result of the lapse between initial exposure and the presentation of symptoms. This
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lapse can be as long as 10–20 years after the accident (Lehmann and Wadsworth
2011). Extreme variations in individual exposure causing tragic outcomes are impos-
sible to followupover longperiods of timewhen analysing large populations.Consid-
ering also that the screening effect inflates health statistics when populations in the
affected area experience intense health control that identifies illnesses which would
otherwise never be explored (UNDP 2002a). It is estimated that the indirect death
toll varies from 4,000 (Peplow 2006; IAEA 2006) to 60,000 (TORCH 2006).
Studies on natural population reproduction trends often did not prove amathemat-
ical correlation with radiation exposure after Chernobyl (IAEA 2006). According to
Linge et al. (1997), the birth and death rates during 1986–1996 were similar to those
in non-affected areas. However, their investigations were based on the populations
of larger regions, potentially cloaking extreme local variations. Other studies (see
Omelianets et al. 1988, 2016; Lakiza-Sachuk et al. 1994; Voloshin et al. 1996; Role-
vich et al. 1996) claim radiation exposure temporarily decreased birth rates immedi-
ately after the accident in the affected areas. However, this decrease can be explained
by the disinclination to bear children during the uncertain life prospects that even-
tuated post-Chernobyl resettlement (Abbott et al. 2006). It can also be explained by
the fear of the effect of radiation exposure during pregnancy instead of the presence
of radiation effect itself (Jaworowski 2010). This view is supported by Lehmann and
Wadsworth (2011), who states that contamination levels have little or no influence on
fertility, marriage behaviour and education performance. This is further illustrated
by a lack of statistical correlation between radiation exposure and chromosome aber-
rations or birth defects (OECD 2002; Baverstock and Williams 2006). According to
the research by Rolevich et al. (1996), Libanova (2007), and Mesle and Poniakina
(2012), there is higher mortality among people living in the affected areas. However,
the increase in mortality cannot be explained by the radiation alone (Shestopalov
et al. 1996). The increase of psychological problems caused by the social disrup-
tion during the resettlement presented significant health consequences (Brenot et al.
2000; Balonov et al. 2010). Furthermore, as younger generations migrate out of the
disaster area (Voloshin et al. 1996; Omelianets et al. 2016), a statistical consequence
is an increase in mortality simply because of the shift in age structures towards aging.
Although approaches cited in the previous paragraph often appear opposing, it
is very important to stress that even if the results are biased that the majority of
scientists agree that the Chernobyl disaster as a whole played a significant role in the
deteriorating natural reproduction during the 1990s. Natural reproduction decline
was also related to general socio-economic decay during and after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, such as growing poverty and unemployment, increasing alcoholism
and poorer medical services (Ioffe 2007; Baranovski 2010; Marples 1993, 1996 and
others). As such, it is hard to distinguish the two separate effects.
Out of the health and natural reproduction studies, only a few research focuses
on wider demographic consequences. Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) underline
the lower market performance of those who were exposed to higher radiation. This
effect however is based on the self-assessment of their own health condition as
poor, not directly from the radiation. These people also have lower mobility. Abbott
et al. (2006) approached the socio-economic effect of Chernobyl through the view
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of risk and uncertainty when analysing poor economic circumstances. The most
significant documentation on Chernobyl-related social and economic issues has been
launched by UNDP (2002a as well as 2002b, c), calling for the need of a new
developmental approach. According to this document, a holistic approach integrating
health, radio-ecology and economic aspects is needed to fully understand Chernobyl.
Based on the literature, we argue that themain direct negative demographic impact
of Chernobyl was not the number of deaths or illnesses, not even the psychological
consequences (see Rumyantseva et al. 1996; Lochard 1996; Brenot et al. 2000 or
Jaworowski 2010) but the urgent need for the resettlement of ten-hundred thousands
of people because of the long-term radiation threat. This resettlement resulted in
the distortion of everyday life and changed natural reproduction due to post-disaster
uncertainty and social insecurity. Post-Chernobyl and post-Fukushima displacement
caused much more significant demographic shifts than the radiation itself. Thus,
the effect of permanent mass displacement should be the focus when explaining
demographic outcomes.
Permanent resettlements resulting from disasters are relatively rare events hence
less discussed in the general disaster literature (Oliver-Smith 2013) despite having
a long-term demographic impact. Flooding, earthquakes and volcano eruption can
cause large evacuations but rarely long-term displacements. However, long-term
demographic shifts can be caused by temporary resettlement during or following a
natural hazard event aswell as it discussed inChaps. 5 and 6. If a displacement caused
by natural hazards becomes permanent, this indicates failed remediation policies
(Oliver-Smith 2013). Yet there is no clear distinction between temporary (short-term)
and permanent (long-term) displacement in the literature. As previously identified,
such a distinction can often be policy induced. In Fukushima, policy documents refer
to evacuees as temporarily displaced people to maintain hope for a return and to keep
communities together (see Chap. 11). A displacement can last for years, even for life
and still, it is described as “temporary”.
Furthermore, mass displacement in practice often does not solve the problem
caused by the disaster itself but generates new challenges (Robinson 2003). In many
cases, the resettlement results in a secondary disaster (Oliver-Smith 2013), which
will further produce serious consequences in a badly planned or unplanned resettle-
ment (Cernea 2004). At a new location, an appropriate settlement design, housing,
services and an economic base need to be built to enable people to revitalise itself and
achieve adequate levels of resilience (Oliver-Smith 2009). These challenges caused
by mass displacement should also be considered as integral parts of the Chernobyl
and Fukushima disasters. We argue that the lack of a holistic view led to an overem-
phasis of health risks by radiation which neglected the effect of the main conse-
quence of nuclear disasters: permanent mass displacement and the uncertainties and
disturbances caused by it.
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2.3 Changing Region and Shifting People by Nuclear
Disaster
Nuclear radiation levels significantly determine evacuation and resettlement policies
rather than an understanding of the key findings from the literature summarised in
the previous section whereby radiation exposure itself has a minor effect directly on
general demographic trends. The radiation is not a homogenous phenomenon, it has
changing levels, composition and characteristics over time, and thus, the evacuation
and resettlement measures follow this change to cope with the changing radiation
threat. Based on this, certain radiation phases can be distinguished over time which
results in an adjustment of resettlement policies following the disaster. Thus, the
level of radiation and change in population trends are strongly interrelated through the
resettlement policies rather than through health consequences. There are important
differences betweenFukushima andChernobyl in termsof the composition of emitted
isotopes resulting in the slightly different evacuation and resettlement policies. In
the following section, these different and changing characteristics of radiation will
be presented to better understand evacuation and resettlement measures in the two
cases.
2.3.1 The Chernobyl Case
In 1986, at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, the operation failure and poor
engineering design that led to an explosion in Unit 4 within the reactor core1 which
damaged the shielding, released 3–4% (5–6 tonnes) of fragmented nuclear fuel2
into the surrounding environment and was followed by a ten-day graphite fire. The
accident caused a release of fission products into the environment, which was the
1A runawaynuclear chain reaction caused a steamblastwithin the reactor vessel thatwas followedby
a larger chemical explosion seconds later either by hydrogen–air or carbon-monoxide–air ignition.
The magnitude of the reactor core explosion and resulting release of fuel was unprecedented in the
history of nuclear accidents, e.g. in Fukushima, in Three Mile Island or Windscale.
2The reactor that exploded in Chernobyl used low-enriched uranium-oxide fuel with 2% 235U and
98% 238U. The spent fuel still consists of ~96% 238U aswell as <1% 235U, 236U and ~1% transmuted
isotopes such as 239Pu, 240Pu and other trans-uranium elements, which emit alpha radiation (high
energy 4He nuclei) when decaying. These isotopes are harmful when inhaled (causing lung cancer)
or ingested in small quantities, but human skin stops alpha radiation.
On the other hand, during normal reactor operation, most of the fissile isotopes (82% of 235U,
62–73% of 239Pu and 72% of 241Pu), representing ~2 to 3% of the total fuel mass, will undergo
fission when capturing a neutron instead of transmutation, producing short and medium half-life
products such as 131I (beta emitter), 90Sr (beta emitter) and 137Cs (beta and gamma emitter, a decay
product of very short-lived 137Xe). Although the total amount of such material released was less
than 0.5 kg for 131I and less than 25 kg for 137Cs, it represents a significant danger because beta
radiation (emission of high energy electrons or positrons) and especially gamma radiation (high
energy photons) can penetrate human tissue, making it hazardous even without actual intake of the
isotope.
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principal source of high initial effective doses3 in large areas that extended outside of
the Soviet Union. However, the isotopes with a short half-life4 rapidly decay (UNDP
2002b), such as 131I (Iodine-131) which was found to be the root cause of increased
thyroid cancer cases after the disaster. One year after the accident, the total effective
dose levels dropped to 2% of what it had been at the time of the accident, and after
two years, it had fallen to 1% (IAEA 2006). Among those isotopes that remained
over long time,5 the largest area (Table 2.1) was polluted by 137Cs (Caesium-137),
which is the predominant source of the remaining dose levels causing a health risk
since the third year after the disaster.6
After the Chernobyl disaster, two solutions—or their combination—were
employed to mitigate the effects on the local population: radiological decontami-
nation and the resettlement of people to non-contaminated areas. Establishing new
homes for resettlement seemed clearly more expensive but was also the much safer
solution (Tykhyi 1998).
The most severely contaminated area was the surroundings of the power plant
with a radius of 30 km, the so-called “Exclusion Zone” including the plant itself,
as well Pripyat city with 50 thousand people (1986), Chernobyl town and several
villages. The total population of this area (116 thousand people) (Table 2.1) was
evacuated during 1986–1987 (UNSCEAR 2000; IAEA 2006) mostly to large cities
such as Kiev, Minsk, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr (Lehmann and Wadsworth 2011), was
their communities quickly dissolved (Voloshin et al. 1996; IOM 1997). Many of
them were settled later in Slavutich, a town established in 1988 for evacuees from
Pripyat (Voloshin et al. 1996; Mesle and Poniakina 2012). The “Exclusion Zone”
remained closed even until today. It is only opened in special cases such as for a very
small number elderly and voluntary repatriates (samosyoli) (Lochard 1996).
The concentric zoning was adjusted in 1988 based on the survey results of 137Cs
surface activity levels7 (Fig. 2.1). At the same time, the definition of “Contaminated
Area” (137Cs activity is above 37 kBq/m2),8 as well as an additional “Resettlement
3Effective dose is measured in Sieverts (Sv) defined as the total amount of energy from ionizing
radiation absorbed by the human body, measured in J/kg.
4Half-life of these released isotopes: 132Te 78 h, 133Xe 5 days, 131I 8 days. This means that half of
the initial amount of each isotope present will have decayed over this time. E.g. 131I 100% on day
1, 50% on day 8, 25% on day 16, 12.5% on day 24 and so on.
5137Cs has a half-life of 30 years, 90Sr 29 years, 239Pu 24 thousand years and 240Pu 6.5 thousand
years.
6137Cs is highly soluble inwater. Thus, its salts aremore easily integrated into parts of the food chain
and easily adsorbed in human soft tissues (particularly the cardiovascular system). Its biological
half-life is only 2 months; thus, it is rapidly excreted on intake. Unlike 137Cs, 90Sr has a biological
half-life of 20 years and absorbed into the bones. This prolonged exposure caused leukaemia
amongst clean-up workers in the evacuation zone (Balonov et al. 2010).
7Activity, given in becquerels (Bq) or curies (Ci), is a measure of the total number of nuclear decays
per second occurring in a certain quantity of radioactive substance. Activity byweight of radioactive
material can be expressed as Bq/g, and average surface activity level can be expressed as kBq/m2
or Ci/km2. 1 Ci = 3.7 × 1010 Bq.
8Staying in an area where 137Cs activity is 37 kBq/m2 is equivalent to receiving an effective dose
of 0.25 µSv per hour (the human body absorbs ~0.25 × 10–6 J energy per kg every hour from beta
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Zone” (137Cs activity above 555 kBq/m2) was established (UNSCEAR 2000; IAEA
2006). The latter was subject to further obligatory evacuation and resettlement. The
general position was that in the mainly rural areas where healthy foodstuffs could no
longer be produced in agriculture, it was futile to compel the local population to stay.
Decontamination efforts were suspended in those areas where the local population
and gamma-decay). This effective dose over one day is equivalent to one dental X-ray check (which
is ~5 µSv), or eating 2.5 bananas every hour (0.1 µSv) (Banana contains naturally occurring 40 K).
During a standard air flight, the average dose is 2–4 µSv/h, while during a flight by Concorde, it
was 9–10 µSv/h.
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Fig. 2.1 Affected areas by Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters (Author and cartography by
Karácsonyi, 137Cs contamination data by USCEAR 2000)
would receive a 70-year (“lifetime”) extra effective dose9 of at least 350 mSv (milli-
Sievert) (Malko 1998), and residents of these areas, 220 thousand people, were also
resettled to non-contaminated areas at the very beginning of the 1990s (UNSCEAR
2000; IAEA 2006). The 350 mSv concept became the subject of sharp criticism
(Malko 1998) given the impossibility of determining the dosage for each person
leading to questioning the calculations made for the resident population as a whole.
This inevitably caused mistrust among people.
Majority of subsequent resettlements happened in Belarus, until 1996, when these
measures were finalised there. This second wave was followed by a more moderate
one during the late 1990s only in Ukraine by the resettlement of additional 50 thou-
sand people until 2005 when the process was officially ended there as well (IAEA
2006).
There are no exact records available on the total number of people that moved in
the three affected countries, the numbers vary between 300 and 500 thousand which
9The average daily global background dose on the Earth’s surface is 100 µSv which means, people
who exposed 350 mSv extra dose throughout their lifetime, they exposed to at least ~10% higher
background radiation caused by Chernobyl.
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Table 2.2 Estimated number of people affected by post-Chernobyl resettlement/evacuation by
country and by time frame (Based on UNDP 2002a; UN 2002; IOM 1997; UNSCEAR 2000; IAEA
2006; Lehmann 2011)





































includes voluntary resettlement as well (326,000—IAEA 2006; 350,000—UNDP
2002a; IAEA-WHO-UNDP 2005; 492,000—UN 2002) (Table 2.2). Outside the
“ResettlementZone”, in areaswith 137Cs activity levels between185and555kBq/m2,
people were free to decide to stay or to leave. A legal act provided dwellings for those
displaced. In these areas, economic restrictions, such as in agriculture, were coupled
with increased health and food control.
It was reported that around 5–6 million people (IAEA-WHO-UNDP 2005;
Balonov et al. 2010) lived in “Contaminated Areas” as of 2005, and still 200 thou-
sand (IAEA 2006; Balonov et al. 2010) resided in the “Resettlement Zone”. We
estimate that by 2010, approximately 5 million people still lived in areas where radi-
ation exposure exceeded 0.25 µSv/h (137Cs activity over 37 kBq/m2) in 1986 (Table
2.1). As a result of the natural isotope decay and purification processes, the exposure
significantly decreased from 1986 which allowed the zoning to be readjusted (IOM
1997; UNDP 2002b). The only exception is the closer area surrounding the accident
site in the “Exclusion Zone”. It was polluted by 241Pu which has a relative short
half-life and decaying into 241Am, a much more radio-toxic isotope.10
10241Pu (a beta emitter) has a relatively short half-life (14 years), but its decay product 241Am
(an alpha and gamma emitter, half-life: 400 years) is much more radio-toxic. In contrast to other
isotopes, there will be a natural increase in 241Am activity over time. By 2058, the 241Am activity
will surpass the cumulative activity of all trans-uranium isotopes (UNDP 2002b) and reach its
maximum concentration a hundred years after the accident (IAEA 2006). Because of its longer
half-life, it will surpass the activity of 137Cs 300 years after the accident, significantly slowing the
natural purification within the “Exclusion Zone”.
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2.3.2 Fukushima—The Accident, Zoning, Regulation,
Consequences
On 11 March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake (moment magnitude of 9.0)
and subsequent huge tsunami hit the two nuclear power plants (Fukushima I and II
or Fukushima Daiichi and Daini) in Fukushima Prefecture. According to the offi-
cial government report (NAIIC 2012), all nuclear reactors stopped safely after the
earthquake. However, soon after the earthquake water from the tsunami wave, which
was higher than 14 m, flowed into the nuclear power plants over the seawall. At the
Fukushima I nuclear power plant, four out of six nuclear reactors lost their cooling
functions because all the emergency backup generators were destroyed or drained
by the huge tsunami. Three nuclear reactors then experienced a nuclear meltdown,
and hydrogen–air chemical explosions occurred outside the reactor vessel.
Due to the accident, a large amount of fission products, mainly 131I, 134Cs and
137Cs, were released into the ocean and the atmosphere. The total amount of radioac-
tivematerials releasedwas estimated to be 770,000TBq by theNuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency and 570,000 TBq by the Nuclear Safety Commission (TEPCO 2011).
Steinhauser et al. (2014) reported around 5,300,000 TBq in case of Chernobyl and
520,000 TBq in case of Fukushima. These numbers mean that the long-lasting effect
of Fukushima is significantly lower than Chernobyl; however, the threat during the
accident was almost on a similar scale. In particular, radioactive materials spreading
in a north-western direction from the nuclear power plant made a huge geographic
area highly contaminated. During the evening of 11th March, the Japanese govern-
ment declared a nuclear emergency.On the sameday, an evacuationorderwas initially
issued to the area within a 3 km radius of the power plant, but this was increased to a
30 km radius until 15th March. Group evacuations of residents were carried out by
municipality offices on the morning of 12thMarch. At the same time, many residents
who could drive cars evacuated individually.
After the nuclear accident, government organisations started to measure accu-
rate aerial radiation levels with aeroplanes, helicopters and cars. Also, radiation
levels weremonitored continuously by at least 1600monitoring posts installed across
Fukushima Prefecture. The geographical extent of the highly contaminated area in
Fukushima is limited compared to the Chernobyl case (Imanaka 2016; Steinhauser
et al. 2014). However, 137Cs is expected to remain for a long time (Fig. 2.1).
In April 2012, since the nuclear reactors were confirmed to be cooled down, the
evacuation areas were reorganised into three based on their annual radiation dose as
of March 2012: (1) areas where it is expected that the residents will have difficulty
returning for a long time (above 50 mSv/year), (2) areas in which the residents are
not permitted to live (20 mSv-50 mSv/year) and (3) areas for which the evacuation
order is ready to be lifted (below 20 mSv/year). The Japanese government accepted
the 20 mSv/year rule during rehabilitation period according to recommendations by
ICRP Publication 111 (ICRP 2009) in comparison with the 5 mSv/year (or 350 mSv
during 70 years) rule introduced after Chernobyl. Inside the evacuation areas, the
total population was 81,291 people over an area of 1150 km2. Among the population,
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24,814 people resided within the highest contaminated area (above 50 mSv/year),
whose size is 337 km2 (Team in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Disaster Victims,
Cabinet Office 2013). In 2015, the evacuation order was lifted for some parts of
the evacuation areas, but five municipalities remain completely within evacuation
areas and another three are partially included. In all the evacuation areas, previous
residents are not allowed to stay overnight without special permission. In the highest
contaminated area, all entrance roads to the area are blocked, and previous residents
are currently not permitted to enter.
In the area affected by Fukushima disaster, large-scale decontamination is now
underway (Ministry of Environment 2017). In fact, owing to natural degradation and
decontamination work since the disaster, some parts of the evacuation areas meet
the criteria for the order being lifted; the annual air dose has dropped to a level
below 20 mSv per year, infrastructure and basic amenities such as supermarkets,
hospitals and post offices can be reconstructed, and close consultation with munici-
palities achieved (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters 2015). In areas where
the evacuation order was lifted, previous residents are permitted to return. On the
other hand, in areas with the highest contamination levels, it was expected that resi-
dents would not be permitted to enter for a long time. The Japanese government,
however, revised their legislation in an attempt to encourage residents to return there
in five years or so by selecting prioritised sites for intensive decontamination and
reconstruction which is named “reconstruction base”.
2.4 Data and Methods
This research analysed and mapped population census data related to the Chernobyl
(1979–2010) and Fukushima (2005–2015) affected regions. Demographic trends
in the Chernobyl affected area at district (raion) level were derived from population
censuses extending three decades following the disaster. In conjunction with the final
two censuses under the Soviet Union (1979, 1989),11 the censuses from the successor
states were also used noting their time andmethodological deviation. These included
Belarus in 1999 and 2009, Ukraine in 2001 and Russia in 2002 and 2012. To further
Ukraine’s 2001 census data, the 2010 registered resident population number and
composition data were included because there was no further census held in Ukraine
after 2001 and until the publication of this chapter.
This investigation used a consolidated spatial system that included 846 units based
on district-level (rayon) data. This data was free of administrative boundary changes
that covered the entire territory of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as nine western
regions (oblasts) of Russia (Fig. 2.1). This wider territory included the evacuation
areas as well the evacuee receiving sites, where the post-Chernobyl evacuation and
resettlement could have a fundamental impact upon the demographic processes. For
an exact determination of the impact of the disaster, the share of 137Cs contaminated
11The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.
2 Long-Term Mass Displacements—The Main Demographic … 27
areawithin the area of each spatial units (districts)was taken into account andArcGIS
was utilised for calculations. The radiation level data was provided by UNSCEAR
(2000).
As evacuation is still underway in the Fukushima-affected area, understanding
displacement after the accident is a difficult task. Resident registration and ques-
tionnaire surveys of evacuees are important data sources. However, at the time of
writing this chapter, the former provides information on registered residents only.
Response rates to the latter are now around 50–60%, and the tabulated data published
is inadequate for demographic analysis. Recently, the results of the Japanese popu-
lation census 2015 were released. The census form, which asked about demographic
characteristics as well as locations of residence five years ago, provides information
on migration from highly contaminated areas. The geographic unit for this study is
the municipality level (Shi-Cho-Son).
As a shortcoming of the census data, the data can only capture night-time popula-
tions who have resided in their current place continuously for at least three months.
Although evacuation areas are lifted every year and temporal visitors increase after
that, we cannot understand such changes in the ambient population by utilising
census data. In Japan, as a new form of dataset, ambient population datasets based
on 70 million mobile phone users’ locations, named “mobile spatial statistics”, are
released at the 500 m grid cell level. The technical details of the dataset are explained
in Terada et al. (2013) and Oyabu et al. (2013). The ambient population datasets we
have shown the average of the hourly population in June 2015 and June 2016. Since
the ambient population before the accident is not available, the census population in
2010 at the same 500 m grid cell level was used in combination to understand the
geographical distributions of population change from 2010 to 2015.
2.5 Demographic Impacts on Regional Scale
2.5.1 Chernobyl Disaster—Shifts of Three Decades
The population of Polesye region, where Chernobyl disaster occurred, has been
decreasing since 1970 (Khomra 1989), first to a moderate extent, then at a higher
rate since 1986. The data series spanning three decades since the disaster reveals
that the consequences of the Chernobyl accident are reflected most characteristically
by the demographic trends of the 1990s even though evacuation measures can be
reached back to the 1980s (Fig. 2.2). This is partly because during the census in
1989, three years after the disaster, many people still stayed in the evacuation zone
and received permanent housing in the following years after that.
The annual population growth of Ukraine amounted barely to 200,000 in the
1980s. Such a wave of resettlement mobilising 100,000 in 1986–87 and additional
100,000 during the following ten years thoroughly reshaped the total population
pattern in largepart of the country. InBelarus, the population increased in the1980sby
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Fig. 2.2 Average annual population change by rayons (Author and cartography by Karácsonyi,
calculation based on 1979, 1989 Soviet, 2001 Ukrainian, 1999, 2009 Belarusian and 2002, 2010
Russian census populations as well as de jure population in Ukraine by 2010)
around 30,000 people each year, while in consequence of the Chernobyl disaster, 25–
30,000 people were resettled in 1986–87, followed by additional 100,000–130,000
during the 1990s in a country with a population of barely 10 million. The effect was
even more dramatic because the evacuation affected around 1–1.6% of the country’s
total population. The corresponding figurewas 0.4% inUkraine and 0.04% inRussia.
Even in 2010, Belarus had the highest share of population living in contaminated
areas (Tables 2.3and 2.4). No other country has experienced the impact of a nuclear
accident to the same degree. Given the large number of peoplewhowere resettled, the
recipient regions—in particular the major towns and their environs—saw a relatively
more favourable demographic trend in the 1990s.
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Table 2.3 People living in administrative units in 2010, where radiation dose was higher than 0.25
µSv/h during Chernobyl (in 1986) and Fukushima (in 2011) disasters
Country Population of affected administrative
units (2010)
Area of affected administrative units
(km2)
Belarus 2,388,700 (34.4%) 60,463 (46.3%)
Japana 1,875,210 (27%) 9,812 (7.5%)
Ukraine 1,407,811 (20.2%) 33,860 (25.9%)
Russia 1,281,781 (18.4%) 26,400 (20.2%)
Total 6,973,502 (100%) 130,535 (100%)
aBefore the disaster, they became affected one year later
Table 2.4 Share of population and area of administrative divisions in selected countries in 2010,




From total population of
the country (%)
From total area of the
country (%)
1 Belarus District 25.1 29.1
2 Ukraine District 3.1 5.6
3 Japana Municipality 1.5 2.6
4 Russia District 0.9 0.2
aBefore the disaster, they became affected one year later
When reviewing the entire affected area within the three countries, a general
dependence of the population change on the proportion of areas of radioactive
contamination was only apparent in the 1990s (Table 2.5). The internal popula-
tion change of entire Ukraine and Belarus was strongly under the influence of the
resettlement measures rather than by natural change or other types of internal migra-
tion between 1989 and 2001. In Russia, the depopulation of affected areas was less
significant. Because of dissolution of the Soviet Union, a large number of ethnic
Russian political refugees from other republics arrived and resettled into these areas
counterbalancing the out migration caused by the disaster (Veselkova et al. 1994).
From the 2000s, a significant correlation between population change and the
share of contaminated areas could not be found. Demographic “waves” of resettle-
ment calmed down by the 2000s, and even returning migration to the former places
could be detected. The population of several small towns that lay in the contami-
nated areas in Belarus but had been cleaned−up (Naroŭlia, Brahin and Chojniki)
began to grow once more (Table 2.6). In these towns that have undergone complex
rehabilitation, people receive significant state assistance as well as apartments built
with governmental funding. In such small towns, the presence of young families
with small children is striking. For this reason, in the contaminated areas, the popu-
lation is becoming urbanised more rapidly than elsewhere. These areas have become
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Ukraine Ovruch 19,121 17,031 16,792 −11 −1
Ivankiv 10,282 10,563 9,768 3 −8
Poliske 13,786 0 0 −100 0
Belarus Lelchitsi 8,600 9,700 8,900 13 −8
Hoyniki 17,100 15,000 13,100 −12 −13
Brahin 5,900 3,400 3,954 −42 16
Naroulya 11,000 7,200 8,400 −35 17
Vetka 11,000 7,700 8,200 −30 6
Elsk 9,600 10,400 9,600 8 −8
Chechersk 9,700 7,400 7,700 −24 4
Petrikova 11,800 11,200 10,200 −5 −9
Turova 15,300 17,100 16,700 12 −2
Russia Novozubkov 44,845 43,038 41,745 −4 −3
Starodub 18,906 18,643 18,445 −1 −1
aOutside the contaminated area
Belarus’s “most rapidly urbanising” regions (Table 2.5). The ratio of urban popula-
tion is on the increase in Ukraine as well, but it is also a result of its close location
to the Kyiv agglomeration.
Chernobyl did not change the direction of regional population dynamics. The
decline in population would be significant even without Chernobyl; however, it did
accelerate the process. The population density was low even before the disaster, and
the evacuations merely accentuated this state of affairs. Natural population repro-
duction data (crude birth and crude death ratio) around 2010 does not reflect any
correlation with higher radiation levels any more, suggesting the decline in the
birth rate was only temporary after the disaster and connected with the uncertainties
because of resettlement. The disaster did, however, fundamentally alter the urbani-
sation processes and the network of villages. Smaller villages in remote areas disap-
peared in significant numbers, whereas small towns and minor urban centres became
relatively more “stable”.
The negative demographic processes of the Polesye combined with the disaster-
caused outmigration and resettlement poked a huge hole in the demographic space of
the region, which is especially spectacular in the changing population density within
rural areas. Even the districts outside the evacuated zone became the most sparsely
populated areas of Belarus and Ukraine (Fig. 2.3).
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Fig. 2.3 Population density by rayons (Author and cartography by Karácsonyi, calculation based
on 1979 Soviet, 2009 Belarusian, 2010 Russian census populations as well as de jure population in
Ukraine by 2009)
2.5.2 Fukushima—Recent Demographic Processes
Regional population structure changed fundamentally after the construction of the
nuclear power plants in the coastal area of Fukushima Prefecture. According to a
case study conducted in Tomioka Town by Kajita (2014), residents consisted of three
groups: (1) people who lived in the area originally, before the construction of the
nuclear power plant, (2) “newcomers” who migrated there to work for construction
and electric industries and had already settled for a long term and (3) short-term
stayers who were sent by TEPCO and other related companies. Overall, the total
population increased in the 1970s when people migrated for work. However, during
the 1990–2000s, it gradually decreased again or levelled off. Along with such popu-
lation decline, the elderly ratio (people aged 65 years and over) went up to around
20–30% in 2010.
The nuclear accident had almost irreversible impacts on regional population struc-
ture. Aswe explained above, group evacuationwas organised bymunicipality offices,
and evacuees temporally stayed at city halls, schools and hotels in nearbymajor cities
such as Iwaki, Fukushima,Koriyama andNihonmatsu.An exception is Futaba,which
chose Saitama Prefecture, located around 200 kms away to the south. Understand-
ably, some people outside the evacuation areas escaped farther, stayed at their friends’
or relatives’ houses temporarily and after that found new houses by themselves.
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According to official statistics, the total number of evacuees including both ordered
and voluntary evacuations reached the maximum number (164,000 people) in May
2012 and 79,000 people remained evacuated as of February 2017 (Asahi 2017a).
In Japan, there are two types of temporal houses provided for evacuees by munic-
ipality: prefabricated houses specially constructed after the accident and existing
rented houses that municipalities leased. The maximum number of house units
providedwas 16,800 in 2013 for the former type and 25,554 in 2012 for the latter type
(Fukushima Prefecture 2017). Evacuees from the same municipality were arranged
to stay in the same prefabricated house complex to maintain the original commu-
nity and human network (Fig. 2.4). As the map suggests, most of them are located
in major cities where infrastructures are provided and daily necessities are easily
purchased. In contrast, the detail spatial distribution of households staying in rented
houses is not publicly reported, but it can be assumed to be more dispersed and close
to major cities based on the locations of housing supply before the accident.
The Japanese population census 2015 provides insights about where people were
displaced after the accident (Fig. 2.5). Table 2.7 provides the proportion of evacuees
who live outside or inside Fukushima Prefecture by five municipalities which lost
their population almost completely after the accident. For those who stay in the
prefecture, the proportions of current residences in four major cities are presented.
Analysing the proportions disaggregated by age group, we found that the younger
they are, the more they are likely to leave Fukushima Prefecture. Around 30–40%
of people aged below 40 years old choose to find new residence outside Fukushima
Prefecture, for example, Tokyo Metropolitan Area and Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture.
Young people can choose a new place which is distant from their home municipality
because they have less economic and social capital which keeps them staying in an
area closer to their previous residence (Isoda 2015).
As far as those who remain in Fukushima Prefecture are concerned, people are
likely to select the nearest major city. For example, in the case of Iitate Village, 60–
70%of residents among thosewho remain in FukushimaPrefecture chose Fukushima
city located 35 kms away. Around 40% of residents from Tomioka selected Iwaki.
These results partly reflect the fact that about 55,239 people still lived in tempo-
rary houses at the end of September 2015 (Fukushima Prefecture 2017), when the
Japanese population census was carried out. The figures in Table 2.7 partially include
people already resettled.According to questionnaire surveys conductedby theRecon-
struction Agency (2016) in 2015–2016, around 30–40% of affected families bought
a new house and settled in a new community. Furthermore, based on the number of
recipients of special provisions for housing acquisition, 85% of them seem to have
found a newly owned house in Fukushima Prefecture (Asahi 2016). The locations
of new houses are likely to be in major cities because land prices in places such as
Fukushima City, Iwaki City have increased or at least levelled off.
The sudden population increase caused by mass displacement unintentionally led
to several complaints among residents in receivingmunicipalities. For example, local
newspapers reported that traffic jams became more frequent, the queues in hospi-
tals were longer, and housing rent increased. It should also be noted that junior and
high school students evacuated from Fukushima-affected areas experienced bullying
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Fig. 2.4 Locations of temporary housing complexes in Fukushima Prefecture (Author Hanaoka,
cartography by Hanaoka and Karácsonyi, data from www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/sec/41065d/juutak
utaisaku001.html)
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Fig. 2.5 Total population change by municipalities (Author and cartography by Karácsonyi,
calculation based on 2010, 2015 Japanese census populations)
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concerning the nuclear accident at school. In this way, resettlement after the nuclear
accident, unfortunately, has been accompanied by various hardships in the new envi-
ronment for evacuees. Figure 2.6 shows those municipatities where evacuees were
Fig. 2.6 Changing population dynamics after 2011 (Difference between population change of
2005–2010 and 2010–2015) (Author and cartography by Karácsonyi, calculation based on 2005,
2010, 2015 Japanese census populations)
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hosted (red colour), changing the demographic trends between 2010 and 2015 in
these settlements.
In Fukushima, affected municipalities are planning several resettlement sites
outside evacuation areas, but they seem to be temporal, not permanent resettle-
ments. This is because firstly, some evacuees’ wish to return to their hometowns,
and secondly, permanent resettlement sites managed by the affected municipality in
the receiving municipality are practically difficult under the current Japanese local
government system. There are several issues to solve, such as whether dual resident
registration can be admitted or not and how to share taxes and public services among
municipalities (Tsunoda 2015). Therefore, in principle, affected municipalities are
making every effort to enable residents to return to their homes through decontami-
nation. The evacuation order has already been lifted for some evacuation areas, and
radiation levels dropped as a result of the natural degradation and decontamination.
In the spring of 2017, the evacuation order excepting the highest contaminated area
was lifted for the majority of evacuation areas in Iitate Village, Kawamata Town,
Namie Town and Tomioka Town. Approximately, 32,000 people lived there before
the accident (Asahi 2017b). The total evacuation areas being lifted until April 2017
was 70% of the initial evacuation areas issued immediately after the accident. Yet,
many people decided not to return. They not only worried about the radiation level,
but basic amenities (e.g. shops, hospitals) and employment opportunities are limited.
For example, inNaraha Town, the evacuation orderwas lifted for all evacuation areas,
which covered 80% of the municipality. According to official town records (Naraha
Town 2016), only 781 people, which is equivalent to 10.6% of the total popula-
tion before the accident, have returned. Among them, the proportion of people aged
65 years and over reached 53% (the elderly ratio in 2010 was 24%).
Young people resettled outside Fukushima Prefecture, whilemany of themigrants
who returned are elderly people. This trend accompanies geographical separations
of generations in rural areas where young families and their parents traditionally
lived together. In addition, since the 1970s, nuclear industries had attracted many
migrants from the outside. Many of the first generations reached or are reaching the
age of retirement (65 years old). Thus, it is a difficult question whether such people
who migrated from the outside previously and settled for a long time will choose
to return again. Pre-disaster population structure characterised by a mixture of rural
and industrialised areas makes the estimation of future demographic trends difficult
in Fukushima-affected areas.
Using spatial mobile statistics, we mapped the average of hourly population per
500 m grid cell in June 2016 and compared it to 2010 population census data to
analyse the changes (Fig. 2.7).Comparing the twomaps,we found that the geographic
distribution of grid cells with high population density almost remained the same
outside the evacuation areas between two time periods,while inside, they disappeared
almost completely. In particular, there is no peak in population density distribution
in the town centre proximity to railway stations, implying that densely populated
residential areas no longer exist after the accident. However, there are several grid
cells with somewhat higher population density in areas close to the nuclear power
plant in Okuma Town and Tomioka Town. This population distribution does not well
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Fig. 2.7 Population distributions in census and mobile phone data (Author Hanaoka cartography
by Hanaoka and Karácsonyi)
overlap with the census one, suggesting that most of the people are temporal visitors
such as engineering and technical workers at nuclear power plants.
Eighty percent of the area of Naraha Town, located within the 20 km radius from
the nuclear power plant, was previously included in the evacuation areas. As we
discussed above, the evacuation order was lifted for these areas in September 2015,
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and the total number of grid cells with population density above 100 people also
increased from 32 grid cells in June 2015 to 41 grid cells in June 2016, among 472
grid cells across Naraha Town. This result may suggest that people already returned
in these areas or people can enter them more frequently than before, perhaps in
preparation for returning. The Japanese population census is conducted every five
years, and it is not able to capture such temporal dynamics of population changes.
Using mobile spatial statistics will help to continuously monitor and explore the
reconstruction progress after the evacuation areas are lifted.
2.6 Discussion and Recommendations
The mass displacement after a nuclear disaster, rather than the radiation itself has
a much more significant impact on deteriorating health, natural reproduction and
economic performance of the affected population. Based on the literature and the
results of this study, these consequences can be summarised as follows:
(1) In both Fukushima and Chernobyl cases, the regional impact of the accident
resulted in a dramatic loss of population in the contaminated areas and acceler-
ated the concentration of populations in adjacent major cities through evacua-
tion. Evacuated communities were traumatised and destroyed, facing challenges
that result from not having any spatial or social attachment in the recipient areas
(see also Chap. 11). The receiving communities faced population growth and a
radically changed composition by the arriving evacuees, whose integration often
ended up in social segregation and marginalisation.
(2) A strong spatial shift towards urbanisation can also be observed because urban
centres provide a better chance for socio-economic recovery and re-integration
(job opportunities, more extensive social network) for the evacuees, even for
former rural residents (Voloshin et al. 1996; IOM 1997). Carson et al. (Chap. 5)
emphasise that other types of disasters can also increase urbanisation because
urban areas providing peoplemore opportunities to copewith the consequences.
(3) Largemigration shifts are significant during thefirst 5–10years after the disaster,
when a large number of evacuated population are on the move, often staying
temporarily at one location and going through multiple migration steps until
settling down. The population trends can take a totally different direction for this
decade in certain areas. This challenges the local housing market, service sector
and government policy. Later, these shifts are less and less significant. Some of
the people remain, but the majority of the people (mostly young families) start
a new life mostly in urban areas out of the affected region.
(4) After a decade, however, positivemigration balance has been observed in certain
areas of the affected region, mainly resulting from clean-up workers, scientists
or even tourists and settlers along with the returning elderly. High variation in
short-term population numbers can be registered in the regions with extremely
low population density caused by the disaster.
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Population immigration trends are influenced by employment opportunities.
Sectors vulnerable to radiation such as agriculture, fishing, food industry are
in decline (IOM 1997; UNDP 2002b), while others requiring a lesser sized
or a rotating labour force, such as forestry or nuclear waste storage facilities
are maintained. New jobs in health care, engineering, science and construction
are also represented.
(5) The returning migration or remaining in place is more common in the case of
elderly people. Firstly because they have a higher attachment to the place and
because of their age, they are less flexible to start a new life somewhere else.
Their expected lifelong exposure is also much lower than for the adolescent
population. Therefore, they are more likely to accept the risks associated with
living in these polluted areas. In-migration to contaminated areas can also be
observed in Belarus recently. However, this results from government policy to
attract new settlers, rather than the return of the elderly population.
Unlike the Chernobyl case, in Fukushima, permanent resettlement sites outside
the affected area were not organised, and instead, extensive decontamination work
and higher accepted radiation thresholds make evacuees legally able to return their
original homeswithin six years or so after the nuclear accident. Thiswas also possible
because of lower level of Cs137 contamination and lack of high risk trans-uranium
elements. Not tomention that according to some experts (seeHjelmgaard 2016), after
the 131I and 137Cs phases (IOM 1997), a third phase related to 241Pu–241Am decay
has begun in Chernobyl with health consequences yet to be realised and understood.
Given the differences in radio-ecological conditions, reconstruction policy and the
time framework, Fukushima may demonstrate demographic consequences that are
different from the Chernobyl case. In contrast, the return rate is very low which
causes a large drop in population density similarly to Chernobyl.
According toWorld Nuclear Association (2018), nuclear accidents have a low and
decreasing probability. Even though previously unforeseen circumstances always
could cause accidents in the nuclear industry (Labaudiniere 2012), bring forth the
need for evacuation or even permanent displacement of large populations. There are
certain points that should be consideredwhen developing resettlement and redevelop-
ment policy for possible future disaster-stricken regions based on the consequences
of past displacements. Most of the following points were not considered in post-
Chernobyl but were followed in post-Fukushima mass displacement showing a clear
policy improvement and better situation-adapted decision-making.
(1) A well-planned short-term evacuation is necessary during the rapid-onset phase
(“131I phase”) of the disaster when a high number of temporary or permanent
housing, as well as financial and social aid, is needed to cope with the conse-
quences. This is the most significant challenge within 1–2 years following the
disaster. Chernobyl, and to some extent Fukushima, evacuation measures failed
during this phase.
(2) A clear distinction between temporary and permanent displacement as well
as planning and straightforward communication of community futures accord-
ingly is strongly required during the slow-onset phase (“137Cs-phase” from 2
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to 50 years onwards following the disaster). The permanent mass displacement
should be seen only as the ultimate solution to cope with the consequences of
a nuclear disaster. It can cause much larger and longer demography shifts than
the distortion caused by a low-level radiation exposure resulting in health prob-
lems. People should be provided with reliable information about the threat and
assistance if they decide to move. On the other hand, people should be allowed
to take the risk if they decide to do so, but compensation is necessary.
(3) The intent to move, stay or return is strongly age-specific, and the return migra-
tion should be supported accordingly. Infrastructure redevelopment should be
planned in accordance with the demographic shift towards aging populations
such as more senior homes, hospitals rather than nursery. Low return rates,
falling population density and shifting settlement system towards population
concentration and urbanisation are also common consequences. Thus, infras-
tructure regeneration, reconstruction (roads, railway links) should target these
areas.
In summary, the most significant lesson from this study is that a poorly planned
mass displacement can cause a larger economic loss than the disaster itself. There
were clear differences between the management of Chernobyl and Fukushima disas-
ters in this regard. The post-Chernobyl policies that drove population displace-
ment lacked previous experiences on effect of radiation on human health in large
populations. The administrative rigidity of the zoning and lack of financial sources
for infrastructure-reconstruction and redevelopment (see also Chap. 11) acceler-
ated further the total population and economic loss in Chernobyl. The knowledge
and experience derived from the Chernobyl case helped the decision-making in
Fukushima. Townshipswere opened up for returners in recent years in the Fukushima
disaster area is possible because of the lower level of radiation and lack of emitted
trans-uranium isotopes. The long-lasting existence of Chernobyl zone contributed
significantly to the false view to explain all demographic consequences by the invis-
ible radiation threat presented in and around the “death zone”. This delivered a
negative image of the entire area,making regional redevelopment evenmore difficult.
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Bay Fires
Ethan Sharygin
Abstract This chapter examines a cluster of wildfire conflagrations that hit northern
California during October 2017, which resulted in significant loss of housing units
(6874 residential structures destroyed or damaged). To assess the magnitude of the
migration response and network of destinations, a method to estimate migration
drawing from a proxy universe of householdswith students enrolled in public schools
was proposed, using data on school exits and re-enrollments from a longitudinal
student database. The analysis finds that a small minority of households affected by
the firesmoved out of the area.Out of nearly 7800 persons displaced by the central fire
complex in one city, this study estimated fewer than 1000 changed neighborhoods;
of those, fewer than 500moved out of Sonoma County. These findings are applicable
to other wildfires and localized disasters where a substantial portion of housing is
lost but public infrastructure in the region remains intact.
Keywords Wildland-urban interface · Wildfire · Natural hazards · Migration ·
Administrative data
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines a cluster of wildfire conflagrations that hit northern Cali-
fornia during October 2017, which resulted in significant loss of housing units (6874
residential structures destroyed or damaged). The magnitude of migration response
was unknown, as was the timing and the network of possible destinations. This
chapter provides a standard theoretical framework for understanding fire disasters:
their frequency and locationsmost at risk. It also presents an overview of the ‘October
2017 Fire Siege’ and the conditions which precipitated the fire followed by a discus-
sion into possible approaches to estimating population impacts.Amethod is proposed
to estimate migration drawing from a proxy universe of households with students
enrolled in public schools using data on school exits and re-enrollments from a
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longitudinal student database. The analysis finds that a small minority of households
affected by the fires moved out of the area. Out of nearly 7800 persons displaced by
the central fire complex in one city, this study estimated that fewer than 1000 people
changed neighborhoods; of those, fewer than 500 moved out of Sonoma County.
These methods and findings are applicable to policies and policy research regarding
future wildfires and localized disasters where a substantial portion of housing is lost
but public infrastructure in the region remains intact.
Section 3.1 of this chapter discusses the growth of wildfire risk in California over
the last and next century. Section 3.2 provides background on the Central Sonoma-
Lake-Napa Unit (LNU) Complex fires, in particular the largest, the Tubbs fire in
Sonoma County. Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the size of the displaced population is esti-
mated, and previous research on estimating migration discussed. The ‘school enroll-
ment proxy method,’ a new method of estimating migration, is described along with
the results. The closing section outlines limitations of this approach and identifies
directions for future research.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Wildfire Hazard in California
Disasters are a major part of the Californian experience. Throughout American
expansion into California, earthquakes, floods, fire, and other catastrophes have
played an important role in defining life in the state. A tragic standard was set by
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and ensuing fire that followed, which destroyed
28,000 buildings, displaced at least 200,000 residents, and killed between 500 and
3000 people. Flooding in Los Angeles in 1938 destroyed 5600 buildings and caused
over 100 deaths. Earthquakes at Loma Prieta in 1989 and Northridge in 1994 injured
thousands and caused billions of dollars of damage. Wildfires in Berkeley during
1923 and then Oakland in 1991 destroyed thousands of residences and emphasized
wildfire as a constant threat in urban and suburban parts of the state.
Disasters can be broadly classified into two types of looming threats. Gradual-
onset disasters include droughts, sea level rising, global warming, while sudden-
onset disasters would include fires, floods, and earthquakes. Sudden-onset threats
are especially important for applied demographers to anticipate and prioritize due
to their disruptive and chaotic aftermath and the essential role that demographic
data can play in the government response. Sudden-onset disasters have immediate
consequences, including mass mobilizations of people and resources.
This paper presents a case study from a series of wildfires in late 2017 that
displacedmore than 10,000 people in Sonoma County in the State of California. This
event presented an exceptional challenge to account for the population of each county
and city as of January 1, 2018 and to estimate the size of the affected population and
the relocation patterns of people displaced by the fires.
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While migration responses to wildfire are the focus of the present research, a
broader agenda on disaster demography should consider sequelae of disasters and
differential vulnerability (see Chaps. 4, 6 and 10). In the example of wildfires, smoke
plumes may have a significant public health impact. Equity concerns are also impor-
tant. Climate change is expanding the geography of risk and changing the demo-
graphic profile of the affected populations (see also Chap. 8). No longer limited
to remote areas or vacation homes, vulnerability to wildfire in particular, may be
reversing from a progressive to a regressive hazard (Davies et al. 2018; Baylis and
Boomhower 2018).
Even though California is one-third forested, many of these forests are in poor
health due to a combination of factors that including climate change and inadequate,
misguided, or uncoordinated forest management policy. Abatzogulou and Williams
(2016) found that climate change was responsible for half of the increase in aridity
in Western US forests between 1966 and 2016 and that without climate change the
cumulative area burned by fires would be just half of what has occurred between
1984 and 2016. Climate change is expected to continue to increase the frequency
and intensity of fires (Keyser and Westerling 2017; Moghaddas et al. 2018).
More than 40% of California housing stock is in areas at heightened risk of fire
damage, where housing abuts forest, referred to as the wildland–urban interface
(WUI; Hammer et al. 2007). The hills, forests, and peripheries of cities and towns
are desirable areas, both for builders and potential residents attracted to their natural
amenities. Housing growth in WUI areas in California grew by approximately 20%
each decade during 1990–2010, compared to 10% each decade for non-WUI areas
even though the WUI accounts for just 10% of land area (Radeloff et al. 2018). This
has contributed to more problematic forests due to fire suppression efforts and also
exposed an increasing number of residents to increased fire risks.
3.2.2 Conditions of the 2017 Fire Season and the LNU
Complex Fires
The year 2017 marked a record fire season in California, with 436 significant fires
that burned more than 630,000 ha (CDFFP 2019). Yet, the records set during the
fire season of 2017 have already been surpassed. Fires during 2018, notably the Carr
fire near the city of Redding and the Camp fire which razed the city of Paradise,
were the deadliest (93 confirmed fatalities) and most destructive (650,000 ha) in the
state’s history. This increase has necessitated the development of a robust toolset for
estimating demographic impacts of disasters.
The LNU Complex fires comprised of the Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, and several other
fires deserves special mention. These three conflagrations occurred during October
2017 and in close to each other in the WUI. Nauslar et al. (2018) state that these fires
‘pushed the bounds of conventional fire wisdom with the extreme rates of spread,
size, and timing.’ They affected four counties, but Sonoma County bore the brunt
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of the population and housing impacts. They affected four counties, but Sonoma
County bore the brunt of the population and housing impacts.
Sonoma County is located north of San Francisco, along the California coast of
the Pacific Ocean. The county has a great deal of climatic variation, according to
elevation and proximity to the ocean. Parts of the county close to the ocean remain
cool and moist year-round and can be foggy most days from late afternoon until
morning. Inland areas have a more typically Mediterranean climate, with hot, dry
summers and cool, wet winters. The Northern Coastal Range of mountains runs on
either side of the Sonoma Valley. Its abundance of variable microclimates lends itself
well to viticulture, with California’s first wineries established in the area in the 1850s.
Santa Rosa is the largest city in Sonoma County and was home to 178,000 of the
county’s 504,000 residents in 2017 (CDOF 2018).
The region had suffered the effects of severe drought since 2011—possibly the
worst drought in more than 1000 years (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014). These condi-
tions contributed to a record high total of 129 million dead trees in the state as of
late 2017 (USFS 2018; Guerin 2017; Buluç 2017). In total, the state’s tree mortality
survey counted 147 million tree deaths during 2010–2018. A normal average would
be 1 million tree deaths each year. However, 62 million deaths were recorded in 2016
at the peak of the drought.
As of October 2016, 83% of the state was in drought, and 21% of the state was in
‘exceptional’ drought status, the most severe category. The first months of 2017 saw
high rainfall, which mitigated drought conditions. Most of the precipitation of the
2016–17 season fell during January and February, marking the state’s wettest winter
and the second-wettest year since records began in 1895 (Di Liberto 2017). The rain
fell so fast that it caused flooding throughout the state and damaged the nation’s tallest
dam, Oroville Dam. The state’s drought declaration had been in place since 2014 and
was lifted in April 2017. The immense volume of rain was a welcome reprieve to
depleted reservoirs but also promoted the growth of shrubs and grasses that typically
wither during the hot, dry summer and become fuel for more intense fires (Dudney
et al. 2017). Recent research found that the connection between wet weather and
fire activity in California has broken down completely during the second half of
the twentieth century, as the effect of growth and fuel buildup during rainier seasons
created greater fire hazardswithin the context of increased annual temperatures (Wahl
et al. 2019).
The state’s seasonal wind patterns are another factor in making California espe-
cially susceptible to fires late in the year. Late summer winds, known regionally as
the Santa Ana or Diablo winds, can occasionally bring fast hot winds that exacerbate
fires. These winds may grow more intense as a result of climate change, although
the effect is debated (Jin et al. 2015; Mass and Ovens 2019). These late summer or
fall winds were a factor in all of the state’s most destructive WUI fires and have long
been recognized as ‘a wind of bad augury […] at this season of the year’ (Russell
and Boyd 1923).
It was during one such windy evening on October 8, 2017 that a small fire ignited
near the town of Calistoga, a city of approximately 5000 in Napa County. The
state had effected a ‘red flag warning’ which alerts the public to heightened fire
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hazard conditions. Warm air at 32 °C combined with strong winds with peak gusts
of 175 km/h. Weather stations in the hills around Santa Rosa recorded windspeed
exceeding the ninety-ninth percentile as well as relative humidity below the second
percentile (Nauslar et al. 2018). At the 9:44 pm local time, a resident of Calis-
toga reported a fire in the vicinity of Tubbs Road. Within six hours of the report,
numerous fires in the region had grown intomajor conflagrations, collectively termed
the LNU Complex (Fig. 3.1). The Tubbs fire, while not the largest of these, was the
most destructive. It moved out of the WUI into urban Santa Rosa and surrounding
communities.
Embers carried by strong winds ignited cascading spot fires that complicated
rescue efforts by making it impossible to track the extent of the fire during the
period of its most rapid expansion overnight. The fire spread uncontrolled during
the night and reached the city limits of Santa Rosa by 1 am on October 9. Although
Fig. 3.1 Central LNU Complex fires in Sonoma County (Author: Sharygin, cartography by
Karácsonyi)
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it was not fully contained until October 31, the urban destruction caused by the
fire peaked within 24 h before winds died down. The Tubbs fire eventually burned
almost 15,000 ha and destroyed 5636 structures, of which 4651 were residential.
Collectively, the LNU Complex fires consumed more than 5000 housing units in
Sonoma, Napa, and Solano counties (Hawks et al. 2017).
The following analysis focuses on impacts in Sonoma County, where the Tubbs
fire displaced the greatest number of residents. The city of Santa Rosa lost 3081
housing units, representing approximately 5% of the city’s housing stock (CDOF
2018). The city was already facing a housing shortage before the fire: with an
overall vacancy rate of just 4.2% in 2017 (1.6% vacancy for rental units), and with
6.5% of housing units defined as ‘overcrowded’ (more than one resident per room).1
Table 3.1 provides additional characteristics of Sonoma County, the city of Santa
Rosa, and the fire-devastated areas.
The census block groups affected by the Tubbs fire had fewer renters as a share of
households and higher average income. Households in the fire zone were also more
likely to have at least one person in the household over the age of sixty-four, but the
difference in the share of households with children was not found to be statistically
significant.
3.3 Estimating Population Impacts From Housing Data
3.3.1 Role of Housing in Population Estimates
This section will investigate ways in which the statistics of destruction presented in
the previous section could be translated to population andmigration data necessary to
plan a recovery effort. The State of California Demographic Research Unit produces
1U.S. Census Bureau; ACS 2017 5-year SF, table DP04. Retrieved 1 April 2019 from https://factfi
nder.census.gov.
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population estimates for July and January of each year. The methods of accounting
for population change include housing data that enters into the calculation in several
ways. Annual estimates for January 1 are produced via complimentary top-down and
bottom-up estimation steps. The headline state population is estimated using a cohort
component method (Swanson and Tayman 2012), in which the total population is
determined by the last known population2 accounting for births, deaths, and migra-
tion. Net migration is composited from different datasets for different age groups
that include school enrollment; tax returns, driver’s licenses, and immigration data;
and pension and health insurance data.
County population estimates are produced by ensemble averaging (Clemen 1989).
The first piece of the ensemble is a composite method in which different methods
are used to estimate the size of the population of different age groups (Bogue and
Duncan 1959). For example, births and school enrollment inform estimates of the
size of the child population; driver’s licenses, deaths, and tax information for the
adult population, and administrative records including pension and health insurance
data are the primary source of information about change in the population age 65
and older. The second piece is a ‘ratio correlation’ regression-based method, which
predicts the county’s total population as a function of covariates such as the county
birthrate, housing stock, and labor force (Schmitt and Crosetti 1954). The third
piece of the ensemble is a cohort component model, in which births, deaths, and
net migrants from federal administrative data are included as measured by the U.S.
CensusBureau. These threemodels are combined into themodel (as equallyweighted
averages, although the weights could be specified differently) to produce a single
county estimate, which is translated into a county share of the total state population
and applied to the state total number estimated above.3
The populations of each of California’s 539 city and county jurisdictions that
include 482 cities, unincorporated parts of 57 counties, as well as the city and county
of San Francisco, were estimated using a housing unit method (Swanson and Tayman
2012), which relates the total population to the number of housing units, the persons
per household, and the vacancy rate. An advantage of the housing unit method is
that, as an accounting identity, the only source of error is in the estimation of the
2Generally, this would be the last decennial Census, post adjustments.
3A small set of 14 counties with population below 65,000 is incremented (births) or decremented
(deaths) from the last decennial census only, without an attempt to estimate net migration.
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parameters. However, the parameters can be extremely challenging to monitor and
update due to data constraints, especially for small areas. Change in the population
that live in group quarters4 can be accounted for exclusively from administrative
data.
The housing unit method and the ratio correlation method both rely on housing
stock to adjust population counts. In the case of the housing unit method, the effect
of loss in housing stock could be offset by updated vacancy and density constants.
However, in the wake of a sudden-onset disaster, there may be no data with which to
update the persons per household or vacancy rates, even if the data on housing unit
change are rapidly updated and very high quality. The ratio correlationmethod can be
even more vulnerable, depending on whether housing is part of the equation. A large
shock in the form of housing stock loss would mechanically produce a significant
drop in the population of Santa Rosa and Sonoma County. Qualitative accounts from
reportage on the fire suggested that many displaced people stayed in proximity to
the fire area, anticipating a return to their land after cleanup and reconstruction. The
higher income and homeownership rates in the area are consistent with this notion.
3.3.2 Estimating the Number of Displaced Persons
To estimate the size of the displaced population in Sonoma County, we tested two
approaches. In the immediate aftermath, without data on the precise location or
addresses of destroyed housing, we interacted the total number of destroyed housing
units inside the county boundaries with the persons per household most recently
estimated for the city, weighted by the occupied share of housing.
In late October 2017, the state fire agency published a report on damage from
the Tubbs Fire (Hawks et al. 2017), in which fire affected addresses and land parcel
numbers were published along with assessments of the extent of the damage to
the building and the building type (residential, commercial, or outbuilding). From
this list, we generated a distribution of damaged and destroyed residential struc-
tures by census block group, which was used to weight block group level household
size estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS), an annual household
survey.5 Results for estimated population displacement using these two methods are
presented below in Table 3.2. Despite the more careful use of block group specific
housing tenure and vacancy rate data, the two alternatives are within 1% of each
other; for this study, we adopted the simpler calculation that resulted in the count of
11,521.
4Group quarters include residential care facilities, hospitals, school dormitories, military barracks,
prisons and jails, and other shared living arrangements.
5Geocoding of fire addresses was performed using the Census Bureau geocoding service, with
manual geocoding of 296 records that returned no matches.
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Table 3.2 Estimates of the population displaced by the Tubbs fire: Sonoma County, October 2017,





Vacancy rate Persons per
household
Displaced persons
A B C A * (1 − B) * C
Sonoma County 1,569 0.083 2.59 3,726

















Freq. Percent Owned Rented
A B C D E D * C * (1 −
B) + E * C
* B
152100.1 131 2.8 0.39 395 1.74 1.70 226
152400.1 169 3.6 0.11 947 2.50 1.36 402
152400.3 397 8.5 0.47 942 1.80 1.30 538
152400.4 642 13.8 0.15 980 2.90 2.54 1,828
152400.5 503 10.8 0.00 630 2.89 0.00 1,454
152502.1 2 0.0 0.35 614 2.65 3.62 6
152600.1 500 10.8 0.13 570 2.24 4.20 1,180
152600.5 169 3.6 0.16 526 2.12 1.41 241
152701.1 276 5.9 0.18 461 2.53 3.49 649
152701.3 35 0.8 0.19 387 2.50 1.83 83
152702.2 98 2.1 0.67 481 2.16 2.78 252
152702.3 315 6.8 0.06 368 2.16 2.13 665
152702.5 8 0.2 0.31 216 2.84 2.36 22
152801.1 219 4.7 0.58 531 2.55 2.49 551
152801.2 401 8.6 0.19 412 2.78 3.97 1,206
152801.3 275 5.9 0.35 403 2.13 4.15 740
152801.4 166 3.6 0.18 250 2.60 4.72 496
152801.5 207 4.5 0.22 296 2.67 2.38 540
152905.1 92 2.0 0.44 482 2.21 2.43 212
152906.1 1 0.0 0.40 1,326 2.80 2.95 3
153807.2 21 0.5 0.09 1,016 2.93 2.50 57
154100.4 23 0.5 0.49 357 2.57 4.19 63
Total 4,650 100.0 11,414
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3.3.3 Estimating Migration
Having prepared an estimate of the population displaced by the loss of their home,
we then needed to devise a system that could accurately model where people moved.
In doing so, we analyzed how many remained in the same city, moved elsewhere
in the county or state, or left the state altogether. We considered the literature from
other efforts to assess disasters, as well as the methods used by other U.S. states.
An inspiring account came from the state of Florida in the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Andrew in 1992, where a publicly funded telephone and field survey provided
updated information on vacancy rates, persons per household, and population in
transitory locations such as hotels and motels. This survey data provided rapid and
accurate new inputs to the classical housing unit method (Smith 1996). However,
costs and logistical challenges mean that this approach has not gained traction. Also,
there are reasons why it might not succeed in all contexts. For instance, the accuracy
of the approach depends on how many likely destinations of displaced people are
captured. In the case of Hurricane Andrew, or indeed the Tubbs fire, this approach
showed great promise because the housing losses were substantial but small relative
to the regional housing capacity. In other cases where these conditions do not hold, a
survey may not be practical or effective. A new data collection effort may not always
be feasible, but there are many other private and public data sources were considered
as shown in Table 3.3.
The US Census Bureau has worked with the US Federal EmergencyManagement
Agency (FEMA) to collect data on persons registered with the agency to receive
disaster assistance. In the case of wildfire, the extent of federal operations is deter-
mined by whether the federal government declares a ‘major disaster,’ ‘emergency,’
or a ‘Fire Management Assistance Declaration.’ The 2018 Camp Fire was declared
a major disaster; however, the 2017 LNU Complex fires were only given the latter
designation, limiting the extent of federal assistance and the accuracy of federal
data. Residents affected by the LNU Complex fires had limited time to register with
FEMA for grants or loans that support uninsured or underinsured residents. In addi-
tion, many homeowners may have opted to rely on private insurance. In Sonoma
County, FEMA approved just 3200 registrations, and ultimately, only 119 house-
holds received temporary housing relocation assistance, leaving major gaps in the
coverage of FEMA data for this disaster (Morris 2017; Schmitt 2019).
The US Postal Service provides change of address (COA) data with names and
addresses of individuals, families, and businesses who have filed a change of address
for mail delivery through a service called NCOALink. Postal service address data are
the backbone of the US Census Bureau’s Master Address File, a putative master list
of all living quarters in the USA. The NCOALink product is the most comprehensive
source of household moves, but it is not a panacea, due to several limitations. The
data are licensed for the purpose of updating mailing lists, and for privacy reasons
cannot be queried without an extant mailing list which includes a name and address.
From cadastral datasets, we generated a database of names and addresses associated
with properties in the burn area, but the names of those with legal title to affected land
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Table 3.3 Sources of data on migration
Data source Coverage Notes




2 USPS NCOALink Registered changes of
address
Requires names and
addresses; no data for
temporary moves
3 ID, drivers license, or vehicle
registrations





data difficult to access
4 Public health
insurance/pension data
Beneficiaries Varying coverage and
rapidity of updates according
to each program. Potentially
longitudinal, but confidential
data difficult to access
5 Traffic measurements Drivers Difficulty of parsing traffic
data and relating to total
population
6 Social media (Twitter,
Facebook)
Users Without adjustment, limited
representativeness of
selected population;
difficulty of parsing data
7 Wastewater Households using municipal
sewer system





8 Solid waste Households using municipal
solid waste collection







9 Historical migration patterns
(census/survey)
All persons Geographic scale may be
limited; historical data may
not be representative of
disaster migration patterns
10 Mobile phone movement Mobile phone users Rapid updates, but
expensive, proprietary data
source
11 Remote sensing All structures Potentially high cost of
imagery and other sensor





Data source Coverage Notes
12 Utilities (e.g. electric/gas) Utility customers Missing population living in
transitional locations;
difficulty of accessing and
parsing/interpreting data.
Limited longitudinal data
13 HUD Point-in-Time Count Homeless Conducted yearly or
biennially
14 Voter registration rolls Registered voters Delayed registration of
moves. Potentially
longitudinal, but confidential
data difficult to access.
Representativeness issues
15 Credit Bureau Headers Persons with credit files Expensive, proprietary data;
licensing issues
16 Tax data State or federal taxpayers Delayed registration of
moves and publication of
data. Generally not available
at small geographies
17 Public education enrollment Public school students Longitudinal, but potentially
limited representativeness;
confidential data
parcels will not give complete coverage. For example, cadastral datasets will include
apartment and rental housing addresses and landlords’ names, but not the names of
individual tenants. In addition, historical metadata are not attached tomoves. In other
words, a search of COA within the past 18 months would return the most recent
address only, not a sequence of moves if more than one move occurred. Another
limitation is that temporary COA, for example, a hold mail or temporary change
of address order may be filed with the postal service for up to one year, but these
temporary orders are not searchable via NCOALink. People change residence for
many reasons, and a blanket query of addresses in a disaster perimeter will overstate
out-migration (as well as missing possible moves into undamaged housing in the
area). For these reasons, NCOALink would be valuable only when a specific list of
destroyed addresses and associated names are available.
Government programs such as public pensions, medical insurance, cash or in-
kind transfer programs, and other entitlements may be a source of migration data.
Their coverage will vary according to the socioeconomic characteristics of the area
affected by the disaster, and the ability or willingness of the agencies involved to
share data with the appropriate geographic specificity. These data were not available
for this study, but in the future, they should be explored further. Agencies that collect
such data ought to give thought to ways in which they could be made available
for demographic studies without violating laws regarding privacy and disclosure of
sensitive information. There are a variety of administrative data sources that may be
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useful resources, but they share the drawback that the populations that participants
in these programs may be few and highly selected relative to the total population.
Still, some of these programs may enable estimation of population migration more
rapidly than other sources, and it may be possible to statistically control for some
aspects of population selectivity.
We pursued leads from the available data sources, and research into the use of
new data is an area of continuing activity. For the LNU Complex fires, we eventu-
ally gravitated toward the use of public education enrollment data. We considered
that public education is more representative than other government programs of the
general population, while still capturing data in a timely manner as relocated fami-
lies re-enroll their children in school. California, like many other US states, received
federal grant funding to produce a student longitudinal data system (SLDS). In Cali-
fornia, the SLDS program is called CalPADS and assigns individual identifiers to
each student. The program records all enrollment activity such as transfers to other
public schools or transfers out of the public school system (to private schools or out
of state). Bias still exists: the behavior of families with children enrolled in Santa
Rosa schools may not be representative of the decisions made by people in other
living arrangements (living alone or with others in households without children, or
in group quarters). On balance, these data offered a superior balance of timeliness,
completeness, and representativeness compared to the alternatives.
3.4 Student Enrollment Proxy Method For Estimating
Migration
Previously, in Sect. 3.2, the displaced population (N) was estimated at 11,521. To
model new locations for this population, we focused this study on developing a
methodology to use longitudinal student enrollment data in order to calculate a rate
of migration of students in Sonoma County and extrapolate from their behavior to
the wider population. To this end, the following data were collected.
1. Fire perimeter (GIS; or, geocoded housing loss registry).
2. Census block group boundaries (GIS)
3. Census block group population and housing characteristics
4. School attendance zones (GIS)
5. Student enrollment data by campus, including:
a. Total enrollment in October 2017 by grade (or age).
b. Enrollment changes by school campus of origin and destination.
Fire perimeter polygons were downloaded from the state’s fire agency. Census
block group boundaries and data were collected from IPUMS-NHGIS (Manson et al.
2018). School attendance boundaries were obtained from the School Attendance
Boundary Survey (SABS), a program of the national department of education and the
US Census Bureau (Geverdt 2018). We used the SABS polygons to determine which
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Table 3.4 Student transfers (N = 211) by destination: Sonoma County school districts; 1 Oct-31
Dec 2017






Total 138 65.4 Total 18 8.5 Kern 3 1.4
Alameda 3 1.4 Sacramento 10 4.7 Fresno-Madera CSA
Contra Costa 4 1.9 Placer 2 1.0 Fresno 2 1.0
San Francisco 1 0.5 Nevada 4 1.9 Stockton MSA
Santa Clara 1 0.5 El Dorado 2 1.0 San Joaquin 2 1.0
Napa 3 1.4 Los Angeles-Long
Beach-Riverside CSA
Modesto MSA
Marin 10 4.7 Total 13 6.2 Stanislaus 2 1.0
Solano 8 3.8 Los Angeles 7 3.3 Visalia-Porterville MSA
Sonoma; of which 108 Riverside 1 0.5 Tulare 1 0.5
Other city 51 24.2 San Bernardino 3 1.4 Salinas MSA
Santa Rosa 56 26.5 Ventura 2 1.0 Monterey 1 0.5
Balance of County 1 0.5 Clearlake µSA San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles
MSA
Lake 16 7.6 San Luis Obispo 1 0.5
Redding MSA Red Bluff µSA




Totals may not be equal due to rounding
schools’ attendance areas included census block groups that experienced housing
losses from the fires, by calculating the percentage overlap between the fire perimeter
and school attendance zones. In Sonoma County, we ultimately selected 41 schools,
spread over six school districts. We received from the state education department
a tabulation from CalPADS data of school level enrollment change data for these
districts, whose coverage areas included all block groups where a significant amount
of housing was lost. The data we received consisted of total student transfers that
occurred between October 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017 that were reported to the
department as of March 2018. The report includes the number of transfers for every
unique origin–destination pair of schools, along with the destination school city and
county summarized in Table 3.4.6
6Due to a processing error, we did not receive out of state transfers, only transfers to other schools
in California.
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Fig. 3.2 Calculating migration universe for school enrollment proxy model. Note labels refer to
the entire area inside the intersection of fire/school/block group boundaries
In total, the data indicated that there were 211 transfer students out of schools
serving homes in the burned area. The majority of the 211 transfer students did not
move far: over half of withdrawn students re-registered at other schools in Santa Rosa
or other jurisdictions in Sonoma County. Other significant destinations (circa 5% of
transfers) were Lake, Marin, and Sacramento counties. The next step was to follow
up by identifying the population at risk of these moves, to estimate a migration rate
for the general population based on the total number of displaced students.
I proposed a school enrollment proxy method, in which the percentage overlap is
calculated between each school’s attendance zone, census block group, and fire area
shown in Fig. 3.2.
In Fig. 3.2, the area B + C + F + H + I (written hereafter as BCFHI) is bounded
by the fire area, and DEFGH is defined by the school attendance boundary. Two
census block groups are represented above where BG1 = ABEF, and BG2 = GHIJ.
Area A is in neither the school attendance zone nor the fire area. B is the fire area, but
not the school attendance zone. E and F are in the school attendance zone, but only
F is within the fire area. The total number of households inside areas F and H was
estimated using a GIS analysis. This revealed households whose migration trends
can be followed in the school enrollment data. The above is an extreme example.
In most cases, there was an insignificant amount of area in a given block group that
was not captured by the school attendance zone. For this reason, the simplifying
assumption was made such that H ≈ HI and F ≈ FB.
To estimate the population at risk of migration, we further needed to assume
which portion of the total enrollment of each school lived in the households in the
intersecting areas. Todo this,we used student enrollment data at each school by grade,
which are regularly published online by the education department (students’ ages are
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withheld from these data for privacy reasons).7 At the block group level, we compared
with data on school enrollment by grade from the latest five-year ACS to estimate the
number of children in the block group whose household moves should be captured
in the enrollment change data.8 For example, if school boundary DEFGH represents
an elementary school, the migration universe or population at risk of migration is
the total number of children in BG1 enrolled in elementary school, weighted by the
share of households in BG1 that are inside block group zone F. To estimate the latter,
we adopted the equal area weighting method of areal interpolation, under which the
share of BG1 land area in zoneF also approximates the zone’s share of housing units.
Student enrollment by school could be used to update ACS data from previous years
or to estimate student counts in their absence. The resulting estimate of population
at risk is shown below in Table 3.5.
This novel approach relies on a geocoded structure damage/loss inventory, which
may not be readily available for other types of disasters. Perimeter data are more
readily available for a variety of disaster events. However, a perimeter-only method
without structure losses by block group greatly overestimates housing units lost since
it implicitly assumes that burned area in any given block is equally likely to have
consumed housing as not (which is unrealistic and usually counter to the goal of
fire suppression). We tested the effect of generating a perimeter-based estimate by
comparing the housing loss estimates from perimeter-only method to the known
total housing loss. This process identified all block groups that intersected the fire
perimeter (46 compared to only 22 block groups identified in the geocoded loss
data). Interacting the share of the area of each of these block groups inside the
fire perimeter with the housing stock produces an overestimate of 10,490 housing
units lost. Weighting the estimated impacted students by the ratio of an independent
standard results in what is likely an undercount of the displaced student population
(N = 1293), but a useful point of comparison (Table 3.6).
The migration proportion of Sonoma students can now be calculated by:
Migration rate = N movers(211)/N at risk (1740) = 12.13%
We assume that all transfers were the result of fire related displacement, and
that there were no moves in due to the fire, which may result in an overestimate
of net migration attributable to the fire. In estimating the student population, the
equal area weighted interpolation assumption implies homogeneity within the block
group. Results will be biased if block group average characteristics do not accurately
describe the characteristics of lost housing units. For example, we implicitly assume
that destroyed homes were equally likely to contain students as standing homes in
the same block group.
There are caveats in the approach as it is currently formulated. A significant
source of uncertainty is whether the rate of migration we estimated for students
7CDE Data Report Office. https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/sd/.
8ACS 5-year 2013–17. “School enrolment by detailed level of school for the population 3 years
and over” (B14007).
3 Estimating Migration Impacts of Wildfire … 65
Table 3.5 Estimating population at risk of migration from ACS survey data
Block Group Enrolled students, by grade Housing lost (share of
total)
Student population at
risk of moveK-6 7–8 9–12
A B C D (A + B + C) * D
1521001 60 5 18 0.332 28
1524001 84 82 202 0.178 66
1524003 0 0 0 0.366 0
1524004 231 63 142 0.655 286
1524005 52 62 241 0.798 283
1525021 228 72 114 0.003 1
1526001 112 0 57 0.828 140
1526005 60 14 36 0.229 25
1527011 109 21 53 0.521 95
1527013 94 21 59 0.090 16
1527022 123 10 39 0.204 35
1527023 72 8 69 0.838 125
1527025 101 8 8 0.037 4
1528011 88 0 6 0.412 39
1528012 152 18 45 0.973 209
1528013 198 28 21 0.647 160
1528014 48 0 37 0.664 56
1528015 96 66 21 0.699 128
1529051 43 20 24 0.191 17
1529061 392 167 209 0.001 1
1538072 312 112 323 0.019 15
1541004 91 38 77 0.052 11
Total 1,740
applies equally to the non-student population. Households without children may be
more or less likely to relocate depending on their age, housing tenure, length of
time in the area, and employment. Of those that migrate, they may be less likely than
households with children to remain in the region. Migration of families with children
could also be underestimated, for example, children may have commuted from new
residences back to their original schools to avoid the stress of changing schools. If
households without children in school are more likely to relocate, then these results
are biased toward underestimating the impact of the fire on out-migration.
To generate new estimates for January 1, 2018, we follow the usual steps for the
housing unit method and county estimates ensemble. However, we deviated from
usual practice in that we keep the housing lost from the disaster in the housing
stock when the models are run. After generating counterfactual estimates this way,
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Table 3.6 GIS-only method for displaced student population from fire zone
Block Group Share of BG Area inside
Fire perimeter
Housing units Student population (K-12)
A B C
1501001 0.450 610 64
1501003 0.034 272 38
1502023 0.745 450 115
1502024 0.545 803 200
1503032 0.002 504 135
1503063 0.489 902 257
[…]
Independent estimate Modelled housing loss Weighted exposure








Total D = 4650 E = 10,490 1,293
we account for the disaster impacts separately. We then define the population at
risk of migration for each jurisdiction where population estimates are needed. In
this case, example results are shown below in Table 3.7 for the city of Santa Rosa.
We apply the migration probability to the population at risk of migration and then
assign migrants to new destinations according to the distribution of destinations in
the student enrollment change data.
3.5 Conclusion
The results suggest that most Santa Rosa residents did not move out of the city:
according to our analysis, only 695 or 9% of displaced persons crossed jurisdictional
boundaries in this case and most often to nearby cities or unincorporated areas in
the same county. The estimation framework is intended to be generalizable to any
origin–destination dyad data, as long as the geographic data can be used to estimate a
population at risk. Themethodologywe presentedmay be suited to timely assessment
of the population impacts of disasters that occur in countries with a well-developed
public infrastructure. The effort we made would not have been possible without
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Table 3.7 Net migration estimates for fire displaced population of Santa Rosa, Sonoma County































the ability of government institutions to produce and share reliable data about the
emergency, as well as high quality small area data from the ACS and longitudinal
records from the public education system.
We propose that the housing stock destroyed by disasters should be handled care-
fully by population estimation methods that rely on housing stock. One solution is
to keep the destroyed housing in the model as if it was still existing and then to sepa-
rately estimate and account for migration as a post-estimation adjustment (similar
to the treatment of GQ population). This would improve the accuracy of the ratio
correlation or other regression-basedmodels. The housing unit method could use this
approach also, but a simpler solution would be to adjust vacancy rates and persons
per household to accommodate the lost housing units while keeping the population
within the jurisdiction. While we anticipate that this approach can be useful for
studying many disaster types, more effort should be put into developing a typology
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of methods that work for a broader variety of disaster types and in other state and
country contexts.
Future work on this methodology should focus on identifying systematic differ-
ences between the general and proxy population, such as students, that can be repre-
sented with data available to the model. Because our primary concern was adjusting
for the very high bias toward overstatement of the number of migrants in the housing
unit and ratio correlation methods, we considered these acceptable tradeoffs.
The area of Sonoma County that burned in the Tubbs fire in 2017 bore great
resemblance to a fire of 53 years previous—the Hanly Fire of 1964. Like the Tubbs
Fire, Hanly started in the hills near Calistoga; propelled by strong winds, it reached
Santa Rosa city in less than 12 hours (Kovner 2013). It caused much less destruc-
tion because the WUI at that time was relatively sparsely inhabited. The fire did
not halt continued growth of the population or expansion of housing continually
deeper into theWUI. As the wildfire hazard increases throughout the state in coming
years, continued research intomethods of estimating population impacts will become
increasingly in demand.
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Chapter 4
The 2010 Catastrophic Forest Fires
in Russia: Consequence of Rural
Depopulation?
Tatiana Nefedova
Abstract Catastrophic forest fires hit the European part of Russian Federation
during summer 2010 as result of a two-month-long period with temperatures above
the average by 10 °C coupled with an unusually long drought period. Even though
forest fires are usual for Russia, these are typically located in the sparsely popu-
lated Asian part of the country. As a consequence of the 2010 summer fires in the
densely populated European part of Russia, the mass media poured forth reports of
burning forests, villages, victims, about lost crops by fires. The situation was further
dramatized by the fact that the extreme smoke from these fires reached Moscow.
Seventeen million people lived in the regions where the state of emergency has been
declared, and another 10 million in Moscow suffered from smoke. Over one-third of
the population of the Russian Federation lived in those regions where the fires were
very intense in summer 2010. Still, the main question remained after the disaster
which I attempt to answer in this chapter; was the heat the only cause?
Keywords Russia · Forest fire · Forestry · Rural depopulation · Land use
4.1 Introduction
Catastrophic forest fires hit the European part of Russian Federation during summer
2010 as result of a two-month-long period with temperatures above the average by
10 °C coupled with an unusually long drought period. Even though forest fires are
usual for Russia, these are typically located in the sparsely populated Asian part of
the country. As a consequence of the 2010 summer fires in the densely populated
European part of Russia, the mass media poured forth reports of burning forests,
villages, victims, about lost crops by fires. The situation was further dramatized by
the fact that the extreme smoke from these fires reached Moscow (see similar case in
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Chap. 10). Seventeenmillion people lived in the regionswhere the state of emergency
has been declared, and another 10 million in Moscow suffered from smoke. Over
one-third of the population of the Russian Federation lived in those regions where
the fires were very intense in summer 2010. Still, the main question remained after
the disaster which I attempt to answer in this chapter; was the heat the only cause?
Chapter 3 by Sharygin highlighted how a California bush fire influenced outmi-
gration from affected areas; while in contrast, this case study attempts to highlight
a vice versa causal relationship: Could demography be a root cause for a forest fire
disaster? In this study, I used media analysis and my existing knowledge and experi-
ence on spatial organisation of Russian countryside (Nefedova 2003; Nefedova et al.
2001), the rural demographic problems (Ioffe et al. 2004, 2006; Nefedova 2013) and
the land use and agricultural change (Nefedova 2017; Nefedova and Pallot 2007) in
the European part of Russia to explain the root causes of the 2010 catastrophic fires.
4.2 Data About the 2010 Russian Forest Fires
and the Course of the Disaster
According to the estimation by ADSR (2010), there were 55 thousand excess deaths
as the consequence of extreme heat, smoke and fire in Russia in 2010. Although the
death toll published by the annual report of ADSR (2010) seems overestimated, there
is no reliable direct data available in Russia on the fires and their consequences. The
area of fires in Russia are normally underestimated by the official statistics. There is
an objective reason for it—in a huge and sparsely populated country, not all forests
are available for monitoring and protection. Besides, some officials intentionally
understate the areas and consequences. So, according to theMinistry of Emergencies
and the Federal Forestry Agency (Rossleshoz), fires affected 1.5 million ha of forests
in 2010. Independent institutions suggest 6million hawere affected,while, according
to the Global Fire Monitoring Centre, which used satellite image data, it was 10
million ha. So, the difference in the sizes of affected areas reported by different
agencies reached 5–10 times. For Europe, or the USA, it is never more than 20%.
Another problem is how to estimate the scale of the disaster. Either by the number
of hot spots? Or according to the total area of affected forests? Or by the number of
the devastated villages, or of the human victims?All these could be considered, while
there is no exact data available on each of them. I analysed publications about fires
in mass media. The intensity of fires may be estimated according to the frequency
of reported areas, villages and other facts concerning fires. Such a digest is not quite
full and reliable; however, it reflects the chronicle of the 2010 forest fire disaster.
The initial reports about local fires in April andMaywere not terrifying. In spring,
residents usually burn old grass which results in local fires in the suburbs of Moscow
and neighbouring regions. Also, as usual, forest fires began to occur in the Siberian
part of Russia. The first signs of the catastrophe in European Russia appeared in June
2010, when extensive fires were reported in the so-called Black Earth Zone (Fig. 4.1),
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Fig. 4.1 Fire risk during summer 2010 in Russia (Author Nefedova, cartography by Karácsonyi)
the southern part of the core regions European Russia, where the hot weather had
been observed first. In early July, large fires have passed through the Ural and Volga
Region in the southeast part of European Russia, moving towards the core Russian
areas.
Since the mid-July, fires had been extending to the east from Moscow, burning
not only the forest but also dried peat bogs fires (Nefedova 2010). At the time, initial
media reported burnt-down villages and associated deaths. Over 19 thousand hot
spots were reported in early August 2010. The area affected by fire, according to the
official data, covered 0.5 million ha. However, the Federal Forestry Agency and the
Ministry of Emergencies pointed out that this was less than in the year 2009 by a
factor of 2 or 3. Their arguments were right, except the fact that this summer was
cooler in Siberia, where fires usually extended in previous years. President Dmitry
Medvedev, who at that time was acting president of Russian Federation, decreed a
state of emergency in seven regions of the Russian Federation on 7 August 2010
(Fig. 4.1).
Entire villages were devastated by the fires during summer in 2010. In total,
three thousand houses from over 150 settlements burnt down and some people were
lost and died. Proceeding these events, the government allocated construction funds
for new buildings to support the victims of the fires who became homeless. Large
cities, including Moscow, suffered heavy smoke from these fires. By mid-August,
the situation began to stabilise. The number of eliminated fires began to exceed the
number of new ones. By the end of August, after the rains started, the situation in
most regions of Central Russia improved significantly. However, it remained difficult
even in September that year in the Urals and in the south of Siberia.
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4.3 Institutional Causes of Fires in Russia, in Particular
to the 2010 Forest Fire Disaster
The authorities classify fires by causes as natural, household or industrial fires. This
classification is artificial because 90–95% of all forest fires, which occurred in 2010,
are caused by human factors. The root causes of fire are usually human activities as
well as the problems within the institutional system, especially those areas respon-
sible for regulation and policy. There is also a separate group of causes, which is
seldommentioned. These are the factors related to the organisation of Russian popu-
lated space, in particular the rural depopulation and associated population concen-
tration into large cities and their surroundings. The human and institutional factors
are summarised in the following paragraphs, while a new factor will be introduced
in the next section (see also Nefedova 2013, pp.338–346).
(1) The main cause of fires is human activity. Activities causing fires, such as
burning the old grass, making fires, dropping cigarette butts, is especially signif-
icant in the areas of people concentration, for instance, in Moscow’s and other
cities’ suburbs. Sometimes individuals or enterprisers even provoke forest fires
purposefully to conceal illegal or excessive woodcuts. This is possible only
because the penalties for breaching fire-prevention rules are too lenient in
Russia. In addition, officials lack initiative and funding. They have not taken
basic fire prevention measures; for example, ploughing around villages and
maintaining ponds. Some officials misrepresent the information about fires,
concealing real danger and so on.
(2) Many people thought that the 2010 catastrophic forest fires are caused by the
reform of legislation and of forest management in 2007–2009 (Gricyuk 2010).
In Russia, with its vast forest areas, these changes have had grave consequences.
According to this reform, a new Forestry Codewas issued by the federal govern-
ment, partly based on the European and Canadian best practices. In frame of
the new Code, the Federal Service of Forest Wardens was eliminated, and all
forest management was handed over to regional authorities who employed a
small number of forest inspectors. Before the legislation change, fire security in
forests was provided by 70 thousand foresters, but according to the new legis-
lation, supervision of forests is charged to 12 thousand people who are engaged
in a considerable amount of paperwork leaving almost nobody in the forests to
detect fires. According to this new legislation, logging concession enterprises
not only harvest timber, but they are also responsible for protecting and restoring
forests. However, they control only 13% of forest areas. Moreover, small enter-
prises have neither means nor desire to do so. As for large companies, they
prefer to pay small penalties for not implementing forest protection, than to
spend a significant amount of money on implementing them. Air protection of
forests was also handed over to regions, according to the new Code, after which
its performance has decreased dramatically. It became impossible to transfer
forces quickly from one region to another.
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When the disaster occurred in 2010, President Medvedev dismissed the head of
Federal Forestry Agency and transferred the Agency into direct subordination to
the government and has charged to correct the Forestry Code. The legislation about
the supervision and control in the Forest Code has been amended hastily during
December 2010, and the Federal Service for Forest Wardens has been restored with
a limited budget (Kuzminov 2011). Because of the limited budget, the amendment
of the Forest Code happened only on paper according to Kuzminov.
4.4 Demographic Root Causes of the 2010 Forest Fire
Disaster
As mentioned previously, there is another root cause of the 2010 forest fire disaster
in Russia, which is the organisation of Russia’s demographic space. The deep strat-
ification of the Russian space was seldom mentioned during the discussion of the
2010 fire disaster (see, for example, articles of Rossiyskaya Gazeta journal in the
period of May–August 2010), especially the rapid rural depopulation of periphery
areas of the Non-Black Earth or Forest Zone and the suburbanisation in urban cores.
Rural population in European Russia has sharply decreased and concentrated in
cities as a result of urbanisation during the twentieth century (see Nefedova et al.
2001). The rural population decline coupled with a negative social selection because
young and most active population left villages for cities. The zone of the rapid rural
depopulation between 1959 and 2017 (Fig. 4.2) has affected almost the entire Russian
Fig. 4.2 Rural depopulation in Russia (Author Nefedova, cartography by Karácsonyi)
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core areas. In the 1990s, the trends of migration have changed, so not only large cities
but also suburbs started to attract rural population from peripheral districts. At the
same time, the urban population from large cities leaked out to the suburbs as a
result of suburbanisation as well (Nefedova and Treivish 2019). Hence, the contrast
between suburbs and periphery areas has been increasing. The largest gap exists in the
northernForest Zone betweenperipheries andurban–suburban cores. In the periphery
areas of the Forest Zone, not only villages but also towns are characterised by strong
outmigration and depopulation. As an illustration, even in the Core of European
Russia, only 100 km out of Moscow, you can find periphery areas without passable
roads. At the same time, public bus services in many areas were eliminated due to
economic insufficiency. On the other hand, the lack of roads is partially compensated
by recent technical developments of other communication facilities (mobile phones
or the internet), but the territory equipped with these facilities is also limited. As a
result, these peripheries are forming a social and economic “desert” within urban
core areas of large cities.
Further, due to globalisation and post-Soviet socio-economic development, the
contrasts between cities and remote rural areas became more striking. Population
density is higher, people are more active, and large enterprises are more successful
in suburban zones of urban cores. Those districts lying beyond these suburban zones
have been coming under social and economic depression, which resulted in the
shrinking of agricultural land. It is also hard to attract agricultural businesses to
areas without sufficient human resources. Neither large nor small farms are strong
and numerous enough to deal with huge areas of abandoned land. The majority of
peripheral villages are populated by old women and strongly drinking men. They are
not capable of implementing even basic fire protection measures.
Consequently, destiny of rural territories is closely connected with agriculture and
forestry. Agriculture in European Russia strongly varies in space and determined by
natural conditions and by distance from cities (Ioffe et al. 2004; Nefedova 2012,
2017). Only 14% of Russia’s landmass has climate favourable for agriculture, such
as the highly fertile Black Earth Zone (or ChernozemBelt) located south ofMoscow.
The collective and state farms in Soviet times were strongly subsidised in the Forest
Zone. Because of this, there was a strong expansion of agriculture to the north
during the Soviet times, into areas with unfavourable natural conditions and rural
depopulation. Furthermore, this expansion was accompanied by large-scale drainage
of peat bogs typically located in the Forest Zone. In the course of the 2010 forest
fires disaster, these drained out and abandoned peat bogs burned and smouldered.
During the transition period, in the 1990swith the end of subsidies for unprofitable
farms, the arable land decreased greatly, and Russian’s agricultural enterprises fell
into depression. This was followed by the restoration of production only in the
favourable southern Black Earth Zone and in the environs of urban cores in the
2000s (Nefedova 2013, Meyfroidt et al. 2016). However, great losses of arable land
were typical for the majority of Forest Zone due to land abandonment that saw
recovering wildlife expanding through formerly populated areas (Fig. 4.3). Hence,
the traditional rural landscape of the Forest Zone of Central Russia with villages
surrounded by fields was transformed. Young forests come nearer to villages as
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Fig. 4.3 Land use change in Russia (Author Nefedova, cartography by Karácsonyi)
possible “bridges” for fires. Few trees managed to grow on these abandoned lands,
so these strips are covered by very high dry grass leading to the ever-greater danger
of fire.
On the contrary, using timber resources is a more promising way for the Forest
Zone than agriculture, but the land used by the timber industry has also retreated. As
a result of the large state-owned logging enterprises transformation in the 1990s, the
Soviet forest infrastructure was wrecked. Timber harvesting moved to forests close
to urban core areas with passable roads. As a result, the intensity of logging in these
areas and the danger of fire have increased.
During the same time, a large part of agricultural land was transferred into
construction land in suburban zones of urban core areas. However, Russian subur-
banization is different from the Western equivalent because it is characterised by the
so-called dachas, which are secondary homes belonging to urban dwellers and only
inhabited during the summer. Only 20% of new-built houses in Moscow suburban
zone are used as permanent residences. Also, more than 70% of urban dwellers have
such secondary house. The concentration of Moscow residents in the suburban zone
is very high, and these dacha settlements are very crowded during summer, yet, they
face a lack of infrastructure, such as garbage removal. The risk of wildfire increases
the when people burn their garbage.
Beside these suburban zones, remote dachas are existing as well. As an illustra-
tion, the dacha zones of Moscow and Saint Petersburg have already merged despite
the 700 km distance between the two cities. Remote dachas in rural depopulation
areas are completely different where summer residents double or multiply the local
population. They prevent houses and villages from complete destruction, but cannot
78 T. Nefedova
restore agriculture (Nefedova and Pallot 2013; Nefedova and Pokrovskiy 2018).
However, coming for one or two months a year, these urban dwellers take care of
their rural houses and try to cut dry grass around them. Still the problems of fire
protection are not solved. There is a lack of local manpower willing to work (aging
and alcoholism are a common problems) in spite of high level of rural unemploy-
ment. Additionally, one can mention the insufficient financing of local governments,
especially those located in peripheral districts. So, they cannot maintain even basic
infrastructure for permanent local or summer residents.
4.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, in the struggle against fires, both human activities and forest legislation
are important. However, the problem ismuchmore complicated, coveringmany other
issues, including rural depopulation, a decline of agriculture and budgetary support
of local communities. Understanding the transformation of Russian rural space is
also important. According to Greenpeace Russia’s data, there were around 3 million
hectare forests on fire in 2012, but some experts (see Delivoria 2019) estimate these
fire areas up the 10 million ha. However, the total area on fire was larger in 2012
than in 2010. The fires had not caused smoke in large cities, so the situation was less
echoed by the media. In spring 2019, a special firefighting system was introduced in
25 regions of Russia, but only in those areas where it can potentially threaten large
cities. In other regions, such as the sparsely populated Siberia, nothing has changed.
Hence, the root causes of the 2010 fire disaster still exists. Coupling this with more
extreme weather conditions due to climate change could cause a similar disaster at
any time again.
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Abstract The Eight Ds model (Carson and Carson 2014) explains the unique char-
acteristics of human and economic geography for sparsely populated areas (SPAs)
as disconnected, discontinuous, diverse, detailed, dynamic, distant, dependent and
delicate. According to the model, SPAs are subject to dramatic changes in demo-
graphic characteristics that result from both identifiable black swan events and less
apparent tipping points in longer-term processes of demographic change (Carson
et al. 2011). The conceptual foundations for this assertion are clear. Populations in
SPAs can experience large and long-term impacts on the overall demographic struc-
ture as a result of decisions by a relatively small number of people. High levels of
migration and mobility cause constant shifts in the demographic profile and prime
SPAs to adapt to many different demographic states (Carson and Carson 2014). The
Northern Territory of Australia, for example, experienced previously unseen waves
of pre-retirement aged migrants in the past decade or so (Martel et al. 2013) as
evidence of detailed but important changes to past trends. However, while dramatic
demographic changes are conceptually possible and occasionally observable, there
have been few attempts to examine the conditions under which such changes are
likely to occur or not to occur. This is an important question particularly in relation
to black swan events such as natural disasters because effective disaster management
policy and planning is at least partially dependent on understanding who is affected
and in what ways (Bird et al. 2013).
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5.1 Introduction
The Eight Dsmodel (Carson and Carson 2014) explains the unique characteristics of
human and economic geography for sparsely populated areas (SPAs) asdisconnected,
discontinuous,diverse,detailed,dynamic,distant,dependent anddelicate.According
to the model, SPAs are subject to dramatic changes in demographic characteristics
that result from both identifiable black swan events and less apparent tipping points in
longer-term processes of demographic change (Carson et al. 2011). The conceptual
foundations for this assertion are clear. Populations in SPAs can experience large
and long-term impacts on the overall demographic structure as a result of decisions
by a relatively small number of people. High levels of migration and mobility cause
constant shifts in the demographic profile and prime SPAs to adapt to many different
demographic states (Carson and Carson 2014). The Northern Territory of Australia,
for example, experienced previously unseen waves of pre-retirement aged migrants
in the past decade or so (Martel et al. 2013) as evidence of detailed but important
changes to past trends. However, while dramatic demographic changes are conceptu-
ally possible and occasionally observable, there have been few attempts to examine
the conditions under which such changes are likely to occur or not to occur (see also
Chap. 6). This is an important question particularly in relation to black swan events
such as natural disasters because effective disaster management policy and planning
is at least partially dependent on understanding who is affected and in what ways
(Bird et al. 2013).
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to begin the process of identifying the
conditions under which dramatic demographic responses to natural disasters in SPAs
might occur. In the process, we introduce two new ‘Ds’ with which to describe the
nature of demographic change. We propose that natural disasters such as cyclones,
floods, earthquakes, bushfires, landslides, avalanches and crop failures present the
potential to disrupt or to divert demographic development. Disruption involves a
temporary break in demographic development afterwhich the pattern apparent before
the disaster resumes. Diversion involves the transition to a new pattern clearly and
substantially distinct from the pre-event state.Disruption anddiversion can be consid-
ered as end points on a scale with attributes such as the length of time taken to revert
to pre-event development patterns and the number and type of demographic char-
acteristics that change post-event along with the severity of the change determining
where an event might be positioned on that scale.
The chapter focuses on two apparently dissimilar natural disasters which are the
Great Deprivation crop failure(s) in northern Sweden in 1867–8 and the flooding
of the Katherine-Daly river basins in the Northern Territory of Australia in 1998
caused by Cyclone Les. While the Great Deprivation affected large areas of Norway,
Sweden and Finland, this chapter will focus on the parish of Gällivare in Sweden’s
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Norrbotten County due to the region’s prominent role in the economic and demo-
graphic development of the north at the time through forestry andmining. Figures 5.1
and 5.2 shows the locations of Gällivare parish and the Katherine-Daly river basins.
Fig. 5.1 Location of case site Katherine-Daly region, Australia (Cartography by Karácsonyi)
Fig. 5.2 Settlements in Gällivare, 1860 and 1880 (Authors: B. Carson, A. Carson, Axelsson,
P. Sköld, G. Sköld, cartography by Karácsonyi)
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Research has not been published about the impacts of the Great Deprivation onGälli-
vare, but Nordin’s (2009) analysis of long-term demographic change in this and other
northern parishes shows a brief (two or three years) slowing of population growth
around the time of the crop failures amid an extended period of population growth
before and after the event. This is primae facie evidence (at least at the gross popu-
lation level) of a demographic disruption. In contrast, grey and academic literature
relating to the Katherine-Daly region reveals a dramatic change in gross population
trends (from substantial increase in the 1980s and early 1990s to a long period of stag-
nation persisting to the present time), along with substantial (and persistent) changes
in the proportion of Indigenous people and women in the population (Harwood et al.
2011). This is primae facie evidence of a demographic diversion.
5.2 The Challenges of Identifying Demographic ‘Impacts’
Attributing demographic changes in SPAs to black swan events is difficult precisely
because of the dynamic nature of populations in those areas. Their susceptibility to
dramatic change exists, even in the absence of such events. In the case of migration
impacts, for example, high levels of migration already occurring in SPAs might be
difficult to separate from migration specifically related to a natural disaster (Adamo
and Sherbinin 2011). Likewise, demographic transitions in fertility andmortality can
occur relatively quickly but sporadically in SPAs (Taylor 2011), such that bubbles
and craters (Martel et al. 2011) are expected characteristics of distributions of
demographic characteristics of SPAs in most circumstances.
Analyses of demographic change are also impacted by themodifiable areal, modi-
fiable temporal and modifiable social unit problems (MAUP, MTUP, MSUP) (Koch
and Carson 2012). The MAUP is concerned with the problem of spatial scale when
analysing statistical (e.g. population) data, as results can change according to the
levels of scale applied to the analysis. It is difficult to ascertain at what spatial scale
the demographic impacts of natural disasters can be best understood. On the one
hand, natural disasters may have physical impacts that are highly localised as is
the case with landslides and avalanches, and sometimes bushfires and flooding and
even violent storm events. On the other hand, public perceptions often attach these
events to broad geographical ideas such as the north, the Arctic or the tropics. While
researchers must be careful in recognising the physical boundaries of event impacts,
they should also not underestimate the power of perceived risk boundaries in influ-
encing demographic behaviour (Ford et al. 2006). In this chapter, we are interested
in somewhat local impacts, which bring the additional challenge of deciding what
demographic characteristics to observe, and how to represent them. Most demo-
graphic rates are designed for application to relatively large populations of 100,000
persons or more while here, we are working with populations much smaller. In the
absence of well-established demographic analysis techniques for small populations
(Taylor 2014), we have restricted our analysis to broad indicators that include gross
populations and percentage of persons with particular characteristics.
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Similar to theMAUP, theMTUP refers to the impact that different temporal dimen-
sions can have on the outcomes of data analysis. This is important in the context of
demographic change following natural disasters, whereby Ford et al. (2006) noted
that demographic change may be a long-term consequence of exposure to the risk
of natural disasters as much as a short-term response to a single event. In fact, the
expectation of experiencing natural disasters in SPAs may make demographic struc-
tures quite resilient to a single major event, and changes in demographic behaviour
may be a cumulative effect of relatively minor events.
This last statement also reveals the challenges of the MSUP, which refers to the
problem that the outcomes of data analysis may differ according to the social units
selected for analysis. McLeman’s (2010) research in Canada showed that specific
individuals may migrate out of northern communities as a result of extreme weather
events, but migration flows may persist with out-migrants being replaced by in-
migrants with similar characteristics. In this way, the demographic behaviours of
individuals might be impacted by the event, but the demographic behaviours of the
population as a whole remain relatively stable. Bailey (2011) noted, for example, that
communities with high pre-existing demographic volatility are likely to experience
high demographic volatility as a result of a natural disaster. This is not the only
problematic dimension of the MSUP, with several researchers identifying that the
differential impacts of events on various social groups (defined by ethnicity, social
status, gender and even religion) can be hidden in higher level analyses (Ellis 2009).
These unit problems are apparent in trying to summarise the impacts of the Great
Deprivation as reported in the academic literature. That literature is replete with
apparent contradictions and counter-intuitive observations. The Great Deprivation
was a severe shortage of food resulting from consecutive crop failures in the Nordic
countries in 1867 and 1868. The 1867 crop failures were caused by a long, cold
and wet winter, while the 1868 failures were caused by drought. The crop failures
affected at least Finland, Norway and Sweden (Nelson 1988). Finland, during the
Great Deprivation, has been the focus of much attention regarding demographic
impacts. This is because of estimates that state nearly 10% of the population there
died as a direct result of the food shortage (Jantunen and Ruosteenoja 2000). Debate
continues as to the impacts of the Great Deprivation across the entire region, but
it is apparent that impacts differed both between and within countries. It has been
common, for example, to attribute the substantial increase in Swedish (and Norwe-
gian) emigration to North America at the end of the nineteenth century to the Great
Deprivation (Akenson 2011), although emigration from Finland to North America
was comparatively rare.More recent research, however, suggests that either theGreat
Deprivation did not have such an immediate impact on Swedish emigration (with
the substantial increase coming at least a decade after the event), or emigration was
largely from southern parts of Sweden (Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987). Likewise, while
direct Finland–America migration was limited, it has been estimated that up to 20%
of Finns who migrated to other parts of Scandinavia (mostly northern Sweden) at the
time of theGreat Deprivation ultimately on-migrated toAmerica (Newby 2014). This
simple example reveals aspects of the MAUP (different migration patterns observ-
able at different spatial scales), MTUP (different patterns observable depending on
86 D. B. Carson et al.
the ‘lag’ times allowed between the Great Deprivation and emigration) and MSUP
(the behaviours of people in northern Sweden have been hidden within the analyses
of the total Swedish experience (Doblhammer et al. 2013), just as the behaviour of
Finnish on-migrants may have been hidden by both time and the relatively small size
of the population within northern Sweden).
Migration responses to theGreatDeprivation are not the only subject of contention
in the literature. While there appears to be consensus that fertility rates decreased
during the immediate Great Deprivation period (typically considered to be 1867–
70 allowing for recovery time) but recovered shortly thereafter, the impacts on life
expectancy and mortality continue to be debated. Hayward et al. (2013) claim lower
life expectancies for people born around the time of the Great Deprivation, while
Saxton et al. (2013) claim that life expectancy impacts were very small. The MSUP
might be important here, with specific population groups such as landless labourers,
Sami (Nordin and Sköld 2012), rural dwellers, and Finnish migrants believed to have
been more dramatically affected than others.
Overall, the published evidence from the Great Deprivation suggests a demo-
graphic disruption lasting between three and five years and affecting fertility,
mortality andmigration. These conclusions are tempered by observations of substan-
tial spatial and social variation, particularly for mortality, migration and possibly
also life expectancy. These presumed impacts of the Great Deprivation are generally
consistent with the observations made about other ‘famine’ events in western and
northern Europe (O Grada 2007). In general, local impacts were less where there
were higher industrialisation and urbanisation. Industrialisation and urbanisation
generally reduce reliance on local food sources, increase access to public and private
sources of famine relief, and provide the resources for individuals and families to
use adaptation strategies such as long-term and short-term migration and changes of
occupation (Isacson et al. 2013).
The Great Deprivation is seen as the last of the European famines to result
from natural events (although food scarcity has since occurred as a result of war
and economic depression). The nineteenth century saw other years of crop failure
(notably 1809, 1832–33 and 1857–58 (Bengsston and Dribe 2002)), with industri-
alisation and urbanisation changing food supply chains and reducing the reliance of
communities on local food production. Nevertheless, crop (and stock) failures as a
result of droughts, floods and other natural events continue in many SPAs in indus-
trialised (and post-industrial) nations, and their demographic impacts continue to be
debated. While the risk of food scarcity is low, there are still likely to be substantial
demographic impacts linked to economic and social consequences of bad seasons.
Drought, cyclone, flood and fire events have been linked to out-migration (partic-
ularly youth out-migration), increased suicide rates, and urbanisation in SPAs in
Australia, Canada and the USA (Hogan et al. 2014; McLeman and Smit 2006).
The specific literature on the Katherine-Daly cyclone-induced flood event of 1998
will be reviewed later in this chapter, but similar events have been researched from
a demographic perspective. Cyclones and floods have the potential to physically
destroy towns and settlements, although the typical response (in the past century at
least) has been to rebuild those towns and settlements once the event has passed.
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Perhaps the most famous rebuilding exercise in SPAs was associated with Cyclone
Tracy. This cyclone hit Darwin (population of 40,000) in Australia’s Northern Terri-
tory onChristmas Eve 1974, destroying over 90%of the housing and general building
stock of the city. Over half of the city’s residents were evacuated, with the popula-
tion only returning in substantial numbers more than a year later once rebuilding had
commenced. The population growth that was being experienced in Darwin before the
cyclone quickly resumed by the late 1970s and even accelerated based on substan-
tial in-migration associated with rebuilding and with the transition from dependent
Territory to self-governing Territory status in 1978. However, it has been estimated
that less than half of the population residing in the city in 1978 had also been at the
time of the cyclone (Britton 1981). While the collective demographic characteristics
(particularly age and sex distribution) looked quite similar, they were the character-
istics of a new population, and the individual demographic impacts in terms of both
out and in-migration were dramatic.
CycloneTracymay also have had different impacts on different population groups,
with recent research (Haynes et al. 2011) suggesting much higher return migra-
tion rates of Indigenous people, and in-migration of Indigenous people from nearby
communities which were also affected by the cyclone but which had less access to
recovery and rebuilding resources. In a review of the literature on Indigenous migra-
tion responses to cyclones and other severe weather events, however, Carson et al.
(2013) argued that the Cyclone Tracy experience may not be typical (nor may it be
atypical) given that so many factors influence individual and collective behaviours.
The review suggested that migration responses could differ depending on the extent
to which: migration was forced [by evacuation policies, for example (Taylor and
Freeman 2010)]; alternative residential locations were available nearby; resources
were available to support both the out-migration and return migration; economic and
cultural livelihoods were tightly linked to specific locations; and individual decisions
were influenced by social and cultural group membership.
The literature on famines, cyclones and floods in SPAs suggests that demographic
impacts are difficult to predict and dependent on a range of factors which need to be
understood in their spatial, temporal and social contexts. Immediate impacts may be
somewhat predictable based on exposure to risk (such as fatalities) and organisation
of disaster response (such as forced evacuation), but longer-term impacts are subject
to many intervening factors, including the difficulties associated with isolating the
impacts of a single event from the ongoing dynamic and detailed nature of demo-
graphic change (see discussion on long-term population shifts in Chap. 2 as well).
This argument can be further supported through the examination of the experiences of
Gällivare and the Katherine-Daly area linked to the Great Deprivation and Cyclone
Les respectively. While these cases are separated by 130 years, 14,000 km and a
plethora of social, economic and political attributes, they demonstrate some of the
ways in which demographic disruptions and diversions may emerge from natural
disasters in SPAs.
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5.3 Gällivare and the Great Deprivation
While northern Sweden is often considered to have been slow to industrialise when
compared with other parts of Europe (Engberg 2004), there is evidence that Gällivare
was well advanced by the 1860s (Godet 2009). Industrialisation in Sweden tended to
come first to rural primary sectors such as forestry and mining. This trend coincided
with the dismantling of guilds and opportunities for private enterprise in manufac-
turing, thus, limiting urban industrialisation at least until after the liberal reforms of
1846 (Ryner 2003).During this time,Gällivarewas in theTimber Frontier region, and
the forestry sector experienced relatively rapid industrialisation after the introduction
of the first steam-powered timber mills in the 1840s (Maas and van Leeuwen 2002).
Gällivare was also at the forefront of mining development in northern Sweden, with
commercial ore deposits near Malmberget (five kilometres north of Gällivare town
itself) being extracted in the early nineteenth century. By the 1860s, British investors
had secured funding to construct the first railway in Norbotten from Malmberget to
the Lule River. Construction commenced in 1865, but was abandoned in 1867 due
to financial strain (Godet 2009). There is no specific evidence that the Great Depri-
vation played a role in halting this initial construction, and, in fact, large projects
such as railway construction would likely have been embraced by government as a
means of providing employment for displaced rural workers during this time. The
Swedish government did take over construction the railway, but poor planning and
engineering meant that a working line did not eventuate in the region until 1888.
Nevertheless, mining developments were already occurring by the 1860s, bringing
with them new extraction and transportation technologies (Dewsnap 1981).
Likewise, while it was the impact of the railway on mining and forestry which led
to the major economic and demographic development of Gällivare in the 1890s and
early twentieth century, the signs of forestry industrialisation were already in place
by the 1860s. Northern Sweden as awholewas already exporting timber by 1860, and
the period of government regulation andmanagement of forests as an export resource
began in 1866 when England removed import barriers for Swedish timber (Axelsson
2014). During the second half of the nineteenth century, and particularly during
the 1860s, there was a substantial consolidation of forestry ownership, with both
government and private ownership focusing on larger landholdings. By 1872, new
settlements were being actively discouraged in Sami pasture areas, which impacted
the larger western parts of Gällivare, and led to a focus of development in the eastern
quarter. Gällivare village itself had been settled in the early eighteenth century and
became the centre of the Gällivare Parish formed in 1742. The Parish was dominated
by small settlements up until the turn of the twentieth century, with just three villages
havingmore than 100 population in 1860 (Gällivare, Ullatti andNattavaara). Even by
1880, there were just six villages larger than 100 population (now including Hakkas,
Leipojärvi and Nilivaara). Figure 5.2 shows the gross population development for
Gällivare Parish between 1860 and 1880. The size of each dot represents the settled
population of the village, with Gällivare Village in 1860 equating to 105 persons.
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Fig. 5.3 Demographic Indicators for Gällivare, 1856–1881
Note that many Sami people (about 400 in both 1860 and 1880) were excluded from
village population lists as they were still considered to be nomadic.
By 1865, Gällivare Parish had an estimated population of 2650 people, including
nearly 1500 Sami people. There were 97 men for every 100 women, although this
rate was much higher among non-Sami (104 men for every 100 women) population.
Over one-third of the population (Sami and non-Sami) were aged under 15 years,
and just five per cent (seven per cent of Sami) were aged 65 years and over. Annual
in-migration rates for the past 10 years had averaged five per 1000 population, with
out-migration averaging seven per 1000. Nearly two-thirds of the male population
were employed in forestry or agriculture (and often in both) (Bäcklund 1988).
The short-term impacts of the Great Deprivation are apparent in a range of demo-
graphic indicators (see Fig. 5.3). These indicators are derived from data provided by
the Demographic Data Base (DDB) at Umeå University. The DDB contains digitised
parish records and links data on individuals identified in these records for most of
the nineteenth century. Additional data were drawn from the 1890 and 1900 Swedish
Census provided by the North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP). Figure 5.3 stan-
dardises indicators according to the 1856 value. The figure highlights the period
1867–1871, which has been considered the critical impact period (Isacson et al.
2013). Population growth stalled very early in this period but had resumed by the
end. The Parish population was 2700 in 1866 and increased only to 2720 by 1869,
but then increased to 2782 by 1872 and continued to grow by between 1.5 and 2.0%
per annum thereafter. The Sami population had been increasing rapidly up until the
early 1860s but remained at 1500 people for the entire critical period. There was a
brief period of growth again between 1871 and 1878 (to 1600 people), but the Sami
population declined again to about 1500 people by 1900 (Karlsson 2013).
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The other indicators in Fig. 5.3 experienced decline throughout the entire critical
period. The child–woman ratio (number of children aged 0–4 years for every woman
aged 15–44 years) experienced the most dramatic decline, from about 85% of its
1856 value in 1866, to just 65% of the 1856 value in 1870. The ratio rose very
quickly thereafter. The child dependency ratio (number of people aged 0–14 years
for every person aged 15–64 years) also declined throughout the period. The age
dependency ratio (number of people aged 65 years and over for every person aged
15–64 years) fluctuated throughout the period, but the general trend was a decline
(indicating fewer older people). The small spike in this ratio in 1869 may be related
to the ‘dip’ in working-age sex ratio (number of men per 100 women in the ages
15–64 years) in 1869–70. There is some evidence here of working-age males leaving
Gällivare, probably via temporary migration to seek work in areas less affected by
the famine (Dribe 2003). This also suggests only a small excess impact of the famine
on mortality for older people (Edvinsson 2014). Interestingly, the period considered
in Fig. 5.3 includes the 1857–58 famine, and there is some small evidence of decline
in variables of similar type (but lower intensity) for those years.
The impact of the Great Deprivation onmigration to and fromGällivare is difficult
to ascertain. There was negative net migration (in the order of 10–15 persons per
year) for four of the five years between 1867 and 1871, but negative net migration
was not unusual and had occurred in 8 of the preceding 11 years and would occur in
four of the following 10 years despite substantial population growth in that period.
Population turnover was lower in the Great Deprivation critical period (10 per 1000
population) than the preceding (13 per 1000) or proceeding (12 per 1000) five-
year periods. Of the 90 people who did leave Gällivare between 1867 and 1871,
none were recorded as moving to North America, and just three moved to Norway.
The remainder moved to other northern parishes within Sweden such as Råneå (20
migrants) and Överkalix (20 migrants). The destinations of migrants for 1867–1871
were similar to destinations in the preceding and proceeding five-year periods, with
the exception that Norway was less popular in 1867–1871 (there were 14 migrants to
Norway 1862–1866 and 13 in 1872–1876). There were 49 in-migrants to Gällivare
between 1867 and 1871, with themajority again coming from other northern parishes
where Överkalix and Jokkmokk accounting for more than half of all migrants. None
were from Finland.
However, migration events may not have been well captured in the data, particu-
larly short-term moves to find work or famine relief. The DDB does record 14 cases
of people who moved out of Gällivare between 1867 and 1871 and moved back to
Gällivare later. Only three of these were working-aged males (and one other male
aged 14 years), while seven were working-aged females. Consequently, the migra-
tion events recorded during the period do not account for the relative decrease in the
adult male population. Instead, there was an excess of adult male deaths (105 males
died during the period compared to 92 females). In contrast, the period 1877–1881
saw 104 adult female deaths and 69 adult male deaths.
Mortality did not increase inGällivare during the 1867–68 famine, crudemortality
rates were 33 and 28 per 1000, but in perspective of the entire nineteenth century,
these years mark a start of a high-mortality period that lasted until the end of the
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century (Sköld and Axelsson 2008). The dominant cause of death during the famine
resulted from infectious diseases. Smallpox broke out in 1867 and measles followed
in 1868. It is difficult to relate this to the starvation and suffering related to the
famine, especially since these epidemics were nationwide. The Sami experienced
a limited mortality increase around 1867–68 that was followed by similar peaks in
the following decades. These changes were not dramatic when seen through a long-
term perspective as they were not remarkable. Infant mortality actually decreased in
Gällivare during the 1860s. The limited immediate impact on Sami populations may
be explained in part by their capacity to use migration (a large proportion of Sami
were at this time still nomadic) as a response to the famine threat (Sköld 1997).
After the Great Deprivation, the Gällivare population became more male (the
total sex ratio rose steadily until the end of the nineteenth century, along with the
working-age sex ratio), and less Sami. Gällivare also became more urbanised, with
nearly three-quarters of the settled population living in villages with populations
over 50 people in 1880, compared with just 47% in 1860. Furthermore, the five
largest villages contained less than 25% of the population in 1860, which rose to
approximately 30% in 1880. However, this urbanisation was not apparent by 1870
with 47% of the population in larger villages and 23% in the five largest villages.
So the Great Deprivation may likely have had a lesser impact than the processes of
industrialisation in both the forestry and mining sectors, despite the more readily
available famine relief in the larger towns (Engberg 2004).
5.4 Katherine-Daly and Cyclone Les
TheKatherine-Daly river catchment area is home to about 21,000 people and consists
largely of two broad demographic zones. The town of Katherine is a predominantly
non-Indigenous (70%) urban centre of 10,000 inhabitants whose location coincides
with the main river crossing as well as the intersection of the only north–south and
east–west sealed road transport routes in northern Australia. The surrounding region
has over 85% of its population identifying as Indigenous, and features at least ten
large (more than 200 people) ‘Indigenous communities’—population centres located
on Indigenous land and subject to specific legislation and regulations about who can
live there.
Both Katherine town and the Katherine-Daly region have been well aware of
the risk of flood events, with the site of the town shifted several times between
initial European settlement in the late nineteenth century and the final siting that
occurred once the railway bridge intended as part of the north–south railway line
(not completed until 2004) had been constructed. The Indigenous inhabitants had
long since adopted practices of temporary and longer-term migration to adapt to
changing environmental conditions (Bird et al. 2013). While Katherine, like other
large Northern Territory towns, was founded largely as a result of the Overland
Telegraph line from Adelaide to Darwin, it quickly developed an entrepreneurial
culture which distinguished it from the heavy government dependence typical of
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Northern Territory regional and local economies (Carson 2011). Katherine was one
of the main service centres for the cattle industry in the north of Australia, was the
site of experimental pastoral (cattle and sheep) and agricultural (peanuts and citrus)
activities and had relatively large mining and manufacturing sectors in the 1980s and
1990s. The Katherine Research Station was opened in 1956 to inform agricultural
and pastoral development.
The Katherine-Daly region was also at the forefront of tourism development in
the north of Australia in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the first northern national
parks was established at Katherine Gorge (Nitmiluk) in 1962. Tourism ventures
originating in Katherine and focusing on Nitmiluk and Kakadu National Parks were
very important contributors to the local and regional economy by the late 1980s when
NitmilukNational Parkwas handed back to its traditionalAboriginal owners (Berzins
2007). Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) report that Nitmiluk received nearly a quarter
of a million visitors in 1997, and over 175,000 visitors stayed overnight in Katherine
town, where the majority of accommodation infrastructure existed. While many
visitors were self-drive, there were large organised tour markets, including 45,000
international visitors. Large tour companies such as Travel North were formed and
based in Katherine, and large motels (many constructed in the late 1970s and early
1980s) dominated the accommodation market.
By the time of the January 1998 flood, however, there were signs that Katherine’s
development was slowing down. Attempts to sustain scheduled commercial air trans-
port (subsidised heavily by the government) had largely failed. Travel North had
been broken up into two companies, with some operations relocated to Darwin.
Darwin had also supplanted Katherine as a major accommodation centre for people
visiting Kakadu National Park, and even Nitmiluk National Park (Schmallegger and
Carson 2010). Overall, visitor numbers to Outback Australia had begun a decline
that continues to this day (Taylor et al. 2015). For the Katherine tourism region,
visitor numbers have continued to decline since Faulkner and Vikulov’s (2001) paper
claimed that a ‘bounce back’ was likely. Visitor numbers did increase substantially in
2000 and 2001 (by approximately 15% comparedwith 1999), but declined evenmore
dramatically between 2002 and 2003 (by over 30%) and continued to decline at least
until 2013 (when visitor numbers were less than two-thirds of the 1999 benchmark).
While detailed data prior to 1996 are difficult to obtain, there is some anecdotal
evidence at least, that other private sector activities such asmining andmanufacturing
in Katherine were also in decline before 1998 (Desert Knowledge Australia 2005).
The Mount Todd mine, for example, was already in the process of winding down
operations by 1997. Population growth had already plateaued by the 1996 Census at
around 9500 people in the town, and 19,000 in the Katherine-Daly region as a whole.
The balance between Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents of the town had also
been shifting, with steady migration of Indigenous people from the surrounding
region to the town observed at least since the early 1970s (Taylor 1989) and may
have increased in the mid-1990s as a result of less support from government for
Indigenous people living in very small communities in very remote areas (Altman
2006). The early impact of this migration had somewhat been hidden by the major
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expansion of the Tindal Airforce Base in the late 1980s, which brought nearly 2000
mostly non-Indigenous (and male) residents to the town.
The broad demographic experience of the town of Katherine in response to
Cyclone Les and associated flooding in 1998 has studied by Harwood et al. (2011).
Theirwork focused on the period from1971 to 2006 reached somebroad conclusions:
• The town experienced rapid population growth from the late 1970s (inspired by
the establishment of a new military installation and the growth of the tourism
industry) until the flooding, when population growth stagnated;
• There was a substantial change in economic geography, with the private sector
and government administrative employment declining, and public services
employment (education and health) increasing;
• There was a substantial change in the age distribution between 1996 and 2001,
with an increase in the proportion of children aged under 15 years and people
aged over 45 years at the expense of younger working-age adults;
• There was a substantial increase in the proportion of Indigenous people (from 18
to 25% of the population) and in the proportion of women in the population (from
about 45% to nearly 50%).
Harwood et al. (2011) focused on the town itself, although the floods affected
the larger Katherine-Daly river catchment area. They did suggest that the increase in
Indigenous population could be partially explained by the continuing migration of
people frommore remote parts of the area to themain town.While thismigrationmay
have increased after the flood (evidence is hard to find), the changing proportions of
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in town was likely more due to out-migration
and a ‘failure to return’ (p. 317) by non-Indigenous people.
Harwood et al. assumed that the flood event was responsible for the immediate
demographic change, and suggested, as did Faulkner and Vikulov (2001), that such
impacts would likely be temporary. Katherine was expected to be well positioned
to bounce back from this event. Partly, because the town’s familiarity with flood
events (big floods also occurred in 1957 and 1974, and since Cyclone Les there
have been flood events in 2006 and 2014). Additionally, rapid recovery should
arise because of Katherine’s advantageous geographical position. Finally, because
of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ which had underpinned rapid development during the
1980s and early 1990s, and the economic diversity and human capital which had
accrued as a result. The expectation of rapid and full recovery (and even increased
growth) existed despite 98% of businesses being affected by flood damage (James
2009).
Both Harwood et al. (2011) and Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) may have overes-
timated the capacity of the town in particular to recover economically and demo-
graphically as quickly as observed in Gällivare. Katherine town did not return to
1996 population levels until 2007, and its growth since has been predicated on
the continued expansion of the public sector workforce, including substantial local
government employment as local government offices for the surrounding region
became located in Katherine town after local government reforms in 2007 (Michel
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and Taylor 2012). Public sector employment in health, welfare, education and protec-
tive services also increased dramatically as a result of the 2007 Northern Territory
Emergency Response, an Australian Government programme designed to combat
reported high levels of domestic violence and child abuse in Aboriginal communities
(Taylor and Carson 2009).
In contrast to the town, population growth in the surrounding region averaged
2% per annum from 1999 until 2013, with 1997–1998 gross population growth (72
persons) being low, but not unusually so. For the surrounding area, growth between
2003 and 2004was estimated at 82 persons, between 2006 and 2007 (coinciding with
another flood event) at 78 persons, and 2010 and 2011 at just 23 persons. In both
Katherine and the region as a whole, Indigenous population growth outstripped non-
Indigenous population growth, and the region became more female as well as more
concentrated in the very young and the older age groups (Brokensha andTaylor 2014).
No doubt the flood event was significant in the embedding of the new demographic
trends reported by Harwood et al. (2011). However, there is some evidence that
Katherine (particularly the town itself) was primed for such a demographic shift
even before the 1998 flood event. The disaster may have served to exacerbate the
new trends, rather than to create them.
5.5 Explaining the Differences
On the surface at least, Katherine appears to have experienced dramatic long-term
consequences of Cyclone Les and the 1998 flood, while Gällivare suffered some
substantial immediate impacts and relatively quickly returned to a pattern of demo-
graphic development which had been emerging by the mid-1860s. However, beyond
the direct impact on individuals (which even so is difficult to assess), it is problematic
to ascribe specific outcomes to the natural hazards. The dynamic nature of popula-
tions and economies in sparsely populated areas is well captured in these two case
examples. For Gällivare, the impending mining and timber booms linked to northern
settlement strategies, the introduction of industrial technologies, the opening up of
global markets (particularly the UK) and the arrival of rail transport were the major
drivers of demographic change in this period. There may be hints of correlations
between Great Deprivation-induced activities such as the failed British attempt to
construct a railway line or the increased Swedish government attention to forest
regulation, but the literature has not teased these out to this point. For Katherine,
the impending tourism ‘bust’ and the diversion of political attention and infrastruc-
ture investment to other locations in the north (principally Darwin) were likely very
significant drivers of demographic change by the mid-1990s. It is likely that the
processes of change would have occurred more slowly without the flood, but it is not
by any means clear that the ultimate outcomes would have been much different.
The Gällivare story stands as an exception to some of the perceptions about the
Great Deprivation—that it affected the north more than the south due to lack of
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industrialisation and that it resulted in substantial international emigration—but rein-
forces someothers—that impactswere short lived, and that component effects (births,
deaths, migration), while noticeable, were generally small. This reinforces the idea
that spatial scale is important when examining the demographic impacts of natural
disasters. Gällivare’s experiencemust be somewhat unique given its economic, social
and political resources, and, at least when it comes to economic circumstances, is
likely to be importantly unique.
The spatial scale at which the 1998 flood disaster in the Northern Territory of
Australia is examined has also proven important. A demographic diversion is clear
when the town of Katherine alone is examined, but the broader region appears to have
been less impacted. The town experience was more dramatic because of the starting
economic and demographic conditions—not only that these were so different to the
surrounding region, but because new trends which the flood would exacerbate in the
short term had already been flagged. Consequently, those trends have persisted at
least until the present day.
This research also includes an interesting comparison of affect—in Gällivare,
the principal threat was to human life. Property was not much impacted by the bad
seasons (although some land was not able to be used productively for a couple of
years). In contrast, human life was not substantially threatened by the 1998 flood, but
there was substantial property damage. This could explain the failure of Katherine
to recover as expected, although property damage and the need to rebuild have
elsewhere been considered drivers of Darwin’s rapid recovery from Cyclone Tracy
(Britton 1981). Loss of human life in a context of high mobility may actually be less
important than the loss of physical infrastructure.
The research has highlighted the ways in which the dynamic processes of demo-
graphic change that typify sparsely populated areas make it difficult to identify the
causes of specific changes, even where black swan events occur. Dynamic change
makes it more possible for sparsely populated areas to absorb immediate demo-
graphic shocks within what are anyway often short-term demographic cycles. It also
makes it easier to exaggerate trends which may have only been barely apparent
prior to the event. ‘Timing is everything’, but interpreting the specific effects of the
timing of a disaster presents challenges. In both cases, had the event been just a few
years earlier, the impacts may have been vastly different. Resulting in perhaps more
dramatic impacts for Gällivare than for Katherine. Timing influences the adaptations
that are available for populations—are there economic alternatives? Are there migra-
tion opportunities? Are there systems in place to coordinate disaster response? The
answers to these questions can change within even very short periods of time.
Similarly, the perception of impact of a disaster event can be altered by the
temporal scale at which those impacts are viewed. It is only at a relatively fine
scale (single years in this analysis) that the shock that Gällivare suffered can be
seen in the surviving data. Perhaps examination at an even finer scale (seasons or
months) could reveal even sharper impacts (Fellman and Eriksson 2001). In the case
of Katherine et al. (2001) andHarwood et al. (2011) inability to stretch the timeframe
of analysis sufficiently both prior to and after the event led to a misinterpretation of
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the economic and demographic context, and consequently a misunderstanding of at
least the medium term economic and demographic potential.
The third attribute of a temporal scale is the relationship between the disaster event
being examined and preceding and proceeding events of similar type. The annual
modelling of demographic characteristics presented for Gällivare, for example, poses
some interesting questions about the relationship between the 1857–58 famine and
the Great Deprivation a decade later. While it is commonly assumed that people
living in sparsely populated areas have heightened risk capacity as a result of frequent
exposure (or expected exposure) to disaster events, the importance of the frequency
of those events and the potentially different reactions of different social and economic
groups are not well known. The slowdown in Indigenous population growth in the
Katherine-Daly region around the time of the 2006 flood is also worthy of further
investigation.
A lot more work additionally needs to be done on examining the social scale
issues that have been flagged in this research. The experiences of women of the
Great Deprivation in Gällivare may actually have been important in the long-term
influencing both urbanisation (if even a fewwomenmoved to larger townswhen their
partners died) andmasculinisation (if future generations of womenwere discouraged
from in-migrating or encouraged to out-migrate) (see also Chap. 9). The evidence
linking these processes and the event is currently unclear, and othermethods (analysis
of oral and written personal histories, for example) are likely to prove much more
useful in creating such links than quantitative demographic analysis. The same can
be said for understanding the role of the Great Deprivation and the Katherine floods
in changing the behaviour of Indigenous people, an issue to which we have already
been alerted in relation to Cyclone Tracy in Darwin in 1974 (Haynes et al. 2011).
In conclusion, the study of disaster events in sparsely populated areas is a task
made particularly complex by the Ds of human geography in those areas. We can
postulate that disaster events can lead to temporary disruptions in demographic devel-
opmentwhen existing trends are so dynamic and powerful as to readily absorb tempo-
rary shocks.We can also postulate that disaster events can lead to longer lasting demo-
graphic diversions when economic, political, social and demographic conditions are
somewhat primed for change in any case (see also Chap. 6). We may not be able,
however, to make any definitive statements of cause and effect except at the very fine
spatial and social scale (essentially the attribution of individual behaviour). Rather,
disaster events should be considered as one part of an ever present and dynamic set
of influences on the human geography of sparsely populated areas.
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Chapter 6
Land Use Planning for Demographic
Change After Disasters in New Orleans,
Christchurch and Innisfail
David King and Yetta Gurtner
Abstract Land use planning is dominated by the growth paradigm—planning and
development strategies of cities and regions to encompass increased demand for
housing and infrastructure. Urban and Regional planning strategies are focused on
enhancing development and growth to counter decline. In contrast, an emerging
literature is concerned with planning for decline—managing population and infras-
tructure loss, decommissioning settlements and planning for reduced population and
economy. The advent of a disaster is frequently a catalyst for local decline, but such
loss is often connected to longer term issues and trends of population decline. New
Orleans, Christchurch and Innisfail are examined in this chapter, to illustrate issues
of population loss and demographic change against the impacts of specific disasters.
The case studies exhibit multiple patterns of migration both spatially and tempo-
rally. Net migration has reflected population loss, but is not homogenous across
the community. Specific demographic, cultural and socio-economic groups exhib-
ited different patterns of migration and mobility. Reconstruction of such settlements
faces changed demographywith a shift in service and infrastructure needs. A reduced
population requires land use rezoning, new strategic plans, land use change, removal
of structures and re-siting of infrastructure while climate change related adaptation
strategies identify protect, accommodate or retreat. Case studies illustrate various
approaches to these issues.
Keywords Population loss · Land use · Planning · Urban planning · Regional
planning · Disaster
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6.1 Introduction
Urban planning and regional planning are dominated by the growth paradigm, and
while the growth of towns and cities have been driven by urbanisation from indus-
trialisation alongside rapid population increase, there has also a demand for growth
from businesses and industry. The influx of migrants into cities creates a demand for
housing, services and infrastructure supplied by private and public sectors, and in
turn creates jobs and economic activity. An increasing population boosts the market
and creates a further opportunity for business expansion and profit. The private sector
drives and invests in growth and thus demands policies and development strategies
from all levels of government that enhance growth. Planning tools and concepts
such as strategic planning schemes are frequently geared to growth. The positivist
approach to city scaling (Bettencourt et al. 2007; Youn et al. 2016) shows that urban
growth generates a value adding factor of about 15%, so that the effects of growth
compound, creating both greater efficiencies and further growth.
While there is a “growth is good” paradigm “the key obstacle here is the notion…
that a healthy city always grows in population and that only unhealthy ones shrink”
(Hollander et al. 2009, p. 27). However, there are many conflicting messages in the
literature regarding increasing urbanisation, including the speed with which cities
have to absorb new migrants from rural areas, issues of city size, high density living,
ecological impact, urban angst and alienation, inequality, social and economic divi-
sions, social change, crime and pollution. Planners are faced with dealing with the
negative aspects of cities, but work towards optimistic outcomes that rely on the
drivers of growth to generate jobs and resources that contribute to solutions. Opti-
mistic growth and modernism have been expressed most powerfully in the devel-
oping world where most urbanisation is presently occurring. In contrast, the devel-
oped world planning profession is increasingly faced with emerging trends of slow
growth, environmental sustainability and population decline. Planning for shrinkage
or population loss requires a significant re-thinking of urban and regional plan-
ning (Hollander et al. 2009). Newman (2006) critiques planning approaches based
on population impact and ecological footprint, favouring a sustainability approach.
A planning approach based on adverse local population impact is best tackled by
a reduction in population and migration, which is not popular with governments or
business as it runs directly counter to growth. Sustainability on the other hand encom-
passes both the positive impacts andopportunities of the city.Newman (2006) stresses
the importance of sustainability in planning both for city growth and the scenario of
stagnation or decline.
The reality of declining and disadvantaged regions is increasingly observed in
towns and cities. Population migration and settlement relocation are part of adapting
to a changing environment and economic opportunities. Alongside rapid urbanisa-
tion, there is a worldwide trend of shrinkage of cities, especially in the developed
world (Oswalt et al. 2006; Hollander et al. 2009), where urban decline, inequity and
social disadvantage are linked issues.Hollander et al. (2009, p. 223) claim that “devel-
oped, modern cities throughout the world are facing declines at an unprecedented
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scale”.Manymedium- and small-sized cities below500,000 population are shrinking
while larger than these cities (in particularly global and mega cities) are rapidly
growing (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division 2018).
To an even greater extent than in city planning, regional planning has been
concerned with economically disadvantaged or declining regions for many decades.
Such areas are often characteristic of endemic rural poverty, remoteness, paucity of
services and infrastructure, and areas of structural economic change as a consequence
of post-industrial and resource change. A primary aim of regional economic develop-
ment has been to arrest regional decline, initiate economic growth and in more recent
decades, to adapt to changed social and economic realities through exploration of
the strengths and opportunities of places to plan for new alternative economies and
communities (Ehrenfeucht and Nelson 2011).
Hollander et al. (2009, p. 228) identify a broad range of processes which have
led to demographic decline and change in both cities and regions. These include:
suburbanisation and out migration, change in economic activity, post-industrial shift
from manufacturing to service industries, war, fire, disease, agricultural crisis, an
ageingpopulation or low fertility rate, political changes that have shifted development
and economic priorities and long-term subsidies, and perhapsmostmarkedly impacts
associated with significant natural or human induced disasters. A complicating factor
of growth or decline is the failure of urban boundaries to shift as population moves
out of city centres. The population of a city may show apparent decline while the
broader peri-urban region may even have grown, or at least the decline may be much
less overall. As populations exit the city for peripheral or peri-urban locations, they
may also increase their vulnerability as they move into unfamiliar areas subject to
different hazards.
In this chapter, we specifically address population decline of towns, cities and
regions as a consequence of disasters. Population decline is not equal or evenly
spread, but is expressed through different demographic indicators—ethnicity, socio-
economic status, age and gender for example. Evacuation is an immediate response to
a hazard, with a gradual return of some of the population during the recovery period,
possibly over many years. This period of dislocation and population loss is an oppor-
tunity to re-appraise planning priorities—to plan and manage for a different commu-
nity (see also Chapter 2). We explore these planning and demographic concepts and
issues through an examination of three places that have lost population following
recent disasters; New Orleans in the USA, Christchurch in New Zealand and Innis-
fail in Australia. The chapter examines theoretical aspects of planning for decline,
the demographic impacts of disasters with emphasis on the three case studies and
planning strategies and approaches.
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6.2 Planned Decline, Planning for Decline and Disaster
Recovery
The concept of shrinkage, shrinking cities (Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2016) and
decline with consequent loss of population and services is an emerging trend in
planning. As planning tools are geared to growth, shrinkage requires a re-thinking of
planning. Hollander et al. (2009) recommend a paradigm shift to proactively plan for
shrinkage—where shrinking cities sounds better than urban decline. An alternative
expression might be “rightsizing”—planning for a different size and composition of
community. Hollander et al. (2009) advocate that the appropriate planning response
is to re visualise the city—to bring about smaller, less dense, redesigned cities
that continue to be productive and sustainable. Shrinkage brings a range of issues
including; land use and vacant land, reduction and/or decommissioning of infras-
tructure, cleaning and greening for maintenance of land values, redevelopment and
revised landscape options, persistence of cultural attractions, historic preservation
and social equity issues.
Shrinking cities, however, are not necessarily in absolute decline. Shrinkage
creates a redefined density with the opportunity for nodes of redevelopment. Such
strategies may include: environmental mitigation and ecological restoration, revege-
tation, stormwater and hazard management through vacant land, community gardens
(“the new ruralism”, Ellis and Fanning 1977), urban agriculture, mixed used redevel-
opment, tourism, temporary use initiatives such as retail exhibitions, urban installa-
tions and street markets, media/industry investments and recreation. Planners are in
a unique position to reframe decline as an opportunity, a chance to re-envision cities
and to explore non-traditional approaches to growth, liveability and safety (Hollander
et al. 2009). A positive “sense of place” and resilience for a locality are especially
significant after a major disaster.
Planning andmanagement in the post-disaster recovery context represents another
emerging area of planning research and policy (Olshansky and Chang 2009; Blanco
andAlberti 2009). Planners play a critical role in the redevelopment of an area after an
event with unique time-sensitive challenges regarding reconstruction and recovery of
housing and infrastructure and social, economic and environmental systems. Specific
issues include resource availability, public interest (with particular concern regarding
speed versus quality) and opportunities for community betterment.
Olshansky and Chang (2006, p. 201) assert, “However defined, it is clear that
post-disaster recovery demands the skills of planners. Recovery is a microcosm of
all the challenges of urban planning—developing land use and economic develop-
ment strategies to improve lives, acting in the absence of sufficient information,
making trade-offs between deliberation and expediency, navigating local politics,
engaging the public and identifying funding sources to supplement inadequate local
resources.” The reimagining of the reduced city enables planners to re-address the
physical vulnerabilities of cities, polarisation, re-urbanisation, sense of place, mixed
use redevelopment, social equity and quality of life—to incorporate new urbanist
principles, to create liveable cities, resilient cities and climate change adaptation
6 Land Use Planning for Demographic Change After Disasters … 105
through new approaches to land use change, zoning and integrated strategic planning
(Hollander et al. 2009).
For environmental systems, large-scale depopulation with reduction and decom-
missioning of infrastructure allows for the removal of buildings and paved surfaces
from floodplains, with enhanced opportunities for green urbanism, environmental
mitigation and ecological restoration, green spaces for reforestation with environ-
mental functions, watersheds (storm water management), wildlife habitats and the
establishment of concentrated areas of vegetation to improve air quality and reduce
urban heat-island effects. Socially and economically, a decreased population size
and density post-disaster may facilitate a revised community focus, redistribution of
resources and access, new social and community networking opportunities, diversi-
fied employment prospects and the development of enhanced resilience, safety and
well-being.
The resized city requires strategic sustainable planning through positive de-
densification (purchase of empty spaces andmaintenance of adjoining blocks), demo-
lition or re-purpose demolition of benign neglect, stabilisation of transitional cities
and neighbourhoods for a sustainable future. Planning concepts require sustainable
redevelopment, planning for a radically altered future alongside the uncertainty of
climate change scenarios impacts. Enablers are participatory processes, local leader-
ship, cooperation all levels of government, external funds and resources, pre-existing
planning documents and institutions, with engagement and consensus on policies
regarding future development (Hollander et al. 2009).
6.3 Shrinkage and Out Migration
While the growth paradigm remains popular, it is widely acknowledged by plan-
ners that cities, towns and regions lose population and may experience a conse-
quent decline in economic opportunities, service provision and community resilience.
Migration is a fundamental human characteristic. It is a rational response to changing
resources, threats and opportunities. People are mobile over time and space. For the
individual, outmigrant relocationmay enhance resilience and quality of life, although
it may not necessarily reduce vulnerability factors. For the community that loses
population to emigration, the process may reduce resilience and adaptive capacity
and may increase overall vulnerability to economic and social change, including
future disasters brought on by natural hazards and climate change. Emigration is
highly significant for disaster risk reduction, although there is limited social science
research literature or systematic data which estimates the impact of disasters upon
population flows post-disaster (Love 2011).
Sociological disaster research predominantly investigates the recovery of social
units such as individuals, family and households, organisations and community
within the context of social networks, systems and institutions (Boon et al. 2012,
2013, 2016). Economic impacts further encompass businesses, economic costs (short
term rather than long term), economic security and capacity, insurance coverage,
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finance, employment and livelihoods. Physical destruction and damage to the built
environment consequent to a disaster generally connects facets such as logistics,
resources, lifelines, critical infrastructure (see Chap. 10), housing and basic service
provision, environment and revised policy. Despite the significant implications
for changed communities and regions, there is limited literature on planning for
recovery and reconstruction, being focusedmore onmitigation of risks for an existing
population, rather than being concerned with the absent or diaspora population.
Additionally, disaster driven out migration takes place within a context of the
pre-existing processes of net migration. Disasters increase out migration, but in the
long term, it occurs within the pre-disaster economic trend (see also Chap. 5, the
case of Katherine flooding). There are five types of out migration processes that are
enhanced by a disaster.
(1) Fear of risk and a consequent preparedness to leave the place to seek residence
elsewhere (King et al. 2014). This is based on hazard vulnerability and percep-
tion of vulnerability by the individual or household, or business operation. Prior
experience, or prior knowledge of the hazard in this place or others, influences
an attitude of intent to move if threatened further. Age, local ownership of prop-
erty, and economic capacity influence relocation capacity. Older people with
local roots and property are much more constrained than younger economically
active families, who cite safety of children as well as having a greater capacity to
seek opportunities elsewhere (King et al. 2014). Disaster risk reduction for this
population may put out migration as the most effective strategy and relocation
may occur at any time prior to a hazard event occurring.
(2) Evacuation prior to a disaster where early warning is possible, such as for floods,
cyclones and bushfires, is organised by authorities and emergency services and
may be forced or advisory. This takes people out of harm’s way and reduces the
death rate, although the experience of severe bushfires has shown that voluntary
evacuation which is left too late may significantly add to deaths. People may
be accommodated temporarily and permitted to return soon after the danger
has passed, but within the constraints of the extent of damage to the home
community.
(3) Evacuation after an event has severely damaged a community, organised by
authorities and emergency services and may be compulsory. Evacuation is
usually a response to sudden onset disasters, such as earthquakes, where damage
is widespread, secondary hazards pose a risk, and the community is unable to
be supported through loss of housing, basic services and lifelines.
(4) Further evacuation from the impacted community or region progressively occurs
as a consequence of the loss of structures, economy, services and infrastruc-
ture, making post-disaster recovery slow and inhibiting early return. Temporary
accommodation nearby in anticipation of a rapid return becomes increasingly
unviable, forcing people to move further away for work and accommodation.
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(5) The longer term loss of economy and dwellings prompt emigration to places of
greater opportunity where people may remain as they settle into a new commu-
nity and lifestyle. Many of those initially displaced by advisory evacuations,
accommodation loss and sustained damage choose this option.
In reviewing the demographic impacts of disasters, Love (2011) refers to popu-
lations in transition. While the long-term decline of a city is not necessarily a direct
outcome of a significant high impact disaster, current research and literature indicate
a period of population transition reflecting evacuations (voluntary and/or manda-
tory), residential damage, and displacement. Decisions to leave or return are highly
dependent on the level of residential damage at localised geographical levels. Love
(2011) identified that ninety per cent of residents return within 6 months, but if return
does not occur within 2 years, it is likely to be permanent (see also Chaps. 2 and 11 on
permanent resettlement). This is especially evident where there has been displace-
ment of vulnerable populations from areas where they do not have the resources
to recover. A concentration of vulnerable populations also occurs in areas where
the better resourced were able to leave. Displacement as opposed to intentional out
migration alters population dynamics, demographic composition and trends (Love
2011). Consequently, the people who leave and return to a disaster-impacted town
or city are not a representative cross section of the population. In disrupting the
functions and dynamics of pre-existing social systems, disasters distort social and
demographic patterns.
As disaster rebuilding takes place in depopulated and changed physical and
community landscapes, the critical issue emerges for planners of which infrastruc-
ture to rebuild, standards of improvement and best practice (Hollander et al. 2009,
Ehrenfeucht and Nelson 2011). Comprehensive and strategic planning are crucially
important in recovery as it is through land use planning and flexible rebuilding strate-
gies that it is feasible to “build back better”. Land is the basis of residential commu-
nities and economy, and thereby provides community security (Lundin 2011). There
is an opportunity for change, urban transition, reconstruction and redevelopment—
moving people away from direct physical exposure, thereby increasing mitigation
and resilience rebuilding. These are priorities of the Sendai Framework—Disaster
Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015) and build back better (see Chap. 12)—and deter-
mined by how we conceive recovery and its narratives in recovery management
decision making. Opportunities exist for planners to integrate New Urbanist princi-
ples (Congress for the New Urbanism 1999) into a resized urban landscape, driving
land use change, development strategies encompassing considerations of economics,
energy, transportation, sustainable development, well-being, social capital, resilience
and liveability, aswell as paying attention to climate changemitigation and adaptation
in a greater future hazard risk environment.
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6.4 Recovery and Loss Following Major Disasters: Case
Studies
Since the newmillennium, numerous towns and cities around the world have demon-
strated population loss following a major disaster. This chapter proceeds to examine
the experience of three disparate places from the perspectives of planning responses
and disaster recovery. Population loss from each place is examined in the context
of longer term demographic movements, with the disaster events extending these
established trends.
Each of the three case studies is quite different, and as such, the aim of this review
is not to make comparisons or contrasts, but rather to examine the direct experiences
of urban places in the developed world that have had a notable decline in population
following the impact of relatively recent disasters. New Orleans in Louisiana, USA,
had an overall population of 1.34 million (Sastry 2009) before it was devastated by
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Christchurch City in the South Island of New Zealand
with a pre-disaster population of 367,720 was severely damaged by two earthquakes
in 2010 and 2011, with the latter quake causing more damage and significant loss of
life (Love 2011). Innisfail and its Local Government Area of the Cassowary Coast
in Far North Queensland, Australia, had a population of around 30,000 in 2011
(ABS 2016), and was hit by two category four cyclones—Cyclone Larry in 2006 and
Cyclone Yasi in 2011. Although there was no loss of human life from either of these
cyclone events, there was a compounding effect upon economic recovery.
Love (2011) stresses that the outmigration and movement of people after disaster
events in Christchurch and New Orleans cannot be compared, proposing that
Christchurch’s experience is closer to the impact of Hurricane Andrew on Miami
(1992), and the Kobe earthquake (1995). Likeswise Zaninetti and Colten (2012)
compare New Orleans to the experience of Galveston, Texas after the category 4
hurricane1 in 1900, following which economic and population growth shifted to
Houston. Galveston was already in decline pre-1900. Both New Orleans and Innis-
fail experienced population stagnation and loss of economic importance over an
extended period before the recent disasters, while Innisfail and Christchurch serve
rural hinterlands, but these case studies are not otherwise comparable. They are
presented as examples of different processes and experiences following disasters.
6.4.1 Christchurch
Christchurch city, the largest city on the New Zealand South Island, is renowned as
a popular heritage tourism destination, surrounded by a peri-urban rural residential
area (Swaffield 2012). Love (2011) refers to the widely cited figure of 70,000 overall
population loss from Christchurch after the 2010–2011 earthquakes. An estimated
1According to the Saffir-Simpson scale hurricanes are scaled from 1 (min.) to 5 (max.). Category
four usually means a maximum wind speed between 209–251 km/h.
6 Land Use Planning for Demographic Change After Disasters … 109












2006 44,060 361,820 35,000 440,860
2011 48,600 367,720 41,100 457,420
Population
change
2008–2009 800 3,700 1,100 5,600
2009–2010 800 4,000 1,000 5,700







400 −10,300 600 −9,300
Low mid
range
400 −7,900 900 −6,500
Mid range 700 −4,700 1,200 −2,900
High mid
range
700 −2,800 1,200 −900
Highest
outlier
800 −700 1,300 1,400
*Estimates modelled by Newell et al. 2012
regional population of 460,000 in the Greater Christchurch area was affected, with
150,000 homes damaged to varying degrees. There was actually little population
change after the 2010 quake, but damage from the 2011 quake resulted in a significant
outflow and relocation (Parker and Steenkamp 2012). Newell et al. (2012) show in
Table 6.1 that the population loss after this event was particularly concentrated in the
city while less damaged peri-urban areas appeared to increase in population.
Newell et al. (2012) estimate around 15%, i.e., 55,000 of the Christchurch popu-
lation left the city after the 2011 earthquake. Many Maori residents returned to
traditional Iwi (Gawith 2011), but many who relocated a short distance subsequently
returned in the short term. School enrolments in Christchurch (Newell et al. 2012)
suggest less than 10% out migration occurred immediately post-quake with a steady
population return. Gawith (2011) reviews a compilation of media reports on the
Christchurch earthquakes, giving the media estimates of 26,000 people departing,
and school rolls showing 4496 pupils having moved to new schools—partly driven
by damage and closure of educational facilities. While the 2013 census shows that
the population in Christchurch city was down 2% from 2006 estimates, the greater
Christchurch region was estimated to have increased in population by 2.6% over
this period (Statistics New Zealand 2014a). These census data also suggest that the
highest rates of decline (35–36%) occurred in the most damaged areas with two-
thirds of those displaced by the damage moving to another dwelling within the same
territorial authority. Census data are not directly comparable to other population
estimates, especially those of local governments and city councils. The 2018 New
Zealand census estimated a 10% undercount, especially of Pacific Islanders, but only
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a 2.4%undercount in 2013 (BERL2018; StatisticsNewZealand 2019; StatisticsNew
Zealand 2014b).
Before the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the trend in Christchurch’s population
growthhadbeen a continuous increase, predominantly through inmigration, although
it also had an ageing population (Love 2011). Newell (2012) places the observed out
migration from Christchurch within a broader context of migration patterns of in and
out migration and international arrivals, which show a marked decrease because of a
loss of capacity for the tourism industry and related short-term visitor sectors, such as
international students. A reduction of births was also observed. Building approvals,
on the other hand, were highly robust from 2012, with the construction industry being
a dominant driver of growth. The number of technicians and trade workers in the
region increased by 6.9% from 2006 to 2013 in contrast to a national trend of decline
in this labour force sector (Statistics New Zealand 2014a). Although the estimates
of population out migration and return after the quakes appear highly variable, it
is evident that the population loss from Christchurch was closely correlated with
the extent of damage and loss of housing, services and infrastructure. Although the
population dynamics have changed, the 2018 census indicates that the population
has grown and by 2018, the census estimates that the population is around 404,600
(Statistics New Zealand 2019).
6.4.2 New Orleans
By comparison to Christchurch, the major US port city of New Orleans was experi-
encing long-term population and economic decline pre-Katrina (Love 2011). Love
(2011) claims that New Orleans City had been noticeably declining since 1970,
while Zaninetti and Colten (2012) assert that the history of New Orleans, known
as The Crescent City or the Big Easy, has been one of declining importance since
the American Civil War (early 1860s). The core city area reached a population peak
of 627,525 in 1960 (Plyer 2011), followed by absolute population decline of this
core city area and progressive expansion into the outer suburbs, encroaching on the
surrounding protective wetlands and subsequently increasing the physical vulnera-
bility to flooding. The population of greater New Orleans (metropolitan area) pre-
event in 2005 was estimated at 1.34 million, of whom 69% identified as African-
American (Sastry 2009). In the decades prior, the population declined 18% between
1970 and 2000 followed by a further 6% over the next 5 years. Unemployment rates
were above the national average, over 20%were living below the poverty line in 2000,
with high levels of socio-economic disadvantage (United States Census 2019; Simo
2008). In this context, Sastry (2009) suggests that many people who may already
have been planning to leave the city for economic reasons may have been prompted
by the Katrina evacuations. Katrina consequently accelerated demographic shifts.
With the impact of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the associated levee system
failure, the entire NewOrleans city centre population of 455,000 had to evacuate and
resettle for over a month. There were at least 1500 recorded fatalities and more than
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Table 6.2 Return rates to
New Orleans post-Katrina
(Fussel 2015; Love 2011)
Housing status One year return percentage
Undamaged 96
Damaged but habitable 81
Uninhabitable 54
Destroyed 30
a million people were displaced within the broader region of impact. Approximately
71.5% of the 188,251 housing units in New Orleans were damaged, with 55.9%
having major or severe damage (Fussell et al. 2010). Given the magnitude of this
damage and the substantial drainage requirements, many evacuated residents ended
up displaced for long periods of time. Four months after Katrina, the population of
New Orleans was estimated at 158,353, a 64% loss on pre-Katrina numbers (Kates
et al. 2006). Of 66,000 school students in NewOrleans parish pre-Katrina, there were
only 5000 by the end of the year. Most displaced students re-enrolled in other states
(Sastry 2009).
With reconstruction and rebuilding slowed significantly by legal and property
rights, provision of temporary accommodation, insurance, ecological restoration
plans, race and other political issues all of which impacted people’s return, the
Census Bureau estimated the population of New Orleans at approximately 223,000
in July 2006—less than 50% of the pre-Katrina level (Zaninetti and Colten 2012).
Fussell et al. (2010) calculated return rates against housing status one year after
Hurricane Katrina (Table 6.2) suggesting an overall return rate of 70%, although
other estimates were closer to 60%. Recovery of urban infrastructure, housing, busi-
nesses and services continued to be slow and highly variable. In 2010, a number
of neighbourhoods that did not flood were near to 90—100% of their pre-Katrina
population, if not exceeding. In contrast, vacancy rates across the entire city were
approximately 25%, reflected in empty lots and abandoned homes, commercial and
institutional buildings (Plyer 2011). The Data Center (Plyer 2015) states that ten
years after Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans (city core area) had an estimated popu-
lation of approximately 385,000, a net loss of 15%. Further analysis demonstrates
the differential social, spatial and temporal population dimensions of recovery and
the continued socio-demographic composition of vulnerability (Fussel 2015).
6.4.3 Innisfail
Innisfail, a small rural town in North Queensland, Australia, serves a surrounding
agricultural population predominantly producing sugar, bananas and other tropical
fruit crops. Historically the township has been significantly impacted by a number
of cyclones. In 1918, a cyclone destroyed 1200 houses with 90 people killed. Of
these fatalities, 37 people were specifically from Innisfail and 40–60 indigenous
people were killed nearby (Boon et al. 2013). In 1986, CycloneWinifred hit Innisfail
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resulting in 3 deaths, 12 injuries and 200 people displaced (Boon et al. 2013). In this
event, fifty homes were destroyed and a further 1500 buildings (95% of the town)
were damaged resulting in insurance reparations totalling $65 million. Local media
were running a historical remembrance of Winifred at the time Cyclone Larry hit in
2006.
Of the two category 4 cyclones2 that recently devastated the area within a five year
period, Cyclone Larry passed directly over Innisfail inMarch 2006 and Cyclone Yasi
crossed near the small town of Mission Beach (50 km south of Innisfail) in February
2011, accompanied by a 5 m storm surge. Cyclone Larry caused the most phys-
ical destruction in Innisfail with over half the dwellings and infrastructure damaged.
These damage rates were higher in older dwellings and in many of the surrounding
townships. Cyclone Yasi destroyed approximately 150 homes, made 650 uninhabit-
able, with a further 2275 sustaining moderate damage across the entire impact area.
No one died (directly from cyclone impact) in either event, and there were very few
injuries. In both events, the direct impact on primary industry was devastating, losing
hundreds of millions of dollars in damaged crops with consequent loss of employ-
ment and economic livelihoods. Insured damage from the whole region impacted by
Cyclone Larry was estimated to be over $500 million dollars, while the damage from
Cyclone Yasi five years later was estimated to be $3.5 billion (Boon et al. 2013).
Given a long period of ineffective local governance with economic weakness and
instability, the rural shire of Innisfail reflected an extended population declinewith an
ageing population and out migration of younger residents. Stagnation of the tourism
industry also led to a steady population decline in the wider Cassowary Coast region
(Table 6.3). Both Cyclone Larry and Yasi occurred half a year before the 2006 and
2011 censuses.Many people were displaced with a significant number of agricultural
employees without work by the time the formal censuses were undertaken. Despite
the economic activity generated by cyclone recovery, the population of Cassowary
Coast declined by 1.9% between 2001 and 2006 and a further 0.3% from 2006 to
2011. The trend of population decrease has continued in Innisfail since 2011 with
both the township andCassowary Coast declining by an overall rate of approximately
1.7% between 2001 and 2015.
6.5 Socio-Demographic Impacts of Disasters and Planning
Strategies
Consistent with the finding of Love’s review (2011), each of these case studies
reveal populations in transition, characterised by obvious accelerated decline post-
disaster event. Patterns of residents staying, leaving or returning have shown a strong
correlation with the level of residential damage at the localised geographical level.
2According to the Saffir-Simpson scale. However Cyclone Yasi reached Category 5 according to
the Australia-South Pacific tropical cyclone classification but was downgraded to Category 4 after
landfall.
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Table 6.3 Population change in Innisfail pre- and post-2006/2011 cyclones (Adapted from ABS
2016)





Estimated population 2001 (census) 35,408 9,719
2005 35,203 9,822
2006 (census) 34,711 9,664
2010 34,921 9,627
2011 (census) 34,718 9,576
2015 34,820 9,556
Population change 2001–2006 (census) −697 (−1.9%) −55 (−0.6%)
2005–2006 (TC Larry) −492 (−1.4%) −158 (−1.6%)
2010–2011 (TC Yasi) −203 (−0.6%) −51 (−0.5%)
2006–2011(census) −101 (−0.3%) −88 (−0.9%)
Total change 2001–2015 −588 (−1.7%) −163 (−1.7%)
While the historical context and demographic circumstances were variable for each
case study pre-event, there have been a number of socio-demographic factors and
issues evidentwithin the recovery process. Populationmovement during recovery and
reconstruction has not been homogenous spatially, temporally or socially. Changes in
gender profiles, age structure, race and ethnicity, employment, income, livelihoods,
insurance coverage, housing affordability, rebuilding and redevelopment, service
provision and rehabilitation of the surrounding environment each have implications
on measures of vulnerability and resilience to future events that should be taken into
account in planning decision making.
Sub-national population estimates forChristchurch city in 2012 revealed a popula-
tion decline of about 13,500 (3.6%) compared to pre-earthquake estimates, although
the greaterChristchurch region experienced agrowthof 2.6%(StatisticsNewZealand
2012; Statistics New Zealand 2014a, b). The net migration loss from the city was
partly offset by natural increase yet there were some observed differences in both
gender and age groups (Statistics New Zealand 2012; Newell et al. 2012). In the
two years after the earthquake, there was a significant loss of women from the
workforce, fewer young adults and a net outflow of children and their parents. The
population continued to age with an increase in the number of people over 50, also
indicating this cohort was less likely to have left Christchurch than people of other
age groups. A significant number of those displaced by damage and destruction to
the housing stock relocated in proximate suburban regions with the 2013 census
showing a large increase in the percentage of workers now commuting to the city
for employment. There was however an 81.1% increase in the number of unoccu-
pied dwellings as a consequence of the earthquake, many of these “red-stickered” as
unsafe for occupation (Statistics New Zealand 2014a).
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In Greater Christchurch construction replaced manufacturing as the industry
sector with the highest proportion of employment after the quakes, as the inflow
of workers and extensive rebuilding activity helped the economy remain reason-
ably resilient. Retail and tourism were hit hardest, but insurance helped to buffer
the economic impact (Parker and Steenkamp 2012). Reflecting the extensive level
of destruction, there was a marked decrease in the number of workers in central
Christchurch City. However with offsets in the south-west and near the airport
there was no long-term change in overall employment rates between 2006 and
2013 censuses (Statistics New Zealand 2014a). Gawith (2011) lists many social,
emotional, psychological, traumatic, economic and financial impacts, as well as
a loss of places and community. Relocation was thus not just physical necessity
but about moving forward. Greater Christchurch strategic planning was in place
pre-earthquake, based on performance criteria that stressed sustainability (Swaffield
2012). Although recovery and rebuilding have been slow there is an optimism about
the future of Christchurch. There is not an alternative central place in that region of
New Zealand.
Even prior to the impact and devastation caused byHurricaneKatrina, the core city
of NewOrleans was a poor community associated with high levels of poverty, crime,
illiteracy, inadequate basic services including health care and education, substandard
housing stock and a lack economic opportunities. Sastry (2009) identified that 23%
of the New Orleans population was below the poverty line, with a 35% poverty rate
amongstAfrican-Americans.Rental rateswere high,with lower thannational average
rates of home ownership. The distribution of predominantly African-American and
more socially and economically disadvantaged people were concentrated in low-
lying areas that took the brunt of floods. There were consequently high levels of
permanent displacement of people and many uninsured losses following Hurricane
Katrina. The principally poor population lacked the finances or resources to rebuild
(Zaninetti and Colten 2012). Raising houses on stilts was seen by planners as too
expensive for a poor population.
The recovery process in New Orleans has further embedded distinct geographical
patterns of social vulnerability. Zaninetti and Colten (2012) highlight a change in
the city’s ethnic landscape with differentiation in population distribution on class
and racial lines. The city and metro area became more ethnically diverse; as African-
American and white non-Hispanic populations declined in overall number, there was
an increase in Hispanic and Asian residents (Plyer 2015). This was also an ageing
population with a noticeable growth in the proportion of residents aged 65 and older.
With the business and tourist centres relatively undamaged by the flooding, there has
been a significant increase in property values and consequently the historic down-
town has revealed gentrification and relative affluence. Recovery in other areas has
reflected a temporal redistribution of population in clusters of settlements associated
with less flood-prone neighbourhoods, the level of damage and extent of rebuilding.
The worst flooded areas have been characterised by depopulation with abandoned
properties and blight rather than spatial contraction of the city and infrastructure. In
2012, vacancy still represented a loss of over 11% of the city, particularly a shrinkage
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of the metropolitan area (Zaninetti and Colten 2012). Population growth and reloca-
tion in NewOrleans has moved from below sea level towards higher ground (vertical
migration). Exposure to flood has been reduced since Katrina through population
redistribution, but population loss has also reduced the tax base and capacity of the
city to provide services and infrastructure. High demand and high rental costs for
viable dwellings have made much of post-Katrina housing unaffordable. The reality
of post-Katrina New Orleans is the emergence of unequal and disparate cities—the
downtown cultural and business areas which have recovered, middle-class neigh-
bourhoods which reflect variable degrees of redevelopment and recovery, and the
disadvantaged areas (Olshansky 2006).
While continued population stagnation and decline in both Innisfail and
Cassowary Coast reflect an established demographic trend, patterns over the last
ten years have been underscored by significant reduction in standards of living.
During the period 2001 to 2006, incomes grew faster than rents and mortgage repay-
ments, but in the second half of the decade post-Cyclone Larry and accompanying
the global recession and Cyclone Yasi, the reverse has been the case with housing
costs increasing at much higher rates than household income, generating concerns
regarding affordability (Boon et al. 2013). As redevelopment and rebuilding post-
disaster resulted in an increase in housing approvals and the overall number of
available dwellings, vacancy rates have also escalated.
Despite the influx of trades, technicians and the temporary construction boom
associated with cyclone recovery, young people and families have continued to move
to larger cities seeking education and employment opportunities. Numbers of youth
and residents aged 25–44 declined by 1.8% with a distinct decline (10%) in couples
with children and family household compositions. Reflecting an aging population
the percentage of residents aged over 55 is increasing (see Chap. 2 for comparison
on disaster-induced aging). The median age in Innisfail has subsequently increased
by 7.2 years to 42.4 between the 2005 and 2011 censuses (QGSO 2017). With net
population loss, there has been a reduction in both business and job prospects in the
Innisfail township.
Growth and decline in coastal Queensland, including the Cassowary Shire remain
heavily influenced by resource exploitation. Tropical fruits and sugar cane have
declined in terms of relative commodity prices. Farmers are ageing, and the fami-
lies of many have left the area to seek qualifications and off-farm careers. On top
of these longer term trends, hazard events are major drivers of community change.
The Cassowary Coast has 9.4% of its population Indigenous and experiences high
population mobility, with 44% of the population of the local government area
in the lowest Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) quintile. Similar to the
Maori of Christchurch (Gawith 2011), aboriginal farm workers and banana packers
in Cassowary Shire found themselves put out of work following Larry and Yasi,
returning to their home communities on Cape York Peninsula between 400 and
1000 km to the north.
Many other seasonal farm workers in the region were backpacker tourists who
also lost opportunities in the shire and ceased to travel in this area. Tourism was hard
hit generally, with resorts going out of business or into “moth balls”, or operating
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part time, seasonally or for booked events. For many potential tourists, the stigma
and perception of a disaster afflicted environment, and infrastructure preserved well
beyond its useful life—the tourism industry has been slow to recover. Within this
context of recurrent cyclones, flooding and coastal hazards, population loss and
economic insecurity the Cassowary Coast Regional Council has continued to pursue
a strategic planning direction of growth based on recognition of Innisfail as the major
regional activity centre, supported by value added agriculture and tourism (AECOM
2012).
6.5.1 Planning Approaches
While population adjustment is fundamental to human response to disasters, popu-
lation redistribution is a part of adaptation. In the aftermath of a disaster event, there
are significant concerns regarding the prospect of sustained population exodus from
a town or city. Task forces consisting of government representatives, planners, non-
government organisations, industry and community members are often established
to develop strategic approaches to arrest further population flight and facilitate recon-
struction, resettlement and recovery. Strategies may be protective, defensive, offen-
sive, opportunistic, or landscape and urban design oriented with different resource
orientations (Lima and Eischeid 2017).
Planning for effective post-disaster recovery requires all scales and levels of
government and a vision and openness to imagine a radically different, new commu-
nity or city. Similarly, it is necessary to recognise patterns of demographic change and
transition thatmay represent short,mediumor even longer termpopulation loss (King
et al. 2016). There is a need for data and resource sharing and extensive communica-
tion. Recovery has to involve the diaspora population and planning for recovery needs
funding (Olshansky 2006). Rather than traditional planning premised on anticipated
future growth and development, post-disaster recovery should be prepared to plan-to-
scale or right sizing for greater resilience and sustainability. Hollander et al. (2009)
identify a number of strategies for “shrinking cities” or depopulated areas including
de-densification, use of vacant land and underused property, green urbanism and
environmental improvement, historic preservation and redistribution of access and
resources aimed at enhancing equity, liveability, safety and sustainability. A number
of these strategies are evidenced in the case studies.
Primary responsibility for planning for the recovery and revitalisation of
Christchurch was given to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA).
The main objective of this group was to strategically manage issues of centralisation,
land use and infrastructure in the recovery process with an appreciation of potential
future seismic activity and climate change considerations including floods, storms
and sea-level rise (Miles et al. 2014). Given the high levels of damage and destruction
in the CBD precinct, the vision was based on decentralisation and changes in the
peri-urban landscape (CERA 2015). This process imagined a greener, more compact,
more accessible and safer central business district dominated by low-rise buildings.
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Further to this was the plan for a green frame or buffer around the CBD that would
blend in with the Avon River, to be developed as a corridor of parkland through
the city—emphasising ecological restoration and environmentally sensitive trans-
port, including a new light rail network, and connectivity of city through recreational
pedestrian boardwalks and cycle lanes.
Priority activities within the initial recovery framework included restoration of
critical infrastructure (particularly water and sewerage) and the residential land use
hazard assessments for resettlement, relocation and rebuilding (Miles et al. 2014).
Specific designations were informed by the changes in building codes and regu-
lations, where code changes required different structural requirements for houses,
especially for foundations. Recommendations also advocated lower urban density
with dispersed and mixed use environments in neighbourhood centres (Chang et al.
2014; Swaffield 2012). Subsequent to the demolition and removal of damaged build-
ings in the CBD, many vacant gaps and gravel quadrants were creatively inhabited
by both temporary and permanent art installations, cultural activities, entertainment,
open space, recreation and public areas including weekly street markets and even a
retail mall made from shipping containers.
Five years after the 2011 quake, formal planning and ideas progressively tran-
sitioned from recovery to regeneration with the new Master Plan focused on urban
renewal and development (CERA 2015). This plan promotes a vibrant, attractive,
resilient city, with abundant open space and themed districts supporting restaurants,
small shops and cafes, music, sports and recreation to stimulate business growth
and economic activity. Restoration and maintenance of iconic historic buildings has
been similarly supported to reinvigorate tourism and help re-establish a sense of place
for residents. Despite the extensive rhetoric of building back residential dwellings
and commercial premises more sustainably utilising green options, there was no
legislation to enforce building “green” and insurance payments limited owners to
like-for-like (with due consideration to new codes) (Miles et al. 2014). Businesses,
services and populations have progressively returned to a revitalised more resilient
region but the new strategic direction still appears to be dominated by top-down
leadership and planning directives rather than a participatory process with consider-
ation of resident aspirations (Chang et al. 2014). A subsequent earthquake affecting
Christchurch in February 2016 recorded limited physical damage in the city, but the
extent of psychological impact on an already traumatised and recovering community
has yet to be fully appreciated.
Even prior to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, the parish of New Orleans lacked
a strong history of traditional urban planning practice (Collins 2015). In the destruc-
tion and confusion post-event residents and displaced populations were confronted
with a diversity of highly conflicting proposals ranging from campaigns to build back
“bigger and better” to complete abandonment of the city (Olshansky 2006). Given
the historical, cultural and symbolic significance of New Orleans, it was imperative
for the community to rebuild and recover. The simultaneous emergence of differing
city wide and neighbourhood plans from organisations such as the Federal Emer-
gencyManagement Agency (FEMA), the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), and
various not for profit community groups did little to address the immediate demand
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for permanent dwellings, basic services and critical infrastructure (Collins 2015).
Kates et al. (2006) observed very slow and inadequate reconstruction and recovery
processes that were influenced by race, class and government incompetence.
Integral to any effective plan for population return and resettlementwas the resolu-
tion of the complexities and conflicts regarding a comprehensive land use and zoning
process. Ehrenfeucht and Nelson (2011) identified a range of strategies relating to
targeted investment and consolidation; restoration of the natural protective wetlands
and environmental quality, alternatives for underused areas; mechanisms to maintain
or reintegrate abandoned parcels; plans for infrastructure and service provision, and
interventions to address issues of social inequality. However most lacked wholesale
community and political support, sufficient funding and resources and activities were
highly sporadic and ad hoc.
The recovery of New Orleans was primarily resident driven, but the rebuilding of
houses and reconstruction of levees achieved replacement rather than building better
structures that reduce future disaster risks. Increased physical vulnerability of New
Orleans to flood risk is seen by Zaninetti and Colten (2012) as “maladaptive evolu-
tion caused by planning” (p. 680). Collins (2015) suggests that the first five years
post-Katrina were focused almost entirely on recovery, the next five years were taken
up with resolving the complex zoning processes with the eventual development and
adoptionofThePlan for the twenty-firstCentury, (commonly referred to as theMaster
Plan); a City Charter-mandated planning framework that shapes NewOrleans’ phys-
ical, social, environmental and economic future. This master plan reflects the values
and priorities of liveability, opportunity and sustainability that emerged through a
participatory community decision making process (Collins 2015). However, it fails
to adequately address vulnerability and hazard resilience.
In terms of population size and the scale of destruction to buildings, infrastructure
and services, recovery for Innisfail and the Cassowary Coast post-cyclone events was
significantly smaller and less resource intensive than either theChristchurch andNew
Orleans case studies. However for the community and residents of this region, effec-
tive planning strategies were equally as significant to lifestyle, livelihoods, economic
viability and decisions to persevere or migrate to other locations. Following Cyclone
Larry, the Operation Recovery Task Force was established through the Queensland
Government to coordinate basic needs, rebuilding and planning priorities (Queens-
land Government 2007). After Cyclone Yasi, this responsibility was delegated to the
Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA).
In both cases, regional planning strategies were aimed at protecting the char-
acter of local townships, limiting exposure to natural hazards, establishing long-term
economic stability and maximising infrastructure and transport provision efficien-
cies (AECOM 2012). Equally, provision was made to protect, maintain and sustain
the region’s unique natural assets and environment through biodiversity conservation
and coastal protection. Specific initiatives identified in the master plan for Innisfail
included the intensification and renewal of its CBD within the existing footprint, the
development of greenfield siteswithin the urban footprint, the inclusion of open space
for public, cultural and community amenity, in fill development and increased density
for established industrial zones, and industry sector reform based on diversification
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opportunities, value added agriculture and technological innovation (AECOM2012).
While statistical population trends suggest small yet continued net out migration the
Cassowary Coast Planning Scheme 2015 anticipates population growth, tourism and
expanded industry development within the region.
6.6 Conclusion
The analysis of planning responses to disasters in these three case studies illus-
trate consistent issues such as the priority restoration of critical infrastructure: water,
waste, utilities, transport (roads, bridges, rail), as well as challenges and contention
concerning dwellings, business, industry, support services, schools, public trans-
port, hospitals, heritage, and environment, and sustainability provisions such as the
enhancement of active transport of walking and cycling (although these were a lower
priority). Recovery was complicated by residential zoning, complex and challenging
regulations, competing visions and directions, a lack of public participation and
engagement, the issue of contested demolition andwhat to dowith unused and vacant
lands, and a plethora of complex issues around insurance and the lack of insurance
amongst the poor, resources and funds. In the midst of these challenges, controversy
surrounded priorities of quick reconstruction and return to some sort of normalcy
as opposed to effective long-term processes and transparency in all recovery and
reconstruction activities.
We can summarise some basic findings and implications.
• Disaster is often inevitably a component of long-term population trends.
• Planning for community recovery and stability may be aimed at smaller rather
than larger settlements in the future.
• Adaptation may be geared towards smaller populations and an altered demo-
graphic and socio-economic structure.
• Planning policy of retreat—decommissioning structures, settlements and infras-
tructure.
• Changed land use patterns—consolidation and principles of New Urbanism.
• Building back better.
• Rezoning hazard-prone areas.
• Sustainable planning and resource use.
King et al. (2016) analysed strategies and policies in the UNISDRGlobal Assess-
ment Review of theHyogo framework and subsequent Sendai framework (Boon et al.
2016). Many of these strategies have been adopted at local government levels, and
some are implemented as policies, but for local governments, especially the three
case studies examined in this chapter, it is a work that is in progress. The urgency of
the pressure to recover and rebuild pushes longer term strategic views to one side,
but we see these emerging after the immediate recovery phase.
There is inevitably short- to medium-term population loss as many people
temporarily move away from danger and the loss of services, infrastructure and
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economic support. The return of this population has to be phased over a long period
as the city is rebuilt, but a portion of this population may never return, or a different
demographic or social group replaces some of those who have left. The challenge of
recovery and adaptation is correctly identifying and anticipating this demographic
change in order to adopt approaches that suit the altered settlement. Within this
change are activities and strategies to build back better, and to enhance both resilience
and sustainability. Planning responds to a primary paradigm of growth, but growth
is not always ideal or desirable. Loss of population and corresponding services and
infrastructure is not necessarily detrimental. It is clearly an opportunity for planners
in envisioning new and altered places. The emerging concept is planning to scale,
or right sizing, where there is a clear and accurate awareness and recognition of
demographic change and transition that enables an appropriate and better place to
emerge from disaster. The latest trend in urban design is placemaking, which within
the last two years has been defined as a movement on a scale with, and comple-
mentary to New Urbanism (Kent 2019). Planners are responding enthusiastically
to the ideas in placemaking as the movement incorporates many of the issues that
we have noted in relation to the recovery of the three case study settlements, but
with a stronger emphasis on people, place and ethical integration as the core of
urban design and planning (Kent 2019; Eckenwiler 2016). Placemaking transcends
recovery and demographic planning. If we approach the planning issues, identified
in these case studies, of adaptation, retreat, the decommissioning of structures settle-
ments and infrastructure, changed land use patterns, consolidation and principles of
New Urbanism, building back better, rezoning hazard-prone areas and sustainable
planning and resource use from a placemaking perspective where we put people
at the centre of well designed good places, it will matter less whether the place is
smaller or whether it is growing. The quality and good design of the post-disaster
community is far more important than its demographic impacts or recovery.
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Chapter 7
Disasters and Demographic Change
of ‘Single-Industry’ Towns—Decline
and Resilience in Morwell, Australia
Deanne Bird and Andrew Taylor
Abstract In 2014, an open-cut coal mine fire burned for 45 days in the small single-
industry town of Hazelwood in Victoria (Australia) spreading smoke and ash across
the adjacent community of Morwell. This chapter examines the extent to which
the mine fire acted as a catalyst for demographic and socio-economic change and
considers how, if at all, it impacted Morwell’s resilience to disasters. We report on
a range of secondary data analyses augmented with qualitative insights captured
in government reports (namely, the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry reports), as well
as from related research papers and media articles. We suggest that a succession
of structural and demographic changes meant that the town and its residents were
accustomed and resilient to relatively large shocks. In this sense, the Morwell and
broader Latrobe Valley population banded together around various community-led
initiatives to fight for a better future for their community.
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7.1 Introduction
Throughout Australia’s history, disasters have challenged the existence of rural and
remote towns. At the extreme end, for example, the rural and remote towns of
Gundagai in New South Wales and, Clermont and Grantham in Queensland were
relocated following fatal floods in 1852, 1916 and 2011, respectively. For single-
industry towns (see Text Box 7.1), disasters involving the pre-dominant industry
present added threats since even temporary closures or wind-backs in economic
production are likely to significantly erode the job base, cut money circulation in
the town and lead to permanent out-migration of some residents. Through these
processes, closures also thin-out the locally based pool of experienced workers,
encouraging companies who own or run the (single) industry to ‘import’ temporary
workers in the form of fly-in-fly-out (FIFO) or drive-in-drive-out (DIDO) workers.
In turn, these factors tend to erode the social fabric and cohesiveness of communi-
ties, making them less resilient to shocks and stressors (Mitchell and O’Neill 2016).
The shock and stressor considered in this chapter are from the Hazelwood mine fire
disaster that impacted the adjacent, single-industry town of Morwell, Australia in
2014.
Before describing the case study location of Morwell, the Hazelwood power
station, open-cut coal mine and mine fire disaster in Sect. 7.2, we first consider
the terms disaster and resilience. There has been much debate around what consti-
tutes a disaster (Quarantelli 1998; Perry and Quarantelli 2005). Based on that debate,
Perry (2005) concluded that disasters are disruptive, social occasions that are related
to social change and that disaster research generally focuses on ‘some change in
circumstances’ (p. 316).
The definition of resilience in relation to disasters has also been the subject of
much debate in academic discourse (e.g. Klein et al. 2003; Manyena 2006; Norris
et al. 2008;Manyena et al. 2011; Alexander 2013; Cutter et al. 2014;Weichselgartner
and Kelman 2015). For this chapter, we consider resilience as a ‘… measure of how
well people and societies can adapt to a changed reality and capitalise on the new
possibilities offered’ (Paton 2006, p. 8).
In light of the above, the aims of this chapter are to examine the extent to which the
Hazelwoodmine fire acted as a catalyst for demographic and socio-economic change
in the single-industry town of Morwell, and consider how, if at all, the Hazelwood
mine fire impacted Morwell’s resilience to disasters, shocks and stressors.
Text Box 7.1: Rural, Remote and Single-Industry Towns in Australia
Rural and remote towns are hallmarked in the national psyche of many devel-
oped nations for their purported resilience in the face of adversity. Perhaps
nowhere has this been more the case than in Australia. Although 68% of
Australians live in major cities and with cities recently accounting for almost
80% of national population growth (ABS 2019), there remains an affinity for
rural and remote towns. Despite the passing centuries, the exponential growth
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of cities and a boon in overseas migration numbers to cities of late, Australian’s
affinity with ‘the bush’ remains. Rural and remote settlements are lauded for
their historical and contemporary contributions to the nation and their economic
and demographic resilience. This reflects, at least in part, remembrance of the
significance of the livestock industry, and particularly wool, for transforming
the economy from a colonially dependent backwater to a ‘modern’ thriving
one with comparatively high living standards (ABS 2003). The nation is said
to have ‘ridden to success’ on the sheep’s back for more than a century from the
mid-eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century as a result of wool exports.
Even today, agricultural or resource products round-out eight of the top ten
Australian export commodities (Australian Government 2018).
Over time, the importance of inland Australia and its towns was re-enforced
by other major historical developments like the Overland Telegraph Line,
which ran through the ‘middle dirt’ of the landmass, and for some time was the
onlymeans of direct communication betweenAustralia and elsewhere (notably
Great Britain). Carrying Morse code signals, it stretched 3,200 km from Port
Augusta in South Australia to Darwin in the north of the country. Likewise, the
national airlineQueensland andNorthern TerritoryAerial Services (QANTAS)
was established in 1920 in the Queensland desert town ofWinton. Some settle-
ments were established and then either thrived or survived from the extraction
of resources. In particular, gold and later a suite of resource-based settlements
were established across the continent.
Many ofAustralia’s rural and remote townswere therefore settled and estab-
lished because of a single industry. The nation’s economy has at various times
been driven by agricultural and later resource-led economic growth. In many
places, commodifiable resource(s) including gold, coal and iron orewere either
the reason for rural town establishments or the reason for its continuation and
growth after initial settlement. Often called ‘single-industry’ towns, these have
been written about for their resilience in the face of volatile population change
and susceptibility to ‘boom and bust’ economic times (for example, Carson
and Carson 2014). While some have disappeared and become ‘ghost towns’,
most have either continued to exist, have grown or transformed their economic
basis despite declines in the main industry because of rationalisation, tech-
nological changes and market forces. Nevertheless, for some single-industry
towns there remains a legacy and mythology whereby the perception of the
town being single industry persists among outsiders. This is in part because
of the past pre-eminence of the industry in question for jobs, business and
maintaining population. Examples include Burnie in Tasmania whose industry
profile was once dominated by a papermill and associated forestry activity (see
The Advertiser 2013), as well as Nhulunbuy in the Northern Territory which
was established specifically to house workers for the nearby bauxite mine and
alumina smelter that closed in 2013 (seeCarson andCarson 2014;Collin 2017).
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7.2 Morwell and the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station
Morwell, centrally located in the State of Victoria’s Latrobe Valley 150 km east of
Melbourne (Fig. 7.1), is often recognised as a single-industry town.While the region
is located in an important agricultural area, Morwell’s history is intricately linked to
the production of electricity produced from the extensive brown coal reserves in the
Fig. 7.1 Location of the town of Morwell (Authors: Bird, Taylor, cartography by Karácsonyi)
7 Disasters and Demographic Change of ‘Single-Industry’ … 129
region. Teague and Catford (2016) report that around 95% of Victoria’s base load
electricity was produced from Latrobe Valley mines (Hazelwood, Yallourn and Loy
Yang) and collectively they constituted the largest brown coal mining operation in
the Southern Hemisphere (Davison 2015).
The Hazelwood mine and power station hailed from the ‘Morwell project’ which
consisted of an open-cut coal mine and briquette works. It was initiated by the State
Electricity Commission (SEC) of Victoria in the late 1940s (Morwell Advertiser
1949). A decade later, approval was given for the development of the Hazelwood
Power Station to service Morwell’s open-cut mine (later known as the Hazelwood
open-cut mine). At its peak, the Hazelwood Power Station met 25% of the State
and over 5% of the nation’s electricity demands alone and its extensive dimensions
reached a maximum depth of 120 m from ground level with an 18 km perimeter
(Teague and Catford 2016).
From these beginnings, and given the coal mine pit begins its descent a few
hundred metres from Morwell’s residential area (Fig. 7.2), the town’s identity had
been interwoven with, up until recently, the Hazelwood Power Station and open-cut
mine:
…the development and expansion of coal mining in the area over time has had a direct
impact on the people of Morwell due to the town overlaying a significant coal deposit. In
the context of the Hazelwood mine and power station being built to the south of Morwell,
the town has expanded to the east and to the north. Despite such expansion away from
the mine, the southern perimeter of Morwell is still remarkably close to the mine site.
(Teague et al. 2014, p. 51)
At times,more than a third of jobs in the regionwerewith the SECalone, not taking
into account associated industry and businesses associated directlywith the coalmine
and power station (Duffy andWhyte 2017). However, it was far from smooth sailing
Fig. 7.2 Looking approximately northwards, this aerial photograph shows the proximity ofMorwell
(residential area outlined in green) to the Hazelwood Power Station (circled in red) and open-cut
coal mine. (Teague et al. 2014, p. 410)
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for Morwell residents and the plant. Most notably, the state government privatised
the SEC in the mid-1990s and with it the Hazelwood Power Station and open-cut
mine. More recently, Hazelwood’s open-cut coal mine was at the centre of one
of Australia’s worst environmental and public health disasters (Doig 2015) when
it burned for 45 days after embers from a nearby bushfire set the coal alight in
February 2014. Three years later, the Hazelwood Power Station and coal mine were
decommissioned.
In this chapter, we plot demographic change in Morwell through periods of coal
mining development, expansion, decline and the mine fire disaster, right through
to post-decommissioning. The mine fire in 2014 ‘… disrupted the community to
a significant extent and was beyond the capacity of the community and support
agencies to cope’ (Walker et al. 2016, p. 16). However, using a range of data from
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) alongside community consultations and
research conducted after the 2014 Hazelwood Mine Fire, we examine population
resilience through a long history of disaster familiarity (after previous major fires
in 1977, 2006 and 2008). Our main contention is that, rather than accounting for a
big change in population numbers and characteristics, the mine fire disaster added
to pre-existing challenges faced by a community which itself had learned to adapt
to and survive, in demographic and economic terms, to shocks, disasters and other
challenges.
7.3 Mapping Resilience Through Demographic Change
In response to academic debate, Cutter (2016) critically examinedmethods for under-
standing and quantifying resilience in relation to disaster. In doing so, she identified
the most commonly used attributes, assets (economic, social, environmental, infras-
tructure) and capacities (social capital, community functions, connectivity, and plan-
ning) for measuring community resilience. This chapter focuses on demographic and
socio-economic indicators asmeasures of resilience. Our reason for doing so is based
on the premise that much can be revealed about the resilience or otherwise of single-
industry towns through the study of change among pre- and post-event demographic
indicators, including socio-economic profiling. Such research and analysis are useful
because they can:
• Provide a baseline for evaluating demographic and economic impacts from
individual disasters (where suitable data is available);
• Plot interrelationships between economic and demographic transformations pre-
and post-disaster;
• Be applied in a range of ways to ascertain likely demographic and economic
futures given the post-disaster population structure and size; and
• Be studied for applied lessons which might help other towns increase their
resilience and map out their futures.
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Importantly, socio-economicprofiling can also bevalidated, compared and contrasted
to qualitative research ‘on the ground’ to enrich the research application.
In this chapter, we examine a range of publicly available demographic and socio-
economic data for Morwell and compare to the wider Latrobe Valley region and the
State of Victoria. We first augment our analysis with qualitative insights captured
in government reports (namely, the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry reports which
provide detail on community consultations, health improvement forums and public
submissions), as well as from related research papers and media articles. This latter
analysis allows us to consider the social fabric and cohesiveness of Morwell with a
focus on social capital and connectivity.
In a presentation given at a Municipal Association of Victoria forum on resilient
cities and communities, Duckworth (2015, p. 6) highlighted ‘resilience is not possible
without the networks and links between individuals, communities, organisations,
businesses and government’. Underlying these networks and links is social capital,
which appears as a key feature in the broad range of tools, indices and scorecards
that have been developed to measure community resilience (Cutter 2016). However,
social capital is more than just connectivity through these networks and links. It is
about cooperation among different groups of people and collective action to produce
a mutual benefit, and it is reliant on trust (Bridger and Luloff 2001). Putnam et al.
(1993) described the kind of trust required as social trust, which emanates from
norms of reciprocity and networks of engagement.
In this chapter, three types of social capital are considered for the Morwell popu-
lation, reflecting the networks of engagement and the situations where norms of
reciprocity evolve.
1. Bonding social capital describes emotionally close, strong connections arising
from family and friend networks.
2. Bridging social capital describes loose connections between acquaintances
and individuals of diverse social groups, often stemming from membership or
involvement in organisations, clubs and associations.
3. Linking social capital describes network connections between regular people
(such as residents) and officials (such as government representatives) (Aldrich
and Meyer 2015).
Before Morwell’s pre- and post-fire demographic trajectories are examined, we
first consider the Hazelwood mine fire alongside the health and economic impacts
of that event and government response.
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7.4 The 2014 Hazelwood Mine Fire Disaster
7.4.1 The Mine Fire
In February 2014, during a record-breaking hot and dry summer, a number of large
bushfires burned across Victoria. Two of these were near Morwell and the adjoining
Hazelwood coal mine. Embers from these fires set the northern, eastern and south-
eastern batters and floor of the Hazelwood coal mine alight on 9 February 2014.
The fires spread quickly and proved extremely difficult to extinguish due to the
highly combustible nature of brown coal and the relatively thin layer of soil and clay
covering the massive coal seams in the Latrobe Valley. Moreover, the mine operator
was not prepared to manage such an event. In this instance, the mine’s firefighting
infrastructure was either not present or had not been maintained in the areas of the
mine that were alight. Furthermore, once called in to assist, firefighting personnel
experienced difficulties accessing and navigating the mine (Doig 2015; Teague et al.
2014).
More than 7,000 fire services personnel, a number equivalent to half the size of the
town’s population, from acrossAustralia fought the fire for 45 days until finally, on 25
March 2014 the fire was officially declared extinguished (Teague et al. 2014). While
it burnt out of control, the mine fire produced a significant amount of ash causing
physical and mental health issues for nearby communities, especially the population
of Morwell. For example, on 16 February 2014, the daily average of PM2.51 reached
approximately 28 times the advisory level (Teague et al. 2014). On the same day,
carbon monoxide levels were almost four times the compliance standard (Teague
et al. 2014). In relation to the particulate matter, an older respondent in the Walker
et al. study commented:
It was like sand on a windy day. Sand on the beach on a windy day hitting your face, that’s
what it was like yet you couldn’t see anything with the naked eye. (Walker et al. 2016, p. 42)
7.4.2 Health Impacts and Government Responses
Commonly reported short-term physical health impacts during the disaster included
skin and eye irritations, blood noses and headaches. Despite the apparent adverse
conditions in the early stages of themine fire, the governmentwas slow to issue public
health alerts due to bureaucratic protocols around decision-making and over reliance
on validated air quality data when indicative data would have sufficed (Teague et al.
2014).
It was the same old information we were getting day after day after day, “There’s nothing
wrong, nothing to worry about, nothing wrong, nothing to worry about, nothing wrong,
nothing to worry about” and that’s from people either in Traralgon or in Melbourne. They
weren’t in Morwell, trying to breathe this rubbish. (Walker et al. 2016, p. 56)
1Particulate matter equivalent to or less than 2.5 microns and known to cause adverse health effects.
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The general conversation was the same… they knew something wasn’t right, and the smoke
was different, and it was different, I’ve never smelt anything like it, or tasted anything like
it. (Walker et al. 2016, p. 42)
On 25 February 2014, in recognition of the need for better protocols, the Envi-
ronment Protection Authority and Department of Health2 developed specific guide-
lines around health actions relating to PM2.5 levels. On 28 February, when PM2.5
levels had increased again, the Chief Health Officer advised temporary relocation
for vulnerable groups, including preschool aged children, pregnant women, people
with pre-existing cardiovascular and respiratory conditions and people over 65 years
(Teague et al. 2014). However, this advice was deemed ‘too late’. Furthermore, as
the advice singled out particular demographic groups, the community found it to be
illogical and divisive (Teague et al. 2014). Overall, the community did not feel that
their views were being heard.
While distributing considerable amounts of information to the community, government
departments and agencies did not engage to any significant extent in listening to, or partnering
with local residents and community groups, which are identified as important strategies in
best practice risk and crisis communication. (Teague et al. 2014, p. 400)
A few weeks into the mine fire disaster, and in response to community outcry,
Monash University’s School of Public Health and Preventative Medicine were
commissioned to conduct a Rapid Health Risk Assessment. Based on the results
of that assessment, the Board of Inquiry concluded that:
… the level of exposure to smoke and ash experienced by the community in Morwell would
not be expected to cause any deaths if the level of exposure remained at that level for six
weeks.However, the studywas based on a standardVictorian population andwas not adjusted
for the poorer health status prevailing in Morwell. (Teague et al. 2014, p. 24)
The Board highlighted that several vulnerable groups characterised the population
with an ageingpopulation, higher incidence of cardiovascular and respiratory disease,
a high percentage of low-income households and a higher percentage of residents
with a disability (Teague et al. 2014). With this in mind, the Board reflected that
the mine fire ‘added further insult to an already vulnerable community’ (Teague
et al. 2014, p. 24). Nevertheless, Walker et al. (2016) report stoicism and resilience,
particularly among older adults within the community. One service provider claimed
their older clients were ‘pretty resilient’ relying on lived experience to deal with
the situation at hand. Moreover, people relied on family and friends for essential
assistance rather than the authorities, stating that they had it ‘under control, we’re
at our families’ and ‘I’ve just gone to my friend in Traralgon’ (Walker et al. 2016,
p. 62).
While the short-term health impacts were of concern, the community were also
gravely concerned about the potential for medium to long-term health impacts.
2The Department of Health became the Department of Health and Human Services on 1 January
2015.
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People are still waiting and people have moved on but I think the impact is longer lasting
because the response post mine fire wasn’t swift. […] They denied that there was health
issues, there was some cover-ups or perceived cover-ups, they could have done a lot more
and they didn’t. I think that affects the community pride, community connectedness and
realizing that we’re not as valued as somewhere else in the state. (Jones et al. 2018, p. 539)
The community petitioned the government to take further action, with over 21,000
signatures of support (Duffy andWhyte 2017). In response, theDepartment ofHealth
andHuman Services commissioned theHazelwoodHealth Study, which commenced
in November 2014. The study showed an increase in the occurrence of gestational
diabetes among pregnant women exposed tomine fire-related air pollution than those
whowere not exposed during the disaster, with the greatest risk associatedwith expo-
sure during the second trimester (Johnston et al. 2019). Furthermore, participants of
the Health Study that were exposed to mine fire-related air pollution were more
likely (compared to those not exposed) to report respiratory symptoms (wheeze,
night-time and resting shortness of breath, chronic cough and phlegm, chest tight-
ness and nasal symptoms) along with psychological distress in adults (Hazelwood
Health Study 2019) and school children (Allen et al. 2019). Yell et al. (2019) also
note that community wellbeing was greatly affected, with a distinct loss of trust
in government authorities responsible for dealing with the disaster. The impact on
community wellbeing is clearly articulated by the following comments captured in
the Jones et al. study:
Bushfires were […] only short lived with buildings and people losing properties and every-
thing like that, whereas here the destruction was, I suppose, the Valley itself […]. (Jones
et al. 2018, p. 539)
I am very proud of my town […] and my town was copping not a very good rap […] It
wasn’t doing our town’s image any good at all. We got known as a smoke town. Morwell
has copped enough over the years without having to have that added to it. (Jones et al. 2018,
p. 539)
I think that my experience here in the Valley’s changed. So, up to the mine fire I think that
life was a certain way, post that, it’s almost like my attachment to the area is not as much.
My feeling for the area, has waned – my commitment to the region – to where I live. My
interest is no longer there. (Jones et al. 2018, p. 540)
7.4.3 Economic Impacts
On top of dealing with the long-term physical and mental health impacts of the mine
fire, the community were faced with economic challenges including fears of falling
house prices and local businesses struggling due to significantly reduced trading
(Walker et al. 2016). The neighbourhood houses3 were also feeling a pinch. Whyte
3Neighbourhood Houses are described by Neighbourhood Houses Victoria as places that “bring
people together to connect, learn and contribute in their local community through social, educational,
recreational and support activities, using a unique community development approach” (https://www.
nhvic.org.au/neighbourhoodhouses/what-is-a-neighbourhood-house).
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(2017) provides an insight from a 2014 interview with the Morwell Neighbourhood
House coordinator:
We’ve been impacted financially here because we’ve closed all our classes, people aren’t
engaged, that component of the community that were coming in to do courses have either
left or have bunkered down because they’ve got their own social and emotional issues and
they can’t engage on that level. (Whyte 2017, p. 14)
Then, in November 2016, the owner at the time, Engie, announced the closure of
the Hazelwood Power Station and open-cut coal mine. A submission from Latrobe
City Council aptly noted:
While residents can learn to co-exist with [mining operations] the more that those operations
intrude on the lives of those residents, the more resentful residents become. This in turn can
lead to a diminishing of a community’s ability to feel empowered and resilient. (Teague et al.
2016, p. 70)
The site was officially decommissioned in March 2017 at which time, 750
personnel were in direct employment at Hazelwood (Engie 2017). Later that same
year, Carter Holt Harvey closed its Morwell sawmill on 28 September leading to
the loss of another 160 jobs in the region.
What has emerged from [the Hazelwood Health Study interviews] (and ongoing conversa-
tions with community members) is that recovery is no longer only framed in relation to the
mine fire event. It is talked about as also needing to address the ongoing impacts of the
privatisation of the power industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the more recent
closure of the Morwell open-cut mine and Hazelwood power station. (Hazelwood Health
Study 2017, p. 49)
Having captured the essence of some of the impacts from the Morwell disaster on
town residents and others, we nowmap out the transition of the population from pre-
to post-disaster to evaluate the extent to which the fire may have altered the town’s
demographic and economic trajectories.
7.5 Morwell’s Pre and Post-fire Demographic Trajectory
7.5.1 Plotting Structural and Demographic Change
Twenty-seven years of population data demonstrate the impacts of several structural
upheavals on Morwell’s resident population (Fig. 7.3). While population growth
for Morwell and the Latrobe Valley has fluctuated quite widely, and at times been
negative, State growth since 1991/92 was positive and comparatively consistent.
Demographic fluctuations for Morwell can be traced to a range of factors. During
the 1990s, the town experienced population decline from restructuring and privati-
sation of the power industry by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SEC).
This led to jobs and population losses in the region with Morwell most affected
in proportional terms, particularly in 1993/94. Following privatisation in 1996, the
then labelled ‘Hazelwood Power Corporation’ was sold to a consortium led by the



















































































































































Fig. 7.3 Annual population growth rates and major shocks, 1991/92 to 2017/18. (Calculation by
Bird and Taylor using data from ABS.Stat)
British organisation National Power. However, population growth rates did not return
to positive until the 2004 announcement of the proposed expansion of the mine to
incorporate Phase 2 of the Hazelwood Mine West Field Development. Before this,
the plant was due to be decommissioned in 2005 by the SEC, placing employment
in the region under threat. This was evident in the negative population growth rates
during the first half of 2000s.
In 2011/12, theAustralianGovernment considered aContract forClosure program
as part of its Clean Energy Act, causing uncertainty in the region. However, that
program was soon scrapped and no plants were closed. Nevertheless, as reported
earlier, Engie closed Hazelwood at the end of March 2017 giving workers and local
communities just five months’ notice (ABC 2017). However, since closure of the
plant in early 2017, there has been no evidence of a significant decline in growth
rates for Morwell. Although growth rates were seemingly better than for most years
since from the early 1990s onwards, from 2011/12 to 2016/17 rates were slightly
negative.
The impacts of the events described above can be seen on the town’s estimated
resident population (Fig. 7.4) which fell by more than 300 during the lead up to the
proposed 2005 closure (which did not take place). It recovered subsequently before
falling again after the threat of the ‘contract to close’ became apparent in 2011/12.
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Nevertheless, in 2018, the population was estimated at 14,026, just 2% lower than
its peak of 14,345 during the past eighteen years.
Changes in Morwell’s Age and Gender Composition
While the population size has not fallen significantly since the mine closure, there
have been progressive changes in the composition of the population. The population
pyramid for the town (Fig. 7.5) for 2006 (black bars) and 2016 (for males blue with



















Males 2006 Females 2006 Males 2016 Females 2016
10%          8%           6%            4%             2%           0%            2%           4%            6%            8% 10%
Fig. 7.5 Population by age and sex, 2006 and 2016. (Calculation by Bird and Taylor using ABS
Census of Population and Housing data obtained from Table Builder)
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the proportion of mid-career working-age residents (aged 30–44 years) and children
aged 10–19 years. The latter is likely associated in part with the former as well as
young people leaving for post-school education. In its place is a relatively prominent
population ageing trend with an increase in the proportion of males and females aged
55 and above. Of note, the proportion of young children has remained stable, while
those aged 25–29 years made up a greater part of the overall population in 2016
compared to 2001.
The changes described above are emphasised when comparing age-based esti-
mates for the total population from 2007 to 2017 (Fig. 7.6). Changes in age compo-
sition for Morwell are shown by the red and black bars with the red indicating a
reduced proportion of the population in 2017 at that age group and the black indi-
cating an increased proportion. Hence, while the total population size has not altered
significantly, its composition has.
Migration
During 2011 to 2016 the town experienced a net loss of 149 males and 162 females
(a total of 311) residents through migration. Analysis of this by life-stages (Fig. 7.7)
shows net losses of early-career residents and children were substantial, while there
were net gains in late-career males and retiree-aged males (those 65 years and over).
Other Demographic Indicators
Comparing a range of other demographic indicators for Morwell to the region and to























Fig. 7.6 Changes in Morwell’s population distribution by age, 2007 and 2017. (Calculation by
Bird and Taylor using data from ABS.Stat)
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Fig. 7.7 Net migration by
age for Morwell during 2011
to 2016. (Calculation by Bird






















for the 15 years to 2016. With a median age of 43 in 2016, Morwell’s population
in 2016 was older than for the region and Victoria by quite some margin, having
risen considerably over the decade (Table 7.1). This indicates population ageing in
the town through either resident’s ageing-in-place or the out-migration of younger
people (or likely a combination of both). Morwell was relatively less ‘multicultural’
than Victoria by 2016 and its proportion born overseas had diminished, unlike for the
State as a whole. Morwell, however, had a higher proportion of Indigenous residents
(2.5%) compared to both the region (1.5%) and State (0.8%).
Also of note were lower median rents and house mortgage repayments in 2016
for Morwell when compared to the region and State. This is in part due to the higher
proportion of householders who were renting from State housing organisations, at
6% in 2016 compared to 3% for Victoria (Table 7.2). In addition, a greater propor-
tion rented from a real estate agent in 2016 (21%) than for Victoria (15%), having
risen from 17% of households in 2006. These data indicate socio-economic status
continues to be relatively lower in Morwell. However, there does not appear to be
any collapse in these housing indicators subsequent to the fire and in the lead up to
the closure of Hazelwood mine suggesting that the housing market may not have
declined significantly in the post-disaster period; although certainly not increasing
to the extent of mortgages and rents for the State as a whole.
7.5.2 Employment, Income, Industry and Housing Profile
Changes
For towns such as Morwell, industrial composition and the distribution of jobs
across industries are generally dominated by the main operation, usually a single
large resourced-based extractive and/or processing industrial unit. Although the label
might be appropriate as a descriptor, in reality, no town is truly ‘single industry’ with
jobs in other sectors invariably prevalent and important including in retail, health
and government administration and services; as well as a range of professions across
various industries (such as medical or technical services). Economists point out there
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Table 7.2 Tenure and landlord type for Morwell and Victoria, 2006, 2011 and 2016
Morwell Victoria
2006 (%) 2011 (%) 2016 (%) 2006 (%) 2011 (%) 2016 (%)
Owned or being
purchased
68 66 64 74 72 73
Rented real estate 17 19 21 15 17 16
Rented state or territory
housing
8 7 6 3 3 3
Other 7 8 9 9 9 9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table constructed by Bird and Taylor using ABS, 2003.0 2016 Census of Population and Housing
Time Series Profile (Morwell SA2 and Victoria State)
are a range of benefits and challenges for towns likeMorwellwhichwere ‘specialised’
(also termed ‘agglomerated’ or ‘concentrated’) and for townswith employment diver-
sified across industries (for a good discussion on these issues see ABS 2014). In this
section, we profile employment and industry indicators for Morwell over time to
examine the extent of industry concentration and identifywhether and how theHazel-
wood mine fire and power station closure may have altered the economic make-up
of the town.
Labour Market and Income Indicators
In 2011, the last Census before the closure of the power station, and at the end of a
period of relatively high population growth from investment in Hazelwood, Morwell
had a relatively high unemployment rate (12%) compared to its surrounding region
(8%) and to the State of Victoria (5%). Participation rates in the workforce were
also much lower (Table 7.3). In general, the range of indicators would suggest that
the comparative socio-economic status of Morwell’s residents was low before the
fire. Despite the scale of the fire and its impacts, the suite of indicators in Table
7.3 does not suggest a dramatic worsening of socio-economic conditions. Although
the town did experience an increase in unemployment and decrease in participation
rates during 2011 to 2016, these can reasonably be described as a continuation of
pre-existing trends or as minor changes to date.
Industry and Employment Profiles.
All else being equal, observed structural adjustments might be anticipated in the
profile of jobs and industry compositions for small towns likeMorwell after a disaster
and when the major employer ceases to operate. Interestingly for Morwell, employ-
ment in the ‘Mining’ and ‘Electricity,Gas,Water andWasteServices’ industry sectors
have never dominated overall employment patterns in the town. This is likely due
to variable distributions of jobs in the mine and plant across a range of industry
sectors including two which show in Census data to have been prominent: ‘Manu-
facturing’ and ‘Construction’ (Table 7.4). The former has significantly declined in
Australia, and this is most evident for the State of Victoria where the sector has fallen
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from being the largest employer in the State in 2011 to the sixth by 2016. Similarly,
in Morwell, manufacturing no longer featured in the top four industries by 2016.
Construction jobs in Morwell likely reflects stages of development in the plant and
infrastructure associated with the mine and power station while the prominence of
health care and social assistance by 2016 reflects a national population ageing trend
and data in demographic analysis earlier in this chapter.
It is also pertinent, when considering possible local economic impacts from the
disaster, to examine baseline industry concentrations and differential employment
profiles for men and women, particularly considering the male-dominated profile of
resource-based industrial operations. In terms of industry concentrations, the share
of employment in the top four employing industries (known as the C4 Index) was
the same in Morwell and the Latrobe Valley region in 2006 and 2011 (47% and
46%) but fell to 42% in 2016; the same as for the State of Victoria. Put another way,
jobs in the town became more widely distributed across industries after the fire. Of
concern, however, have been differential gendered outcomes for employment seen
in the employment to population ratio. For males, there was a significant decline in
the proportion of those 15 years and over who were employed, down from over half
in 2006 to 43% in 2016. While this also declined in the Latrobe Valley and Victoria
overall, the fall was larger in Morwell and is likely indicative of a range of long-term
(for example, technology changes and population ageing) and event-related impacts
including the mine fire and structural workforce adjustments in other industries.
Meanwhile, the employment to population ratio for women was more stable for all
three jurisdictions although much lower than for males (Table 7.5).
7.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The small Victorian town of Morwell, with a 2018 population of 14,000, has long
been subject to shocks and stressors. In this chapter, we postulated that Morwell
might previously have been considered a ‘single-industry’ town, given the historical
importance of the coal mine and power station to employment andwealth generation.
As a single-industry town, and in consideration of the apparent vulnerabilities that
exist in relation to the poor health and wellbeing statistics of Morwell (see Teague
et al. 2014), we anticipated that the 2014 mine fire, located adjacent to the town,
might have led to substantial impacts on the economy and population. We know
that health and wellbeing alongside socio-economic status impact the resilience of
a population (100 Resilient Cities 2019; Latrobe City Council 2017; Wisner et al.
2004). However, our analysis of population and economic data over time suggests,
aside from serious impacts during privatisation in the 1990s when growth rates were
negative, the economy and population of the town have never substantively collapsed
in the face of such shocks and stressors. Even subsequent to the fire and after the
closure of the power station in 2017, the population size did not drop significantly
when we might have anticipated otherwise.
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Table 7.5 Indicators for industry diversity and gendered employment outcomes
Indicator 2006 (%) 2011 (%) 2016 (%)
Morwell
C4 index 47 46 42
Employment to population ratio—males 51 48 43
Employment to population ratio—females 36 37 36
Latrobe valley
C4 index 47 46 45
Employment to population ratio—males 58 57 53
Employment to population ratio—females 45 48 46
Victoria
C4 index 43 42 42
Employment to population ratio—males 63 64 61
Employment to population ratio—females 51 53 52
Table calculated by Bird and Taylor from ABS Table Builder data
Part of the explanation for lower than anticipated impacts on the economy and
population after these shocks and stressors may lay in the historical diversity of
industrial units comprising the mine and power station operations, as well as the
employment profile it helped generate in the town through successive periods of
renewal and growth (see Fig. 7.3). While we might have anticipated mining and
power generation to be dominant industries in the town, particularly when the mine
and power station expanded, the employment profile instead suggests retail and health
or aged care to have been more prominent. Nevertheless, employment in manufac-
turing, likely the response option which many power plant employees selected in the
Census, has suffered tremendously over time; but this is common across Australia
and especially in the State of Victoria (see Table 7.3). However, declines in construc-
tion employment leading up to the closure may signify pending economic issues for
the town in the form of downstream impacts on the whole economy and possibly
on population size. Morwell is by no means alone in this respect with the construc-
tion industry historically subject to high variations across rural and remote Australia
through boom and bust cycles.
The employment profile in Morwell may bring into question the voracity of the
application of the label ‘single-industry town’, and this is further supported by indus-
trial concentration measures derived for analysis in this chapter. Jobs in Morwell
have never been significantly more concentrated in the top four industries than for
the surrounding region and over time have become less concentrated with the C4
index (see Table 7.4) in 2016 the same as for the State of Victoria as a whole (42%).
However, in spite of what appears to be stoicism in the face of major shocks, there
is evidence that the fire and (what was then) the impending closure of the mine and
power station worsening gendered employment outcomes with a lower proportion
of working-age males employed in 2016 (see Table 7.4). This might also explain the
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increased unemployment rate and reduced participation rate in the five years to 2016
when the State experienced the opposite with a buoyant economy and rapid popu-
lation growth driven primarily by the city of Melbourne. Migration data supports
this supposition with a noticeable net loss of population aged 35–54 years to other
parts of Australia during 2007 to 2016 (see Fig. 7.6), and particularly for males (see
Fig. 7.5).
Nevertheless, our demographic and socio-economic data suggests a certain
stoicism and resilience inherent within the Morwell population. If we reconsider our
working definition of resilience, it is pertinent to question how Morwell is adapting
to the changed realities and capitalising on any new possibilities offered?
Walker et al. (2016) noted a certain level of stoicism and resilience in the commu-
nity post-mine fire disaster with people relying on lived experience to deal with the
situation at hand and their social connections for support. It has already been noted
that Morwell has lived experience resulting from a long history of disaster famil-
iarity (previous major fires in 1977, 2006 and 2008). In terms of social connections
for support, however, we now consider the community’s capacities in relation to the
three different types of social capital—bonding social capital, bridging social capital
and linking social capital.
If we look at the various community-led action groups established to secure a
better future for Morwell and the Latrobe City area, it is evident that bonding and
bridging social capital were prevalent. Most notably, strong and loose connections
exist among the generations of families that have worked together in the mining
industry and through attachment to place—i.e. people are connected because they
are proud of the region where they live. Work place connections and attachment to
place connections are clearly articulated by Doig (2019). Through these networks,
withinwhich a certain level of social trust evolves, the population collectively banded
together around various community-led initiatives to produce a mutual benefit—
a better future for their community. One such initiative was the formation of the
community action group, Voices of the Valley in response to the Hazelwood Mine
Fire. Voices of the Valley was established, through community fundraising, to ensure
public concerns regarding health issues resulting from the mine fire were heard by
government and the broader Victorian population. Another key network of collective
action emanated fromMorwell NeighbourhoodHouse and together, theywere instru-
mental in petitioning the government to take further action (Doig 2015, 2019). This
action resulted in the establishment of the Hazelwood Health Study and reopening
of the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry. Regarding linking social capital, however,
the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry reports clearly articulate the fact that network
connections and social trust between residents and the government was missing.
The Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry was originally completed in 2014 with 12
recommendations. In the second iteration, however, the Board of Inquiry made 246
recommendations for government, which included many bold initiatives aimed at re-
establishing the lost social trust between residents and government officials, while
at the same time, improving health and wellbeing across Latrobe City. Three of the
key items included the designation of Latrobe City as a Health Innovation Zone,
the establishment of the Latrobe Health Assembly and appointment of the Latrobe
Health Advocate (Teague et al. 2016), which have been achieved.
148 D. Bird and A. Taylor
The purpose of the Latrobe Health Innovation Zone, within which the Latrobe
Health Assembly and Advocate sit, is to give voice to community aspirations in the
planning and delivering of better health andwellbeing outcomes.With amembership
of about 45 members, the majority of whom are Latrobe City residents, the Latrobe
Health Assembly is a mechanism for increased community engagement leading to
health improvement and integration of services. Based on community feedback and
concerns, the Latrobe Health Advocate is providing independent and direct advice
to the Minister for Health on system and policy issues affecting public health and
wellbeing.
While it is too early to determine whether these initiatives are improving health
and wellbeing and enhancing social trust between residents and the government
(at the time of writing, they had been operating as a collective for 1 year), we are
witnessing some positive demographic outcomes with Morwell’s population growth
rates tracking close to zero.We consider this a positive outcome in demographic terms
in light of the closure of the main employer in the town. One key factor here is the
ability of former Hazelwood employees to source work elsewhere in the region while
remaining as residents in the town. Much of the transitioning of workers has been
achieved by the Latrobe Valley Authority, which was established by the Victorian
Government in November 2016 on the back of Engie’s announcement to close the
Hazelwood Power Station and open-cut coal mine.
The Latrobe Valley Authority is charged with the Worker Transition Service
(providing upskilling, training and support to all ex-employees of Hazelwood
including contractors, supply chain employees and their families) and the Back to
Work Scheme (providing support to employers for hiring and training unemployed
Latrobe Valley residents). This is part of the Victorian Government’s ‘Economic
Growth Zone’ which is injecting $266million into the Latrobe Valley for the creation
of local jobs and businesses.
The town’s relative proximity to Melbourne, a fast-growing and large city, may
also position it as a future commuter town where affordable housing and lifestyle
amenity secure its demand as a place to live and for businesses and the economy to
continue to shift focus to servicing an emerging commuter population. Nevertheless,
the memories of the fire disaster are likely to linger for remaining residents in perpe-
tuity with the presence of the open-cut coal pit both a reminder of the town’s past
events, as well as potential ongoing environmental issues.
While the data and analysis conducted here provides consistent evidence of the
resilience of the Morwell population, in reality, it may be too early to discern the
full impacts from the fire and the de-coupling of the town from the power plant. A
better understanding will come from repeating the sorts of analysis undertaken and
reported on here with 2021 Census data and other data sources. This will provide a
sturdier assessment on whether this seemingly resilient town was able to withstand
the major shock of the power plant closure. Similarly, future studies should consider
a more robust analysis of the strengths inherent within this community, particularly
in relation to social capital and other social indicators of resilience highlighted by
Cutter (2016). This will be critical to identify whether or not the various forms of
social capital are negatively impacted by the possible diversification of the population
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as new people move in in search of the new jobs and business opportunities being
created.
It must also be noted, in relation to studying demographic indicators at these low
levels of geography, there is some possibility that, for several reasons, they may not
proximate actual ‘on the ground’ changes and trends in the community. Some of
these issues are explained by Carson and colleagues in Chap. 5 and include data
accuracy, changes in methods for data collection and ensuring changes are looked at
using the most appropriate level or unit of geography (as far as possible).
In the face of the inevitable shift from fossil fuel to other sources, towns like
Morwell were always going to experience a big shock at some point in time.Morwell,
whose population and economy, although transitioning, has more than survived,
may be a valuable case study for other towns undergoing such transitions from
changing global resource consumption patterns. In reality, shock after shock may
have helped ‘prepare’ the town to transition. The enforced transition with the closure
of Hazelwood can be viewed as a litmus test for other rural and remote towns in
Australia (and elsewhere) whose economic basis has been strongly tied to a main
source (whether or not this is labelled ‘single industry’). Climate change will no
doubt lead to other towns facing similar challenges, testing their capacity to adapt
and thrive.
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Chapter 8
Migration as a Potential Heat Stress
Adaptation Strategy in Australia
Kerstin K. Zander, Carmen Richerzhagen, and Stephen T. Garnett
Abstract As the climate changes, natural disasters are becoming more frequent and
severe. Some disasters are sudden and briefly devastating. Research shows that, in
response, many people emigrate temporarily but return when the danger is past. The
effect of slow-onset disasters can be equally disruptive but the economic and social
impacts can last much longer. In Australia, extreme heat and the rising frequency
of heat waves is a slow-onset disaster even if individual periods of hot weather are
brief. This chapter investigates the impact of increasing heat stress on the intention
of people living in Australia to migrate to cooler places as an adaptation strategy
using an online survey of 1344 people. About 73% felt stressed by increasing heat of
which 11% expressed an intention to move to cooler places in response. The more
affected people had been by the heat, the more likely they were to intend to move.
Tasmania was a preferred destination (20% of those intending to move), although
many people (38%) were unsure where they would go. As Australia becomes hotter,
heat can be expected to play a greater role in people’s mobility decisions. Knowing
the source and destination of this flow of internal migrants will be critical to planning
and policy-making.
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8.1 Introduction
Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of many weather-
related disasters, including floods, storms, droughts and heat waves. Heat waves1
are the most dangerous natural hazard worldwide (Fang et al. 2015). The 2003 heat
wave in Europe, for example, killed more than 70,000 people (Robine et al. 2008),
particularly older people and those with illnesses (see Chap. 10 as well on 2009
south-eastern Australia heatwave). As climate change increases, the frequencies of
heatwaves (Perkins et al. 2012; Perkins andAlexander 2013)mortality andmorbidity
rates will also rise from associated disasters such as bushfires and droughts. Temper-
atures are also increasing in general due to climate change (Coumou et al. 2013), and
this increased exposure to heat, even if not on consecutive days, are also of public
health concern. Being exposed to too much heat can cause heat stress and associated
illness with symptoms, ranging from being uncomfortable to hot flushes, headaches,
fatigue, dizziness, nausea, cramps and, eventually, heat strokes and collapse (Parsons
2003). Any of these symptoms can compromise people’s wellbeing and productivity
(Zander et al. 2015).
Short-term in-situ adaptation to heat includes hydration (drinking), cooling
(including air-conditioning) and resting. In the long-term, however, adaptation plans
to heat and heat waves must include alterations to infrastructure such as insulation,
ventilation, air-conditioning (Barnett et al. 2015; Hatvani-Kovacs et al. 2016) as
well as landscape design. The latter is likely to be particularly important in cities
suffering from higher temperatures as a consequence of human activity, known as
the heat island effect (Solecki et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2014).
Migration is the most extreme form of adaptation to heat stress. Migration as
an adaptation to climate change has been recognised since the first report of the
Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC) aswell as debated extensively in
academic literature focused on developing countries (Hugo 2011; de Sherbinin et al.
2011). Migration as a response can be seen as either a failure of in-situ adaptation or
as part of a portfolio of adaptation measures (Bardsley and Hugo 2010; de Sherbinin
et al. 2011) which includes taking advantage of opportunities offered by cooler
places (Tacoli 2009; Scheffran et al. 2012). Those who stay may be well-adapted
and resilient. However, of particular concern to developing countries are those people
who lack the resources tomove away, that is that they are trapped (Black et al. 2011b).
However, even successful in-situ adaptation to increasing temperatures might not
prevent people from moving away (Sakdapolrak et al. 2014) because migration is
rarely caused by a single factor alone but by many factors that collectively contribute
to an individual’s decision to move (McLeman and Smit 2006; Black et al. 2011a).
Interaction effects and the wider range of climatic effects on migration are not yet
well understood (Carleton and Hsiang 2016).
1Several definitions of the term heat wave exist within the international meteorological community.
The IPCC defines a heat wave as a ‘period of abnormally and uncomfortably hot weather’ (IPCC
2014).
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In developing countries, the fact that people move, or are pushed, away because
of climate change impacts is increasingly the subject of research (Bardsley and
Hugo 2010; Massey et al. 2010; Gray and Mueller 2012a, 2012b; Warner and Afifi
2014; Ocello et al. 2015), with a few recent examples concentrating on heat stress
(Mueller et al. 2014) and increasing temperatures (Bohra-Mishra et al. 2014; Gray
and Wise 2016). There is much less research in this field from developed countries
and is mostly limited to Indigenous people (Zander et al. 2013; King et al. 2014).
For most people in developing countries, responding to climate change by migrating
is impeded by shortages of economic resources and human capital (Black et al.
2011a) or inhibited for cultural reasons such as a strong attachment to traditional
lands (Mortreux and Barnett 2009; Adger et al. 2013). Most people in developed
economies such as Australia, in contrast, have few constraints on decisions about
when and where to relocate to improve economic prosperity and wellbeing. As heat
increases, it is therefore increasingly likely that people in developed economies will
move to avoid it, regardless of their stage in life.
This chapter extends the work by Zander et al. (2016) on this topic using the
same dataset: a cross-sectoral sample of people living in Australia between 18 and
65 years. This chapter explores peoples’ intention to move from their current place
of residence to cooler places because of heat stress. It investigates determinants of
the intention to move, the timeframe of moving and the geographical frame of their
mobility.
Understanding how people adapt to heat is particularly important to Australia, a
generally hot continent (see also Chap. 10). Australia’s climate has already warmed
by 0.9 °C since 1910 and temperatures are projected to rise by 0.6–1.5 °C by 2030
compared with the climate of 1980–1999 (BoM 2014). As has happened globally
(WMOandWHO2015), both the duration and frequency of heatwaves had increased
over the period 1971–2008 with the hottest days during heatwaves across most of
Australia becoming even hotter (Perkins and Alexander 2013) and the chances of
standalone hot days also being higher (Min et al. 2013; Perkins and Alexander 2013).
8.2 Data and Methods
8.2.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour
This chapter focuses on people’s intentions to move away from their current place
of residence voluntarily because of heat. This intention reflects a willingness to
change place of residence (de Jong 1999). Although this is not the same as actual
moving (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Lu 1998; van Dalen and Henkens 2008; de Groot
et al. 2011), it is a moderate to strong indicator of future movements, based on
Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour (1991), that is particularly valued in the fields of
humangeography and psychology (Manski 1990; Sandu and de Jong 1996; vanDalen
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and Henkens 2008). Previous studies have shown a significant positive relationship
between intentions and actual behaviour (vanDalen andHenkens 2008; Thissen et al.
2010).
8.2.2 Data Collection and Sampling
Data were collected through an online survey conducted in the last two weeks of
May and the first two weeks of October 2014.2 To carry out the survey, a research
company (MyOpinions) we commissioned that has a continuously updated online
panel of more than 300,000 verified respondents within Australia. Online surveys
havemany benefits overmail-out surveys and in-person interviews and aremore cost-
effective (Berrens et al. 2003; Dillman 2007; Fleming and Bowden 2009). Some
studies have shown that results do not differ across survey modes (Lindhjem and
Navrud 2011; Windle and Rolfe 2011). To avoid self-selection bias, not uncommon
in online surveys, the topic of the survey was not made known when members of the
panel were invited to participate. Respondents were paid $2 upon completion of the
survey, which took between 13 and 15 min of their time.
In total, 9406 people from the MyOpinions panel were sampled (4913 in the first
wave and 4493 in the second wave). The overall response rate was 20.5%, including
a 3.3% drop-out rate. There were 1925 responses received in total, consisting of 847
and 1078 from each wave, respectively.
8.2.3 Questionnaire
The questionnaire comprised of three parts: (1) questions on general mobility
including frequencies and reasons for pastmovements, (2) questions on intentions for
future movements and whether heat would influence this movement, and questions
about the timeframe of the movements and the intended destination, and (3) ques-
tions on respondents’ socio-demographic background, attitudes and climate change
beliefs.
The first question within the second section was a general question about whether
or not people had been feeling heat stressed in the previous 12 months. Those who
denied this were assumed not to think about heat at all when deciding whether to
move and were not included in the analysis on intentions to move because of heat.
2The surveys were staggered into twowaves to reduce the chance of surveying during (or soon after)
particularly hot periods, choosing late May and early October as being times when exceptional heat
would be unlikely. The other reason for conducting the survey in two sessions was to ensure that to
the demographics of both samples were representative of Australian society and that results could
be replicated.
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8.2.4 Data Analysis
The data were tested for different factors likely to affect respondents’ probability of
moving to cooler places because of heat using ANOVA. If the data required it, Tukey
tests were then used for multiple comparisons of means.
8.3 Results and Discussion
Eighty-six of the 1925 responses obtained were largely incomplete and therefore
omitted from further analysis. Out of the remaining 1839 respondents, 27% did not
feel heat stressed in the year preceding the survey and were also not included in
the analysis of movements because of heat stress. The final data set explored here,
therefore, contains information of 1344 respondents.
8.3.1 Demographic Sample Characteristics
Slightly less than half of the respondents (48%) were female. The average age was
41 years (SD: 12.2), with a median of 41, which is slightly higher than the 37 median
age at a national level (ABS 2015). One of the reasons for a higher median is that
the survey was targeted to people over 18. Fifty-six per cent of respondents said
they had children. Most respondents (72%) had tertiary education (Diploma: 35%,
University: 37%) and most (96%) were in paid employment (Full-time: 57%; Part-
time: 34%; Casual: 5%; Not in paid job: 4%). The average annual personal income
was AUD 58,000 (SD: 76,000) with a median of AUD 50,000 which is very similar
to the national median of working people between 18 and 65 (AUD 46,000; ABS
2012). In line with the national population distribution (ABS 2012), about 64% of
the respondents were from the three most populated states (Victoria (VIC): 26%,
New South Wales (NSW): 24% and Queensland (QLD): 16%) and proportionally
fewer from the other states/territories (WesternAustralia (WA): 13%, SouthAustralia
(SA): 9%, Australian Capital Territory (ACT): 5%, Tasmania (TAS): 4%, Northern
Territory (NT): 3%).
8.3.2 Past Movements and Their Reasons
About 18% of respondents were highly mobile, in that they usually moved once a
year (3%) or every 2–3 years (15%) in the past. Almost half were moderately mobile
(46%), moving once every five (20%) or ten years (26%) and about a third were
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relatively sedentary, having never moved either in their lives (11%) or within the last
15 years (25%).
Respondents’ mobility was correlated with age and family status. Younger people
were more likely to be highly mobile (P < 0.001) which is consistent with the life
cycle theory ofmigrationwhichpostulates that youngpeople aremostmobile, usually
as they search for education and employment (Polachek and Horvath 1977; Coulter
and Scott 2015). The average age of highly mobile people was 33.8 years, that of
moderately mobile people 40.8 years and that of people with lowmobility 44.5 years
(Fig. 8.1). Those peoplewith low andmediummobilitywere significantlymore likely
(P < 0.001) to have children (58% and 61% respectively) than those who were highly
mobile (43%). Again, this can be attributed to respondents’ life cycles, stipulating
that families with children are less mobile than singles or couples without children
(Long 1972), particularly regarding long-distance movements (which is expected
if one moves to escape the heat). The reasons behind this could be that the costs
of moving increase as the number of persons living in a family rises and that the
presence of additional members in the family means that more ties must be broken
at the place of origin and established at the destination (Long 1972). Gender, income
and work situation (workload and employee) did not have a significant impact on the
degree of general mobility. The state from which people lived also had no significant
impact on people’s general mobility.
In line with migration/mobility theory (Clark and Withers 2007), employment
was the most important reason for moving among respondents who had moved in
the past (Fig. 8.2). Although the weather was the least important of the reasons
for past movements, 41% of respondents listed it as having an important or very
important influence in their decision to move in the past (this can include people
moving to warmer as well as cooler climates).
Fig. 8.1 Boxplot showing the significant relationship between age of respondents and their level
of mobility, showing that highly mobile respondents were significantly younger than those whose
mobility was low or medium and those with mediummobility younger than those with lowmobility
8 Migration as a Potential Heat Stress Adaptation Strategy … 159
Fig. 8.2 The importance of different factors in past movements (% respondents, N = 1839)
8.3.3 Intention to Move Because of Heat
Almost 11% (N = 133) of respondents who said that they were stressed by heat
intended to move because of this heat stress; the large remainder (89%; 1133) would
not move for this reason. One result that stood out was that respondents living in the
NTwere about three timesmore likely to intend tomove because of heat (36% versus
the average of 11%; P < 0.001). This was not surprising given that most respondents
from the NT live in Darwin, the capital, situated in the tropical Top End of Australia.
Because of the high humidity, the perceived heat is particularly high for at least half
the year (Goldi et al. 2015).
The intention tomovewas also affected by gender (P <0.005), degree of perceived
heat stress (P < 0.001) and general mobility (P < 0.001) (Table 8.1). A higher
percentage of male respondents said they would move because of heat than female
respondents (13% versus 8%; P < 0.01). Not surprising, the more heat stressed
respondents said they felt, the more likely were they to intend to move because of
heat stress with almost a third (28%) of those feeling very heat stressed intending to
move.
Also not surprising was the result that highly mobile people (see previous section)
were more likely to intend to move because of heat stress (21%). This is consistent
with migration intention studies (de Jong et al. 1985). This can also mean that people
see heat only as a factor in the mix of reasons why they would move, and they would
probably move anyway after a certain time in the current location. On the other hand,
it can mean that those who have never moved, are ‘trapped’ where they are, even if it
becomes very hot, to the extent that it affects health. Often these people wish to stay
because of tight connections (family, culture) to where they live, or because they have
employment that they do not want to leave. In developing countries ‘trapped’ people
do not have the resources to move away (Black et al. 2011b). In Australia, this might
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Table 8.1 Percentage of
respondents (N = 1344)
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Table 8.1 (continued) Variable Percentage
Low 7.0b
Note Differences in superscript letters signify statistically
significant differences in the intention to move within the
categories. They show, for example, thatmenare significantlymore
likely to intend to move than women (12.7% versus 8.2%) and that
different workloads have no impact on the intention to move
also be true for the very poor, noting that 13.3% of the population in Australia live
below the poverty line (ACOSS 2016). This survey did not confirm that income was
of concern when deciding to migrate because of heat stress. However, even though
the income distribution of respondents resembled that of the general population, the
sampling method may have excluded the very poorest people.
Other core demographic factors such as age, income, having children and work-
load did not have significant impacts on the intention to move because of heat. The
conclusion that age did not affect moving intention was unexpected. Previous studies
have shown that movement intentions (mainly international migration) were posi-
tively correlated with age (de Jong et al. 1985; de Groot et al. 2011). This means
that heat can influence intentions to move regardless of a person’s stage in life. This
can have consequences for service provision by altering normal movement patterns.
For instance, if more middle-aged people in established careers move than would
previously have been expected, this could leave a shortage of skills and labour in
areas that experience more frequent uncomfortably hot weather.
8.3.4 Moving When?
Of those people who intend to move because of heat, most thought they might move
in the distant future (33%), 17% in two to three years, 20% in about a year and 14%
within the next three months (Table 8.2). A substantial proportion (13.5%) was in
the process of moving at the time of the survey. Men stated significantly more often
that they are already in the process of moving because of heat than women (19.3%
versus 4%; P = 0.01). Women were significantly more likely to intend to move in
the distant future (Table 8.2). Those of either gender who said they would move in
the distant future were also older (P < 0.01) than those thinking of moving within
the next three months (mean age 42.6 versus 34.3). Respondents with children were
more likely to intend to move at later stages than those without children (P < 0.05).
Those already in the process of moving were more often stressed by heat than
those intending to move later than within the next three months (P < 0.005). Those
intending to move in the distant future exhibited lower general mobility than those
who would move earlier (P < 0.005). Education, gender, income and location (their
state) did not significantly explain the timeframe of potential heat relatedmovements.
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Table 8.2 Time horizon, by gender, age and family status, of peoples’ intention to move away from
where they currently live because of heat (N = 133)




13.5 4.0a 19.3b 35.9ab (9.8) 6.8a
Within the next
3 months
15.8 10.0a 19.3a 34.3a (9.8) 17.8b
In about a year 20.3 22.0a 19.3a 40.5ab (13.4) 20.5b
In about 2–3 years 16.5 22.0a 13.3a 43.3ab (10.7) 23.3b
In the distant future 33.8 42.0a 28.9b 42.6b (11.0) 31.5b
Note Differences in superscript letters signify statistically significant differences in the intention to
move across gender, age and family status
Those intending to move in the short-term (within a year, categories grouped)
were significantly younger (P < 0.005), on average 37.2 years, than those planning
movement in the long-term (42.8 years). This is again the highly transient population
of young people. Of all men intending to move, more than half (58%) would do so
in the short-term, while only 36% of those women intending to move would do so
in the short-term (P < 0.01).
8.3.5 Moving from Where to Where?
More than a third (38%) of those wanting tomove because of heat stress did not know
where they would move to. Most people (91%) would move within Australia with
the remaining 9% intending to move overseas. Significantly, more women intended
to move overseas than men (16% versus 5%; P < 0.05).
Only 9%wouldmovewithin their state of origin,most (91%)would change states.
Almost 20%would move to TAS (Table 8.3), particularly fromNSW (31%) and VIC
(19%). TAS was the only state that would receive more people than it would lose,
which was expected given its cold climate.
Nobody would move to the NT or SA (Table 8.3), with a particularly high propor-
tion of those from the NT (36%) intending to move because of heat stress (Table 8.1);
this proportion was only about 9% in SA. Besides the NT, many of the respondents
intending to move were from QLD (ratio: origin (%)/sample distribution % = 1.24;
Table 8.3) and NSW (ratio = 1.06). This was not surprising, given that parts of the
NT and QLD lie in the tropical humid north, and given that a large proportion of
respondents from the NT stated an intention to move. It was surprising, however,
that so few people from SA intended to move because of heat, given that Adelaide
and surroundings saw record temperatures and increasing frequencies of heat waves
in the last few years (Steffen et al. 2014) with many people suffering (Xiang et al.
2014; Hatvani-Kovacs et al. 2016; Zander et al. 2017).
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Table 8.3 Origin and destination of respondents intending to move because of heat stress (%; N
= 133)




Tasmania 19.5 2.3 0.51 4.5
New South Wales 9.8 24.8 1.06 23.5
Victoria 9.0 19.5 0.76 25.6
Queensland 8.3 19.5 1.24 15.7
Western Australia 4.5 12.0 0.91 13.2
Australian Capital
Territory
1.5 3.8 0.73 5.2
Northern Territory 0.0 10.5 3.28 3.2
South Australia 0.0 7.5 0.82 9.1
Overseas 9.0 NA NA NA
Unknown 38.3 NA NA NA
Those currently in the NTwouldmovemainly to QLD (29%),WA (21%) or NSW
(14%). Those originating in SAmostly did not know their potential destination (40%)
or stated TAS (30%), QLD (20%) or VIC (10%) as destinations.
8.4 Conclusion
Our results provide one, out of several accounts, of the general population in a devel-
oped economy intending to relocate because of climatic heat stress. So far most
research on migration as a response to climate change is from developing coun-
tries, or, if in developed countries, then in the context of Indigenous people. Because
people inAustralia are free tomove if financial resources permit, this research applied
Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour to investigate peoples’ intention tomove away to
cooler places. Results of an Australian-wide online survey with about 1900 respon-
dents showed that 11% of those respondents who said that they were stressed by
heat intended to move away because they felt heat stressed in their current place of
residence. As expected, people who have been highly mobile in the past were more
likely to intend to move because of heat, while age did not affect the intention to
move because of heat stress. Men were also more likely to intend to move because of
heat stress. Most heat-stressed men intended to move in within the next three months
while most women (42% of those intending to move) would do so in the distant
future. Younger respondents are more likely to move in a short-time frame, many of
those already in the process of moving. People living in the NT, notably from the
tropical (hot and humid) Top End of Australia, were three times more likely to move
because of heat stress. Although slightly more than a third of respondents intending
to move did not know where to, among those who knew, the preferred destination
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was Tasmania which has one of the lowest mean temperatures in Australia. Many
people (38%)were unsure about a potential destination and Tasmania was a preferred
destination for those who were not.
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Chapter 9
Designing Resilient Cities that Work
for Women, Too
Jessica L. Barnes
Abstract Urban landscapes can—and do—influence multiple aspects of our lives,
including our overall quality of life and disaster resilience. Research has confirmed
that some populations experience negative outcomes in disasters at least partially
attributed to poorly designed urban environments; and women’s and girls’ resilience
in particular can be impacted by their experience of the urban landscape. In response,
urban designers have an opportunity and an obligation to incorporate gender-sensitive
design approaches in all of their projects to ensure the whole community has access
to the benefits of urban landscapes. This chapter examines current evidence and
strategies for successful urban design that supports resilience in women and the
cities they occupy.
Keywords Gender mainstreaming · Urban design · Landscape architecture ·
Inclusive design · Resilient cities
9.1 Introduction
Urban landscapes can—and do—influence multiple aspects of our lives, including
our overall quality of life (Rondeau et al. 2005; Urban Development Vienna 2013).
This observation is what draws me to landscape architecture and urban design—
the potential to have large-scale, positive impacts on the people who create our
communities and cities. It is only recently, though, that urban designers are starting to
understand that these landscapes do not affect everyone equally. Indeed, researchers
have confirmed that social, economic, and political factors influence our perceptions
of and interactions with the spaces we occupy (Garcia-Ramon et al. 2004), and in
some instances, these varied experiences can impact individuals’ and communities’
disaster resilience (Tidball and Krasny 2013).
I believe that urban designers have an obligation to reduce disaster risk and support
resilience in their communities (see also Chap. 12). This is not only because the
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incidence of disasters is increasing (UNDRR 2019), but also because, as Wisner
et al. (2003) put it: “… disasters can be perceived within the broader patterns of
society, and… analyzing them in this way may provide a much more fruitful way of
building policies that can help to reduce disasters and mitigate hazards, while at the
same time improving living standards and opportunities more generally” (p. 4). In
other words, disaster resilience and quality of life are interlinked, and improving one
will have a positive impact on the other. This—tome—is the essence ofwhat it means
to be an urban designer: improving the quality of life for those in the communities we
serve by taking a multifaceted approach to community development that recognizes
the role that economic, social, and gender inequalities have in creating truly resilient
communities.
When considering disaster resilience and the urban landscape, much has been said
about the importance of engineering, infrastructure, and natural systems in protecting
communities from physical damage; however, there is less discussion about the
importance of connecting the urban landscape to the economic, social, institutional,
and community capacities that also make up disaster resilience (Cutter et al. 2010;
Tidball and Krasny 2013). Confining the field of urban design to infrastructure and
natural systems misses opportunities to build capacities in these interrelated areas.
To expand and build upon the scope of urban design’s contribution to disaster
resilience, I suggest that designers focus on a near-universally marginalized group of
people who routinely experience substandard outcomes in disasters and who account
for half of the global population: women and girls. This chapter connects women’s
disaster resilience to their experiences of and participation in the built environ-
ment. To my surprise, while the field of gender and disaster has been well estab-
lished for some decades (Ashraf and Azad 2015; Enarson and Chakrabarti 2009;
Enarson and Morrow 1998a), few studies have specifically examined the intersec-
tion between gender, disaster, and the built environment. Likewise, researchers have
long-understood that our built environments have various andmeasurable impacts on
our health and well-being (Ekkel and de Vries 2017; Markevych et al. 2017; WHO
RegionalOffice forEurope 2016), but fewof these studies have gender dis-aggregated
their data or connected it to resilience. With this in mind, I’d like to spark a conversa-
tion between researchers, design professionals, and women and their communities to
consider the myriad of potential benefits of combining efforts. As I will demonstrate,
bringing these stakeholders together to design and build our cities has the potential
to proactively support resilience among over half of our world’s human population
and will likely have positive outcomes for the other half as well.
Why focus on women’s disaster resilience? As Wisner et al. (2003) observe in
At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters, “gender is a perva-
sive division affecting all societies, and it channels access to social and economic
resources away from women and towards men” (p. 48). Enarson and Chakrabarti
(2009) assert that gender must be a mandatory, critical dimension of all initiatives
in order to create more sustainable societies. To understand how urban landscapes
affect communities differently, city officials must identify which stakeholders have
the most limited voices when it comes to making decisions about the built environ-
ment. Since men overwhelmingly dominate the field of urban planning and design
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(Rustin 2014; The American Institute of Architects 2015), women represent a prime
target demographic for this purpose. In short, our urban landscapes have a male
bias—a bias that must be addressed and corrected to improve a community’s overall
disaster resilience.
In this chapter, I review both published articles and gray literature that document
gender-specific outcomes for women and girls in disasters. I compare these studies to
research concerning the measurable impacts that the built environment can have on
individual and community capacities while looking for overlap and commonalities
between the two fields. Finally, I speculate on how these connections between urban
design and disaster resilience might influence the future of the design of the built
environment and how the lessons gleaned so far might have a broader impact on
resilience.
9.2 Definitions
Discussing women and girls as a homogeneous demographic group disguises the
rich diversity among them. Women as individuals will all have unique and valuable
skills, knowledge, and experiences that can contribute to building more resilient
cities (Hankivsky 2005). While I note specific demographics of women when such
information is available, generally I use the term with broad strokes. In this paper,
“women” refers to people of all ages who were born female, people who identify as
women, and/or people who perform labor traditionally assigned to women, like care-
giving and domestic work. Each broad group ofwomenmay overlap, and somemight
include men. Perhaps because of this diversity, cities designed with and for women
have the potential to benefit the community across many demographics (Micklow
et al. 2015; Women in Cities International 2010).
When discussing women’s disaster resilience, I’m referring to resources that
support an individual’s and a community’s capacity to respond to and recover from a
hazard. Capacity relates to five major areas of resilience: social resilience, economic
resilience, infrastructure resilience, institutional resilience, and social capital (Cutter
et al. 2010). Vulnerability, on the other hand, describes those barriers that limit
an individual’s or a community’s ability to respond to disasters. Importantly, all
communities have both vulnerability and resilience.
Gender mainstreaming, also called gender-based analysis, means normalizing
decision making to consider how any planned decision, policy, or program might
impact bothwomenandmen (Bellitto 2015). It is considered themost favored strategy
for gender inclusion among urban design professionals around the world (Hankivsky
2005). Though often associated more strongly with women, gender mainstreaming
emphasizes that women’s and men’s needs are equally important and must equally
be accounted for when making decisions (Bellitto 2015).
As already discussed, considering gender alone has the potential to be too broad,
missing valuable opportunities and feedback. Hankivsky (2005) argues that one of
the main weaknesses of gender mainstreaming is that it creates a dichotomy of
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male versus female at the expense of embracing intersectionality. She advocates for
highlighting the relationships among gender, class, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and
power (Hankivsky 2005). I acknowledge that gender mainstreaming, as compared
to diversity management, has the potential to exclude marginalized populations.
However, scholars like Bellitto (2015) believe that gender mainstreaming might be
the most acceptable entry point to challenging the status quo in countries, such as
the USA, that lag behind in achieving gender equality, since it can be implemented
from both the top-down and bottom-up. Future studies should compare the results of
gender and diversity mainstreaming within urban design to determine a framework
that could have the most positive impact.
Following the precedent set in Urban Green Spaces and Health: A Review of
Evidence (WHO Regional Office for Europe 2016), I choose to approach the defi-
nition of the urban landscape in a holistic way. Perhaps most obviously, these terms
describe the physical environments that cities occupy. This includes green spaces
like parks, plazas, and nature preserves; natural features like rivers, forests, and air
quality; and transportation networks like bike lanes, bus routes, and streets (WHO
Regional Office for Europe 2016). Urban landscape also describes policies that direct
how the physical environment takes form, for example: zoning policy, planning regu-
lations, and design guidelines for new development (Micklow andWarner 2014). The
various components of the urban landscape combine to create the overall experience
of being in the city.
9.3 Women, Girls, and Disaster
The influence of gender on disaster resilience iswell-documented, and it should come
as no surprise that women and girls are often more marginalized and vulnerable to
disaster compared to men (Ashraf and Azad 2015; Criado Perez 2019; Enarson and
Chakrabarti 2009). For example, women are more likely to be affected by a disaster,
and they’re more likely to die or experience trauma during a disaster (O’Reilly
et al. 2015). Tragically, they also experience increased rates of male violence after
a disaster (Wilson et al. 1998). Women’s needs are less likely to be accounted for
during disaster. For example, onmore than one occasion, homes rebuilt after disasters
lacked kitchens (Criado Perez 2019, p. 290), and stories of shortages of menstruation
and breastfeeding-related supplies in post-disaster shelters and temporary housing
abound (Criado Perez 2019; Hargest-Slade and Gribble 2015). Facilities to support
common income-generating opportunities, like small-scale markets and childcare,
go ignored and unbuilt (Enarson and Morrow 1998b). Given these realities and the
fact that women and girls represent half of everybody, a logical question to ask is:
Why is this happening?
Ariyabandu (2009) says that women’s vulnerability to disaster springs from pre-
existing gender relations, which create differences in social and economic status,
mortality rates, needs, gender-based prejudices, among other disparities. Criado
Perez (2019) takes a simpler approach, distilling the reasons for women’s inequal
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status as being related to “the female body, women’s unpaid care burden, and male
violence against women” (p. 49). Cannon (2002) argues that vulnerability depends
on “initial conditions” like a person’s health, mobility, and capacity for self-reliance.
In all accounts, the circumstances that contribute to better or worse outcomes are
created in our daily lives, prior to disaster. What do we know about women’s existing
conditions that improve or detract from their disaster resilience, and howmight those
conditions relate to the built environment? To answer this question, I have identified
four areas of inquiry: women’s transportation and economic resilience, access to safe
public spaces, women’s specific health needs, and inclusion and leadership through
gender mainstreaming.
9.4 Transportation and Economic Resilience
Economic capacity often represents the most significant predictor of a person’s
resilience and ability to recover after a disaster (Ashraf and Azad 2015; Cutter
et al. 2010), and women tend to start off in a worse economic position than men
when a disaster strikes. In 2007, 23.8% of American women heads-of-household
were in poverty (English et al. 2009). Single, working women headed one-fifth of
all households with children, and they were nearly twice as likely to be unemployed
as married men, possibly because of the challenge of finding work and childcare
whose schedules and locations often do not complement each other (English et al.
2009). Even for those working, employment does not necessarily guarantee equi-
table economic opportunities. Hegewisch and Williams-Baron (2018) documented
that women continue to work in female-dominated occupations, which have lower
salaries on average than male-dominated occupations at similar skill levels. When
women’s salaries are compared to men’s salaries within the same female-dominated
occupations, men still out-earn women (Hegewisch and Williams-Baron 2018).
Consider this: In the USA, for every one man with poverty-level wages, there are
eight women also in poverty (Hegewisch and Williams-Baron 2018). With fewer
and more marginalized economic opportunities, strengthening access to women’s
economic resources has the potential to significantly improve resilience.
Reliable transportation provides the foundation for accessing many urban
resources, including economic resources, and is directly connected to women’s
resilience. So, struggling with limitedmobility can compromise resilience due to less
access to jobs and careers, professional development, economic status, and personal
well-being and health (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009;Madariaga 2013a). Andwomen
do struggle. Despite the fact that on average more women than men rely on public
transportation in their daily lives, the design of many public transportation routes
and schedules typically frustrate women (Action Aid International 2013; Loukaitou-
Sideris et al. 2009; Madariaga 2013a). Their frustration stems from the fact that
women and men have vastly different travel patterns, but transportation systems tend
to prioritize commuter travel needs, which traditionally favor men (Micklow et al.
2015). Since women continue to shoulder the majority of unpaid care-giving and
174 J. L. Barnes
household work, commuter-centric design further puts women at a disadvantage
(Khazan 2016; Madariaga 2013a). People who are responsible for care-giving and
domestic work are more likely to trip-chain, a pattern of mobility characterized by
connecting multiple trips into one outing (Micklow andWarner 2014). For example,
a woman might drop her children off at school, go to work, leave work, pick up her
kids, go grocery shopping, and check-in on an elderly parent before finally returning
home at the end of her day. If the same woman relies on public transportation, a
disproportionate amount of her day will be spent in transit (Micklow et al. 2015).
That is in addition to the extra unpaid hours she will spend on domestic duties like
child and elder care and housework, which women are more likely to be responsible
for around the world (OECD 2014). While urban design is limited in its influence
on the division of care-giving and household work, it has a tremendous impact on
transportation options.
Even though women use public transportation more frequently than men, trans-
portation systems have historically been designed for the commuter at the expense
of the caregiver; that is, transportation design tends to focus on single-trip journeys
between home and work or school (Madariaga 2013a). One reason for this is how
transportation planners evaluate travel needs. Conventionally, transportation plan-
ners categorize trips into “essential” and “non-essential” groups; however, many
trips that get labeled as “non-essential” are related to essential care-giving activities
like grocery shopping and escorting children to school (Madariaga 2013a). When
care-giving activities are grouped together, they account for about a third of all trips
taken, hardly “non-essential” (Madariaga 2013a).Othermobility differences include:
women tend to have less access to cars, cease driving earlier than men as they age,
make more multi-modal trips, and their trips tend to be “shaped as polygons” (as
opposed to the straight, two point travel associated with men) which often requires
catching connecting trains or buses to get where they need to go (Madariaga 2013a;
Micklow et al. 2015). Basically, women’s mobility patterns are more complex than
men’s, but the urban landscape and transportation systems often aren’t designed with
women’s needs in mind (Madariaga 2013a; Perera 2008).
As will be discussed more later in this chapter, safety concerns keep many women
from accessing public spaces or walking alone on the street, and this includes public
transportation. If the public felt more secure, public transportation ridership in the
UKwould increase 10.5% according to the UKDepartment of Transport (Loukaitou-
Sideris et al. 2009).When asked how to improve their sense of safety while traveling,
women often identify poor lighting as a top concern (Johnson andMiles 2014). Urban
design professionals often seek to improve lighting in public places, especially on
streets and around station platforms or bus stops, as an initial design intervention
(Johnson andMiles 2014).However, this strategyworks onlywhen areas surrounding
these transit hubs, like parking lots, are also well-lit to avoid a “fishbowl” effect
(Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009). Additionally, women have pointed out that well-
maintained, clean areas that are free of graffiti and debris feel safer than poorly
maintained spaces (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009).
Loukaitou-Sideris et al. (2009), who performed a comprehensive review of litera-
ture concerning safety and transit and surveyed16 representatives ofwomen’s interest
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groups on the topic, found thatwomen’s andmen’s preferences in safety interventions
for public transportation differed. Women clearly favored more visible interventions
like additional security staff in public places compared to technological interven-
tions like CCTV, which men preferred (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009). Women also
feel safer with clear sightlines and no corners or tight spaces where someone could
hide (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009). In contrast, a concurrent survey of 245 transit
authorities in the USA revealed that transportation agencies are choosing the oppo-
site of what women want, with a clear preference for technology (Loukaitou-Sideris
et al. 2009). More puzzling, most of the transportation agencies that responded to the
survey did not employ security officers nor have a desire to. In contrast, transporta-
tion agencies that do provide officers stationed at their facilities reported that they
are “very effective and [give] you a nice, secure feeling” (Loukaitou-Sideris et al.
2009).
Improving access to transportation elevates community—especially women’s—
resilience by improving access to economic capital through more time available
for jobs, study, and networking (Cutter et al. 2010). Urban design professionals
need to create user-friendly, safe transportation systems that accommodate multiple
transportation styles and patterns, paying specific attention to improving options for
women.
9.5 Access to Safe Public Spaces
Transportation areas aren’t the only public spaces that need to be made safer. On
a global scale, violence against women remains a dire crisis, not just for women
themselves, but for society as a whole, as it limits the full participation of half of
the population in public life (Johnson and Miles 2014). In addition to this violence,
women experience sexual harassment on a near-universal scale. A recent study from
the nonprofit organization Stop Street Harassment found that 81% of women and
43% of men report experiencing some form of sexual harassment or assault at some
point in their lives (Kearl 2018). Worse, official crime statistics do not represent
the full scope of sexual crimes against women. A survey in New York City found
that 96 percent of victims of harassment did not file a report with the police or
the transportation agency (Stringer 2007). On an extreme, sexual violence has been
explicitly used to prevent women from occupying public spaces. A study in Egypt
found that some groups deliberately dispatchedmen to rape andmolestwomen taking
part in the 2013 Tahrir Square protests in Cairo (Langohr 2013). Tandogan and Ilhan
(2016) speculated that because of these realities, when women discuss their fear in
public spaces, what they are really discussing is women’s fear of sexual violence
in public spaces. Sexual violence, overt harassment, and crass remarks all create a
hostile urban environment for many women (Tandogan and Ilhan 2016).
This information is important to contextualize broader statistics on violence in
public places. While women are more likely to report violence in private spaces, it is
men—notwomen—who aremore likely to be victims of violence and crime in public
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(Rollnick 2007). Despite that, women aremore likely to feel unsafe in public space—
two to three times as afraid by some estimates (Reid and Konrad 2004). Therefore,
while men are more likely to be in danger, women are more likely to be aware of
danger (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009). In addition to encouraging women’s use of
the urban landscape, women’s insights on public safety have the potential to reduce
crimes against men as well since safer places will be safer for everyone (Micklow
et al. 2015).
Further complicating the issue, Loukaitou-Sideris et al. (2009) found in a survey
of US women that culture plays a significant role in propagating women’s fear.
As one interviewee observed, “[the societal dialog] has done a very good job of
convincing women that [they] are unsafe in public space” (Loukaitou-Sideris et al.
2009). Parents have been found to have stricter rules for their daughters concerning
curfews and mobility compared to their sons, possibly because of disproportionate
media attention given to crimes against women (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009). We
teach our girls to believe they’re vulnerable in public places, even though our boys
might benefit more from the warning.
Therefore, it’s not surprising that Loukaitou-Sideris et al. (2009) concluded that
fear of crime is a primary barrier to women’s access to the urban landscape, while
Madariaga (2013b) connected the fear of public spaces to the fear of public trans-
portation, which I’ve already discussed. This perceived danger—whether imme-
diate or not—causes many women to self-limit their movements (Women 2017).
Women might be reluctant to be in public space at certain hours or avoid a place alto-
gether (Madariaga 2013a). Many women who steer clear of plazas or parks might
be reducing their chances for serendipitous encounters that could build their social
networks (Johnson and Miles 2014); avoiding travel at certain times of day might
limit economic opportunities (Halsall 2001); spending less time walking outside
could compromise health (Frank et al. 2008); and limiting use of public space might
reduce women’s voices in public discussions (Perera 2008). Because unsafe envi-
ronments limit access to urban landscapes’ wide array of resources, it is reasonable
to identify a lack of safety as a key vulnerability in the urban landscape that affects
women in particular. Urban design professionals must recognize that improving
safety is an opportunity to support resilience, especially for women.
How can urban design professionals take these considerations into account
when designing the urban landscape? The obvious answer is to ask women what
they need and what they’re lacking (Criado Perez 2019). For example, Toronto’s
Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children devel-
oped the Women’s Safety Audit tool for this purpose. It allows cities to undertake a
critical evaluation of their built environment and has since become the most widely
used tool to assess urban safety around the world (Rollnick 2007; Women in Cities
International 2008). In these audits, women document specific features that either
increase or decrease their sense of safety in places that they frequently visit, like bus
stops and train stations (Lambrick et al. 2011). Other popular tools include focus
group discussions and street surveys (Lambrick et al. 2011).
A word of caution: In documenting women’s needs, urban design professionals
must self-screen for benevolent sexism in their actions andwords. Benevolent sexism
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is the well-intentioned actions or words based on inherent gendered stereotypes
(Meagher Benjamin 2017); cities must avoid the “damsel in distress” rhetoric and
instead encourage women to take the lead in designing their own safety measures
(Rogers 2014). This is especially vital when considering controversial interventions
like creating female-only spaces. In addressing safety concerns on public transporta-
tion, some trains and buses in Japan, Mexico, Germany, and Thailand have desig-
nated women-only areas, and many cities are implementing rideshares and common
spaces like gyms and apartment buildings that are just for women (Hillin 2016).
Train companies in Tokyo documented a 3% reduction in the number of reported
cases of lewd behavior after designating cars for women, so these programs appear
to offer some success in reducing harassment (“Japanese women can now travel in
women-only train cars to avoid groping,” 2006). Similarly, Germany, China, and
Switzerland have all experimented with designated parking spots for women that
place them closer to their destinations (Hillin 2016). However, despite the growing
popularity of female-only spaces, some scholars and activists reject segregation as
a solution to improving women’s safety, advocating that the onus is on men to treat
women with respect, not on women to evade men (Hillin 2016). Local women need
to decide which approaches suit them, and the answers will vary across communities.
Fear of crime affects more than just access to public spaces; it takes a toll on
women’s health as well. Stafford et al (2007) found that people who are afraid of
crime showed lower levels ofmental health, exercised less, and had an overall reduced
quality of life. They participated in fewer social activities and saw their friends less
frequently (Stafford et al. 2007), so improving public safety will likely improve
women’s health as well.
9.6 Women’s Specific Health Needs
A 2012 meta-analysis of men and women across 57 countries showed that women
report significantly lower health than men, and this held true across different ages,
socioeconomic statuses, and countries (Hosseinpoor et al. 2012). The U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that illness and injury cost the economy
$225.8 billion annually (CDC Foundation 2015). Poor health can also result in
personal financial burdens because of missed work (Gould and Schieder 2017).
Similar to how women lose time navigating lousy transportation systems, time lost
to illness robs time from other activities that could benefit resilience. Chronic health
concerns can negatively impact a person’s overall quality of life (Ekkel and de Vries
2017). Since women manage poor health more often than men, improving health
outcomes can directly contribute to women’s resilience. Sowhere do urban designers
fit in?
One community-wide approach to improving health is to increase access to
green space (Markevych et al. 2017; Wood et al. 2017). A recent report from the
World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (2016) summarized decades
of studies that examined the relationships between urban green space and health,
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affirming that the available evidence supports the observation that increased expo-
sure to green space correlates to better health and wellness. In particular, green space
most significantly affects mental health compared to other aspects of health that have
been studied (WHO Regional Office for Europe 2016).
While it remains unclear precisely which aspects of green space influence health,
the WHO Regional Office for Europe identified nine possible pathways in which
these benefits might be realized (Table 9.1). While it is possible that green spaces
can contribute to some negative health impacts, it appears that the benefits of green
space outweigh the negatives (WHO Regional Office for Europe 2016). Likewise,
the authors note that many of these adverse effects can be mitigated with design and
best practices in maintenance; for example, maintenance crews might use only the
minimum amount of pesticides and herbicides, which would reduce or eliminate the
risk of exposure (WHO Regional Office for Europe 2016).
From a women-exclusive perspective, studies have connected green space to
improved reproductive health outcomes in pregnant women. They have found that
proximity to green space predicted reduced blood pressure (Grazuleviciene et al.
2014), lower rates of depression (McEachan et al. 2016), and tendency to have chil-
dren with higher birth weights (Dzhambov et al. 2014). Similarly, a Lithuanian study
found that the risk of preterm birth and younger gestational age decreased as the
Table 9.1 Summary of findings from Urban green spaces and health: A review of evidence (WHO
Regional Office for Europe 2016)
Pathways to improved health Positive effects of urban green
space




Improved mental health and
cognitive function
Risk of allergies and asthma
Improved social capital Reduced cardiovascular
morbidity
Exposure to pesticides and
herbicides
Improved functioning of the
immune system
Reduced prevalence of Type
II diabetes
Exposure to disease vectors
and zoonotic infections
Enhanced physical activity,






and production of natural
sounds
Reduced mortality Excessive exposure to UV
radiation
Reduced exposure to air
pollution




Optimized exposure to sunlight
and improved sleep
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distance between residences and city parks decreased (Grazuleviciene et al. 2015).
Women uniquely benefit in other ways from green space. A cross-sectional study
of four European cities found that all participants who spent more time in green
space reported fewer symptoms of anxiety, but only women reported significantly
fewer symptoms of depression (van den Berg et al. 2016). Meanwhile, von den
Bosch et al. (2015) found that serene landscapes—described as safe, calm environ-
ments—predicted significantly reducedmental health illnesses inwomen, supporting
similar findings from Annerstedt et al. (2012). Kuo and Sullivan (2001) found in a
study of inner city urban public housing residents that women whose homes were
near nature were significantly less likely to report aggressive or violent behavior.
A study of disadvantaged neighborhoods in Detroit, Michigan, found that people
living in neighborhoods with strong local street networks and connections to the
surrounding urban area reported higher levels of walking (Wineman et al. 2014);
however, the authors of this study did not present gender dis-aggregated data. In
contrast, a cross-sectional review of people in Atlanta showed that men tended to
be thinner as connectedness increased, while women tended to be heavier (Frank
et al. 2008). Frank et al. (2008) speculate that this could be related to women’s
perceptions of safety and use of public space. As already discussed, if women are
fearful for their safety, they are less likely to walk outside. Though the authors did
not address it, another possibility is that the street networks fail to address women’s
needs, perhaps by lacking adequate sidewalks that people with strollers, children, or
mobility impairments can easily navigate (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009).
Various qualities and types of green space have been shown to have different
health impacts. Work by Akpinar et al. (2016) indicates that the type of green space
influences its overall effect. In their analysis, they found that access to forests and
urban green spaces reduced mental health complaints in Washington State more
than compared to access to wetlands, rangeland, or agricultural land. Goto et al.
(2017) evaluated the cognitive health impacts of experiencing Japanese-style garden
design, finding that cognition and relaxation improved in patients with dementia
and Alzheimer’s disease when exposed to a Japanese-style garden compared to an
“unstructured” garden. The team had previously found that elderly, cognitively intact
individuals experienced less stress and improved overall mood when exposed to
Japanese-style gardens (Goto et al. 2013).
Partly because of its correlation to mental health, green space has been found to
aid in healing after disasters as well. Okvat and Zautra (2013) assert that commu-
nity gardening and exposure to gardens has the potential to build resilience after a
disaster. They useCommonGroundRelief inNewOrleans, Louisiana, as an example.
Common Ground Relief is a nonprofit organization created after Hurricane Katrina
to aid and assist community members in creating their own urban and commu-
nity gardens, an effort that Okvat and Zautra describe as providing exercise and
respite. Also in New Orleans, produce from community gardens in the local Viet-
namese communities helped the neighborhood come back sooner, before grocery
stores were open (Okvat and Zautra 2013). Meanwhile, Krasny et al. (2013) make
the case for using nature exposure to help returning military veterans build their
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resilience and readjust to home life. They point to the growing popularity of horti-
culture therapy, employing veterans in green jobs, or encouraging them to become
involved in gardening, hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities. These exam-
ples of green space providing restorative effects to people who were traumatized in
disasters are a new field of research with few studies and even fewer with gender
dis-aggregated data, so more work needs to be done to learn how to tailor healing
nature-based programs to different demographics in after-disaster contexts.
9.7 Inclusion and Leadership Through Gender
Mainstreaming
We’ve examined the influence of transportation-, safety-, and health-related aspects
of the built environment that impact women’s resilience. At this point, you might
be asking yourself why these inequalities continue to persist in our communities?
The short answer is there has been a toxic and fundamental lack of representation of
women in leadership and decision-making roles.
Why should urban design and emergency management professionals recruit more
womenwhen planning to improve their community’s disaster resilience? For starters,
diversity in leadership leads to more innovation, which has the potential to make
communities more flexible and adaptable (Lorenzo and Reeves 2018), and if one
thing is certain, it’s that there is a dearth of women in the urban design world.Women
are terribly underrepresented in the urban design professions, and the situation is
especially bleak when examining leadership and professional roles (Rustin 2014;
The American Institute of Architects 2015). Additionally, women in the community
are less likely to have their voices heard in public meetings or in public design forums
(Micklow et al. 2015).With decision-makers skewed heavilymale, it is not surprising
that an increasing body of research has documented widespread bias against women
in the urban landscape (Greed 1996;Micklowet al. 2015;UrbanDevelopmentVienna
2013).
The USA is one of only seven U.N. member nations that hasn’t ratified the U.N.’s
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Bellitto
2015), and the USA ranks 49th in the U.N.’s 2017 Global Gender Gap Report (World
Economic Forum 2017). Clearly, there is plenty of room for improvement. That
said, some regions—particularly Europe, Canada, and Australia—lead by example
with decades of gender mainstreaming under their belts (Bacchi et al. 2010). Some
of these communities have already started the transition to more-inclusive, diver-
sity mainstreaming policies, also called diversity management (Executive Group for
Organisation, Safety and Security 2011).
Male bias in the urban landscape is the tendency for cities to cater to men’s needs
while neglecting or sidelining women’s and minority’s needs (Garcia-Ramon et al.
2004). Male bias is rarely malicious; it’s more a product of men in power forgetting
about (and therefore missing out on) women’s knowledge and capabilities (Criado
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Perez 2019). Bias, at its heart, stems froma lack of female andminority representation
in urban planning, city government, and community design—especially in leadership
and decision-making roles (Enarson andMorrow 1998a). This lack of representation
creates a blind spot for urban design professionals, and it hinders cities’ ability
to respond to and benefit from women’s and minority’s perspectives, wisdom, and
insights, which are too often absent from public discussion (Greed 2007; Sham et al.
2013; Women 2017; Women in Cities International 2010). As an example of that
blind spot, a survey of 624 planners in the USA found that just 2% of comprehensive
plans addressed women’s needs specifically, and only 7% of respondents agreed with
the statement “developers are responsive to the special needs of women” (Micklow
et al. 2015). The American Institute of Architects (2015) found in a 2014 survey that
while women agreed that the industry had not yet achieved gender equality, only half
of men surveyed held the same perspective. This implies that half of the men at the
table do not recognize the gendered bias against women in their field. This does not
bode well for improving representation in the USA in the near future. Simply put,
women’s voices aren’t being heard. Without an awareness of women’s needs, how
can cities possibly respond to them?
Urban design professionals increasingly look to gender mainstreaming as one
avenue for including women and countering male bias (Bacchi et al. 2010). Since the
strategy prioritizes both women and men, gender mainstreaming actively addresses
the needs of all stakeholders. The importance of direct engagement with a commu-
nity’s women cannot be overstated. Women have different needs globally and within
the same city (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2009; Urban Development Vienna 2013). It’s
impossible to predict these needs without gender mainstreaming. Unsurprisingly,
there are very few examples of gender mainstreaming in the USA (Abbey-Lambertz
2016), but that also means there’s ample opportunity for improvement.
Gender mainstreaming requires a comprehensive approach to be effective (Exec-
utive Group for Organisation, Safety and Security 2011; Urban Development Vienna
2013). Praised for its inclusive process in urban planning and governance, Vienna
has been actively gender mainstreaming since the early 1990s (Bellitto 2015). Their
model includes guidelines for gender-inclusive language onpublic documents, demo-
graphically diverse decision-making teams, and analysis of gendered impacts of city
budgets and projects (Executive Group for Organisation, Safety and Security 2011).
In their early mainstreaming efforts, women expressed concerns about their access
to transportation (Executive Group for Organisation, Safety and Security 2011). By
including women and asking them for insights, Vienna has been able to improve
women’s access to transportation through neighborhood-centric bus routes, lifts for
patrons who struggle with stairs, like a person pushing a stroller, and improved
lighting across the system (Criado Perez 2019). Vienna’s women identified other
gapswhere public spaces weren’t working for them—from parks to housing develop-
ments, women’s voices have changed the way that Vienna is designed (Foran 2013).
In recognition of its success, the program received the United Nations Human Settle-
ments Programme Excellence in Urban Planning award in 2010 (Hassan 2010), and
it still shines as a leading example of gender mainstreaming the urban landscape.
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Listening to women’s needs by including them into urban design processes can
promote equitable access to urban landscapes. This was evident in the Nou Barris
neighborhood in Barcelona where Garcia-Ramon et al. (2004) documented the trans-
formation of Via Julia, which was accomplished with strong leadership fromwomen.
As part of the participatory process in seeking public input for the redesign, women
asserted their needs for “street lights, pedestrian paths, lighting, etc.” (Garcia-Ramon
et al. 2004, p. 219). They demanded integrated spaces for shops, playgrounds, seating
areas, and safe access to public transportation (Garcia-Ramon et al. 2004). As a result
of taking women’s needs into account, Garcia-Ramon, Ortiz, and Prats documented
nearly balanced use between men and women of the redesigned public boulevard.
They found that different demographic groups tended to filter in and out of the boule-
vard with time of day according to traditional schedules (Garcia-Ramon et al. 2004).
The researchers conclude that the success of the space came, in part, because it was
designed in negotiation with the whole community, includingwomen, which allowed
for diverse groups of people within the neighborhood to appropriate the space as their
own and for their own uses.
9.8 Moving Forward
Urban landscapes contribute to and influence disaster resilience. Moreover, since
everyone’s personal knowledge, experiences, and skills inform their perceptions
of and relationship to the urban landscape, the landscape can affect resilience in
different ways among different people. Since men have been the primary shapers of
the urban environment, women’s needs have often been neglected in the design of
their cities. Urban design professionals can use gender mainstreaming to equalize the
landscape, build women’s capacities across the spectrum of resilience, and increase
their city’s overall disaster resilience in the process. Transportation, safe access to
public space, and health can all be improved through thoughtful, inclusive urban
design, implying that investment in these areas could have broad effects in improving
disaster resilience.
While this chapter has identified broad areas for design interventions that have the
potential to improve overall resilience, cities must implement their own engagement
programs to find their community’s individual and unique approaches to gendering
their urban landscapes and improving their disaster resilience. Administrators and
leaders must commit to supporting the education and recruitment of women urban
planners, landscape architects, architects, and engineers (Fleming and Tranovich
2016). They should look to global leaders in gender mainstreaming for inspira-
tion and direction; for example, they could consult Vienna’s Gender Mainstreaming
Made Easy: Practical Advice for More Gender Equality in the Vienna City Admin-
istration (Executive Group for Organisation, Safety and Security 2011) for detailed
and practical steps that cities can take to begin their journey toward gender equity.
Urban design professionals should strive to collect preliminary data on their city’s
resilience and their city’s current gender equity in order to monitor progress and
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to look for correlations between gendered urban landscapes and resilience that are
working in their communities. Cities should emphasize that gender mainstreaming
is every department’s responsibility while also appointing a specific task force or
gender mainstreaming officer to ensure that someone is responsible for monitoring
and developing the program (Bacchi et al. 2010).
The urban landscape’s role in supporting all aspects of disaster resilience is still
poorly understood, and even less so when considering how it supports various demo-
graphic groups differently, but the preliminary data are promising. As urban design
professionals and researchers expand the knowledge around these topics, they will
find many more opportunities to maximize investments into the urban landscape so
that they respond to all community members’ needs and grow resilience.
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Chapter 10
Compounding Impacts of Lifeline
Infrastructure Failure During Natural
Hazard Events
Emma A. Singh
Abstract Critical infrastructures, such as transportation systems, communication
networks, power and water utilities, have become so integrated into our modern
and globalised world that they are commonly taken for granted. That is, until their
services are disrupted. The failure of these lifeline services during natural hazard
events has the potential to impact populations by exacerbating the hazard itself and/or
hindering their ability to respond to or recover from the event. The failure of lifeline
infrastructure can also propagate outside the reach of the hazard footprint, causing
disruption in regions not directly impacted by the event. Understanding the potential
flow-on effects from lifeline failure during natural hazard events is vital for future
disaster mitigation, response and recovery. The 2009 South-Eastern Australia heat-
wave and the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland are drawn on to highlight and
discuss the vulnerability of lifelines to disruption from natural hazard shocks and the
compounding impacts of lifeline failure during natural hazard events.
Keywords Critical infrastructure · Lifelines · Natural hazards · Compounding
impacts · Indirect disruption · Cascading disasters
10.1 Introduction
Lifelines are the critical infrastructure and systems crucial to the distribution and
continuous flow of goods and services essential for human livelihoods, the func-
tioning of society and economic prosperity. They include, but are not limited to trans-
portation, telecommunication and utilities such as power and water. Transportation
systems are used daily to move people to and from places of work and education, and
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goods betweenmanufacturers, suppliers and customers. Telecommunication systems
are used to connect people, conduct business and performfinancial transactions. Elec-
tricity and gas provide power to homes and industries, and water and sewage systems
contribute to the public health of communities (Murray and Grubesic 2007). These
lifelines have become so integrated into our modern society that they are commonly
taken for granted; that is until something goes wrong. The failure of lifelines can
range frombeing an inconvenience to being debilitating for a population both socially
and economically (Davis 1999; Hawk 1999). Being without electricity or water for
less than a few hours can generally be tolerated. However, prolonged disruption of
such services can lead to major economic losses, deteriorating public health that
includes an increase in mortality, and eventually population migration (Rose et al.
1997;Brozovic et al. 2007;Rose andOladosu 2008,Anderson andBell 2012;Klinger
et al. 2014;Yates 2014). Power failure inAuckland,NewZealand (Leyland 1998); the
drinking water quality crisis in Sydney, Australia (Clancy 2000); and gas outages in
Victoria, Australia (Dawson and Brooks 1999), that all occurred in 1998, had media
pointing out how easy it was for a modern building with lights, heating and plumbing
to convert into a third world slum when such services were lost (Hawk 1999). The
water crisis had residents boiling drinking water and the gas outage left residents
with cold showers (Hawk 1999). Moreover, the power failure in Auckland impacted
business operations, with some businesses closing, some temporarily moving out of
the CBD and a few continuing with generators. All suffered a significant drop in
income. Those who continued to operate as usual did so at the expense of their staff
that had to climb stairs and swelter in the summer heat without air-conditioning or
sufficient ventilation (Leyland 1998). The impact of these utility crises could have
beenmore severe if they had lasted formonths instead of days toweeks (Hawk 1999).
Lifeline infrastructure often consists of a large number of interconnected compo-
nents, which often span extensive geographic areas and, in some cases, multiple
urban centres, states and international borders (Kinney et al. 2005; Guikema 2009).
The concentration of mutually dependent lifeline infrastructure within urban centres
results in complex and interconnected systems, creating feedback loops and complex
topologies that can trigger and propagate disruptions in a variety of ways (Rinaldi
et al. 2001; McEvoy et al. 2012). Consequently, a fault in one lifeline can cascade
and directly or indirectly affect other lifelines or services, with impacts potentially
felt not just locally but nationally or even globally (McEvoy et al. 2012). Significant
power failure, for example, can result in the disruption of telecommunications and
transportation systems. The most noted example of this was the Northeast blackout
in August 2003 that impacted the Northeastern USA and parts of Canada (US–
Canada Power System Outage Task Force 2004). This event not only cut power to
over 50 million people but also disrupted Internet communications. Banks, manu-
facturers, business services and education institutions were severely disrupted when
they were taken offline for hours to days (Cowie et al. 2003; Murray and Grubesic
2007). The event cost an estimated US$6 billion (Electricity Consumers Resource
Council 2004). The blackout caused major disruptions to the lives of those impacted.
Thousands of subway commuters were trapped for hours as trains stopped operating;
the closure of major manufacturing plants idled thousands of workers; cars lined for
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blocks waiting for gas; high-rise apartments were left without water services as elec-
tric pumps used to deliver water to the upper floors shut off; mass food spoilage
occurred due to the loss of refrigeration; and, hospital admissions increased due to
an increase in heat exposure, exertion and stress (Electricity Consumers Resource
Council 2004; Anderson et al. 2007; Lin et al. 2011). Anderson and Bell (2012)
investigated the impacts of the blackout on mortality in New York and found that the
event resulted in approximately 90 excess deaths (a rise of 28%), with the mortality
remaining slightly higher than average throughout August. Although there was a
steep rise in accidental deaths, the authors found that the majority of the excess
deaths were from disease-related causes rather than non-accidental. This was due to
the lack of power (and therefore the cessation of services and equipment that rely on
electricity) exacerbating and complicating the management of illness. Those aged
between 65 and 74 were particularly susceptible (Anderson and Bell 2012).
Lifelines can be disrupted by various shocks, including structural and techno-
logical failure, human error, targeted attack, and of interest in this chapter, natural
hazard events (Murray 2013). The often-large footprint of natural hazard events has
the potential to cause simultaneous failure of multiple lifeline components, across
one ormore networks (Erjongmanee et al. 2008). For example: storms can bring down
powerlines with strong winds or fallen trees, while simultaneously cutting off trans-
portation routes with floodwater (Chang et al. 2007; King et al. 2016); earthquakes
can destroy multiple lifelines, such as pipes and roads, through ground shaking or
liquefaction (Menoni 2001; Giovinazzi et al. 2011; O’Rourke et al. 2012; Lanzano
et al. 2014); and only millimetres of ash fall from volcanic eruptions can disrupt most
lifeline services (Blong 1984; Jenkins et al. 2014; Wilson et al. 2014).
A further complication of natural hazards is the potential for events to be
prolonged. They can, for example, have an extended duration of a week or more,
or they might consist of a series of events that occur in succession (Blong et al.
2017). Natural hazards can be associated with secondary hazards, which can occur
simultaneously or subsequently. Earthquakes, for example, are often associated with
liquefaction, landslides, fires, tsunami and aftershocks (EERI 2011; Daniell et al.
2017). Volcanic eruptions are not only associated with a range of phenomena, such
as lava flows, lahars, pyroclastic density currents and ash fall (Jenkins et al. 2014;
Wilson et al. 2014), but can also be sustained forweeks,months or even years (Siebert
et al. 2011; Sword-Daniels et al. 2014). A prolonged natural hazard event can affect
a region for an extended period, causing vast and on-going disruptions to lifeline
services vital for disaster response and community recovery.
Natural hazard-prone areas, such as coastal zones and volcanic regions, have
attracted large populations of people over time due to the presence of food, natural
resources and fertile soils (Chester et al. 2001; Small and Naumann 2001; Klein
et al. 2003). Today, some of these settlements have grown into large cities, which
continue to expand with urbanisation and natural population growth. A significant
proportion of these large cities are located in some of the world’s lowest socially
and economically developed countries (Kummu and Varis 2011) which sit within
the cyclone-prone regions near the equator (10–30 degrees latitude). The increasing
demand for development has seen populations and infrastructure expanding into
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areas more exposed to natural hazards—such as houses being built on previously
avoided flood plains—despite the risk (Huppert and Sparks 2006; Cutter and Finch
2008; Lall andDeichmann 2010). The continual and growing presence of populations
and infrastructure within natural hazard-prone areas, combined with climate change
impacts, has the potential to intensify the exposure and vulnerability of lifelines
to natural hazard shocks (Wu et al. 2002; Van Aalst 2006). Consequently, future
lifeline failure, of varying degrees of seriousness, may simply have to be expected
(Hawk 1999). It is therefore necessary to better understand how lifelines and their
functionality might be impacted when subjected to disruption from disasters, and
furthermore, the social and economic costs of lifeline failure for at-risk populations.
This chapter aims to add to this area of knowledge by looking at two case
study examples: the impact of extreme heat on electricity and transportation systems
during the 2009 South-Eastern Australia heatwave and the closure of the European
airspace during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland. This chapter explores
the compounding effects of lifeline disruption during natural hazards and, using the
learnings following these events, discusses potential changes needed to reduce future
vulnerability for at-risk populations.
10.2 The 2009 South-Eastern Australia Heatwave
10.2.1 Hazard
Heatwaves are extended periods of hot days and nights resulting in little to no relief
from high temperatures. According to the Australian Bureau ofMeteorology (BoM),
an event is considered a heatwavewhen there are three ormore days of unusually high
maximum andminimum temperatures (Bureau ofMeteorology 2018). Alternatively,
Scorcher (2019) defines a heatwave as ‘… at least three consecutive days where the
daily maximum temperature is in the top 10% of warmest temperatures for that
calendar date’.
Heatwaves are known to cause serious health, social and economic problems
(McInnes and Ibrahim 2013; Wong 2016). Although not as dramatic as other natural
hazards, such as wildfires and major storms, heatwaves can cause great loss of life.
The 2003European heatwave, for example, resulted in extensive loss of lifewithmore
than 40,000 heat-related deaths (García-Herrera et al. 2010). In Australia, heatwaves
have been the most significant natural hazard in terms of lives lost (except for disease
epidemics), causingmore than 4,000 deaths over the past 200 years (see also Chap. 8)
(McInnes and Ibrahim 2013; Coates et al. 2014).
An individual’s ability to respond to a heatwave depends on both the degree of
exposure to the heat hazard and their adaptive capacity, which is influenced by social,
economic and biophysical factors and their access to resources, technology, informa-
tion and infrastructure (García-Herrera et al. 2010; Reeves et al. 2010; Coates et al.
2014;Wong 2016). Elderly, very young, ill, urban, marginalised and socially isolated
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residents are often identified as the most vulnerable groups during a heatwave, often
lacking the capacity to avoid or reduce exposure to the heat hazard (Reeves et al.
2010). Elderly populations aremore likely to experience poor health, social isolation,
reduced mobility and lower socio-economic circumstances (McInnes and Ibrahim
2013; Coates et al. 2014). They also tend to have a reduced thermoregulatory and
physiologic heat-adaptation capability and an altered sense of thirst (McInnes and
Ibrahim 2013; Coates et al. 2014). Urban populations experience higher ambient
temperatures than neighbouring rural areas due to the urban heat island effect (Wong
2016; Petkova et al. 2014). The homeless are often neglected in impact assessments
but are at considerable risk from heat exposure during heatwave events. This popula-
tion has compromised health; limited access to resources including food, water and
shelter; and, this increased risk of exposure is often coupled with the use of drugs
and alcohol (Reeves et al. 2010).
Heatwaves can put a strain on medical facilities and support services, not just
with an increase in morbidity but also by impacting the lifelines that support services
heavily rely on such as electricity systems and transportation infrastructure (Reeves
et al. 2010). Heatwaves can cause an increase in demand on electricity grids as
residents turn to air-conditioning and electric fans to keep cool (Miller et al. 2008).
On top of this, high temperatures can impact the electricity infrastructure directly.
Most problems occur when underground transmission lines overheat and short out
or when overheated above ground power lines, which have stretched and sagged,
come into contact with trees and short to the ground (Palecki et al. 2001). To keep
systems from overheating and to avoid complete electricity outage, the total amount
of energy produced must be reduced and distributed to end-users (McEvoy et al.
2012). To mitigate overheating and potential fires produced from electrical system
faults, rolling blackouts can be enforced (Broome and Smith 2012).
Extreme temperatures experienced during heatwave events can also directly
impact transportation infrastructure by buckling rail lines and melting roads (Palecki
et al. 2001; Zuo et al. 2015). Indirectly, transportation systems such as public trans-
port and traffic signals, which rely on power to operate, can be impacted by the loss
of electricity (Rinaldi et al. 2001). Extreme temperatures can also affect the health of
public transport employees and passengers (Reeves et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2012).
10.2.2 Event Overview
In 2009, South-Eastern Australia experienced its most extreme heatwave on record.
The states of Victoria and South Australia were exposed to severe, extensive and
prolonged heat across two weeks in January and February. These conditions were
caused by the stalling of a hot air mass over South-Eastern Australia due to slow-
changing synoptic conditions, with sea and bay breezes providing only little relief
in coastal areas (Reeves et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2012). During this period, new
daily maximum temperatures were observed for Adelaide (45.7 °C) and Melbourne
(46.4 °C) (Reeves et al. 2010), the state capital cities for South Australia andVictoria,
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respectively. Adelaide experienced eight consecutive days over 40 °C andMelbourne
had three days over 43 °C, 12–15 °C above the seasonal average (Reeves et al. 2010;
McEvoy et al. 2012). The Victorian town of Hopetoun experienced a record high of
48.88 °C (McInnes and Ibrahim 2013).
The extreme heat experienced during the 2009 heatwave resulted in a dramatic
increase in mortality and morbidity. The persistent high temperatures resulted in
increased cases of heat-related illness and exacerbated chronic disease. There was
an increase in emergency ambulance dispatches and presentations of heat-related
conditions at emergency departments (Reeves et al. 2010; Lindstrom et al. 2013).
The extreme heat resulted in an estimated 374 excess deaths in Victoria and between
50 and 150 excess deaths in South Australia (Department of Human Services 2009;
Reeves et al. 2010; McInnes and Ibrahim 2013). Most of the deaths that occurred in
Victoria during the 2009 South-Eastern Australia heatwave were those aged 75 years
or over (Table 10.1) (Department of Human Services 2009; Reeves et al. 2010; Bi
et al. 2011; McInnes and Ibrahim 2013). In Adelaide, South Australia, Zhang et al.
(2013) found that the populations most at risk during the heatwave were those who
lived alone, had a lower socio-economic status, had renal problems or were at risk of
falls and needed help from community services. It was also noted that occupational
heat exposure could have been a cause of an increase in hospitalisations of working-
age men (35–64 years) during the 2009 event (Reeves et al. 2010; Bi et al. 2011).
However, this needs further investigation.
Table 10.1 Totalmortality between26 January and1February 2009:Expected deaths (derived from
mean deaths in 2004–2008) versus 2009 reported deaths (based on data extracted from Department
of Human Services (2009))
Age Expected deaths 2009 deaths Excess deaths % Total excess % Increase
≥75 388 636 248 66 64
65–74 99 145 46 12 46
5–64 116 180 64 17 55
0–4 4 7 3 1 –
Unknown* – ~ 12 ~ 12 ~ 4 –
Total 606** 980 374*** 100 62
*A small number of deaths were reported with unknown age
**Total noted in Department of Human Services (2009), sum of expected deaths here is 607.
Difference may be due to rounding
***Total noted in Department of Human Services (2009), sum of expected deaths here is 373.
Difference may be due to rounding
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10.2.3 Lifeline Disruption and Compounding Impacts
On 29 and 30 January 2009, Melbourne experienced rolling blackouts due to a
combination of failures that occurred throughout the system. Supply was impacted
when the Basslink electricity supply connection between Tasmania and Victoria was
shut down due to heat-related issues, and Victorian generators were unable to supply
additional power. Transformer faults resulted in outages of major transmission lines,
and supply loads were restricted in the Western metropolitan area. Additional faults
occurred in up to 50 local voltage transformers. Load shedding was finally required
to protect the security of the electricity network, further restricting supply (Reeves
et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2012). Cumulative system faults, ageing infrastructure
and a rapid increase in demand (breaking Victoria’s load record by 7%), primarily
from the use of air-conditioning, all contributed to the system’s vulnerability to the
heatwave (Reeves et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2012). Rolling blackouts resulted in
over 500,000 residents being without power on the night of 30 January. The outages
occurred for 1–2 hours, but the ripple effects lasted up to two days (McEvoy et al.
2012).
The periodic loss of electricity limited access to air-conditioning, electric fans
and refrigeration, key aids that people rely on to cope with prolonged high temper-
atures. This was especially detrimental to those most vulnerable to heatwaves, such
as the elderly, ill and isolated (Reeves et al. 2010). This event also showed how
vitally important night-time relief from extreme heat is. During the 2009 heatwave,
many deaths occurred overnight where residents were found in stuffy rooms with
air-conditioning turned off (Reeves et al. 2010). In these cases, it was not just the
blackout that hindered the use of such services, but the cost of electricity also, with
many residents unable to afford to continually run air-conditioning units overnight
(Reeves et al. 2010).
Transportation systems suffered minor to moderate disruptions during the heat-
wave, with rail being the most affected by the high temperatures. During the initial
heatwave peak (27–30 January), more than a third of the train services were cancelled
in Melbourne and 7% in Adelaide (Reeves et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2012). There
were nearly 30 reported instances of track buckling in Melbourne, which slowed
down or disrupted services and increasedmaintenance and repair expenses for the rail
transport industry (McEvoy et al. 2012). Also, half of the train fleet were older stock
with air-conditioning units not designed to operate above 34.5 °C. Air-conditioning
failure was the leading cause for service cancellations due to industrial action taken
by train drivers (Reeves et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2012). This is an important factor
often forgotten when considering critical infrastructure vulnerability. Although there
may not be any direct impacts to infrastructure components, workers themselvesmay
not be able to continue to operate the systems under extreme heat conditions. The
operation of lifelines can also rely on the operation of other lifeline infrastructures.
Electricity outages, for example, resulted in the indirect disruption of transportation
systems. Rolling blackouts on 30 January impaired traffic signals at 124 intersections
in Melbourne and resulted in the cancellation of city loop train services, stranding a
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large number of inner-city commuters (Reeves et al. 2010). Overall, power outages
and transport disruption resulting in an estimated financial loss of AU$800 million
(Reeves et al. 2010).
Although transport was not vital in mitigating heat exposure, forcing commuters
to use alternatives, such as biking or walking, could lead to increased exertion and
exposure to extreme heat conditions. The loss of train services also impacted public
transport users by disrupting their access to work, home or loved ones. With public
transport often being an affordable form of transport for students, the elderly and
poor, the loss of operation largely impacted themobility of these demographic groups
(Rodrigue et al. 2017).
10.2.4 Learnings
The 2009 heatwave was characterised by a substantial increase in health service
demand and disruptions to electricity supplies and public transport systems. Govern-
ments, councils, utility providers, hospitals, emergency response organisations and
the community were largely underprepared for an event of this magnitude, with the
extreme conditions not anticipated in seasonal forecasts (Reeves et al. 2010). The
number of excess deaths (approximately 374) demonstrates demographic impacts
from severe heatwaves are most acute for older residents (at 66% of excess deaths
of those 75 years or older) (see Table 10.1).
Reeves et al. (2010) concluded in their report on the 2009 event that extreme heat
should be given the sameprominence as high-impact natural hazards such aswildfires
or flooding with regards to impacts on lifeline infrastructure. The report highlighted
how vulnerable lifelines, specifically electricity and transportation systems can be to
heat stress and how significant the impacts of lifeline failure, both direct and indirect,
can be for people and the urban system. Overall it was noted, ‘people mostly manage
when they have power, when they have transport’ (Reeves et al. 2010 p. 99). The loss
of these services had adverse affects on people’s ability to cope and compounded
the experience of the heatwave event. Broome and Smith (2012) calculated that
being without power, and therefore air-conditioning, would increase the risk of those
susceptible of dying from heat-related illness by 50%, especially among the elderly
and those in remote rural communities. These authors estimated that if electricity
was cut for an entire day in Victoria during the 2009 heatwave, 28 additional deaths
could have occurred. Therefore, the urban system as a whole, including lifelines,
needs to be considered in future risk assessments and mitigation measures.
Following the 2009heatwave event, bothSouthAustralia andVictoriamoved from
a reactive and response-driven approach to mitigation and risk reduction. Health and
emergency services developed strategies to identify and manage vulnerable groups
(Reeves et al. 2010). Vulnerabilities and lack of redundancy in lifelines, such as
transport and power, were highlighted. Attitudinal, socio-economic, behavioural and
financial barriers to improve resilience in future heatwave events were also identified.
Specifically, the increase in population vulnerability to heat-related mortality due to
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an ageing population and an increase in obesity in adults were highlighted as areas
in need of attention (Petkova et al. 2014). It was also identified that there was an
increase in the expectation and dependence on emergency services for warnings and
timely advice (Reeves et al. 2010). It must be noted, however, that the unfortunate
occurrence of the Black Saturday bushfires during the second phase of the heatwave
overshadowed the impacts of the heatwave itself, hindering the publicity of the huge
health impacts of the 2009 heatwave, lifeline vulnerabilities to extreme heat and
post-event reflection.
In January 2014, South-Eastern Australia was again hit by a heatwave. Although
maximum temperatures were not as high as those experienced during January 2009,
mean temperatures were higher and the heatwave peak lasted for longer (four days
in 2014 compared to three days in 2009) (Department of Health 2014). The 2014
heatwave resulted in an estimated 167 excess deaths in Victoria, compared to the 374
excess deaths in 2009. The decrease in estimated excess mortality was contributed
to the implementation of Victoria’s Heatwave Plan (Department of Health 2014).
Since 2014, the Victorian State Government also focused on educating vulnerable
populations on how to be prepared for electricity failure in their ‘How to cope and
stay safe in extreme heat’ brochures (Victoria State Government 2015). Additional
research is needed to determine if this information positively influences people’s
preparedness for, and actions during, heatwave events in the future. It would also be
interesting to see if this information reached those most vulnerable.
The transportation sector also took steps to adapt to extreme heat events by:
upgrading rail infrastructure to prevent trackbuckling; creating better heat policies for
drivers and providing easier access to cold water and ice; and creating better contin-
gency plans including providing stand-by replacement services (Chhetri et al. 2012).
The 2014 heatwave resulted in minor disruption to Melbourne’s public transport as
trains operated at reduced speeds (Mullett and McEvoy 2014). The electricity sector
also fared better in 2014 with the system avoiding load shedding during the highest
temperature period. Only small local distribution outages were experienced due to
distribution equipment failure; however, periods of low reserves were of concern.
AEMO (2014) highlighted that any fault with an interconnector or major generator
could have changed the outcome and resulted in load shedding. The system’s ability
to cope in 2014 was in part attributed to the contribution of embedded solar photo-
voltaic (PV) generation, namely in South Australia, which helped to support the peak
usage period (AEMO 2014).
There is still much to be done to increase resilience and adaptation capacity to
heatwaves within Australia. Although many stakeholders took steps to assure future
risks were being adequately managed, they appeared to have done so in isolation
(McEvoy et al. 2012). Due to the integrated nature of the urban system, there is a
need for all stakeholders to take on a ‘whole system’ approach. McEvoy et al. (2012)
concluded that sectoral segmentation and the lack of holistic urban infrastructure
management are major barriers to improving urban resilience to future heatwave
events.
Heat-sensitive infrastructures such as the electricity network and rail transport
will continue to be vulnerable to extreme heat events in the future, compounding the
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impacts of events. A warming climate may make heatwaves more likely (Meehl and
Tebaldi 2004; Revi et al. 2014), putting more pressure on expanding urban areas
(McInnes and Ibrahim 2013). Expanding urbanisation and high-density housing
will also exacerbate the situation through urban heat island effects (Coates et al.
2014; Petkova et al. 2014; Wong 2016). Furthermore, populations are increasingly
living andworking in climate-controlled environments, relying on air-conditioning to
reduce heat stress and therefore isolating people from a changing climate and limiting
their ability to acclimatise (Coates et al. 2014; Reeves et al. 2010). This further
increases the dependence on air-conditioning, whose operation cannot be guaran-
teed during a heatwave. Air-conditioning is also counter-productive in reducing the
risk of heat stress. Farbotko and Waitt (2011) note that the use of air-conditioning to
decrease resident exposure to extreme heat results in a spike in energy demand
during a heatwave, which contributes to system-wide blackouts, hiking energy
prices as a result and exacerbating existing social-economic inequalities. On top of
this, the waste heat released from air-conditioners also contributes to higher outside
temperatures, worsening the urban heat island affect (Salamanca et al. 2014).
10.3 The 2010 Eyjafjallajökull Volcanic Eruption, Iceland
10.3.1 Hazard
Volcanic ash is the material produced by explosive volcanic eruptions and is made up
of tiny fragments of rock and glass (Wilson et al. 2012). Volcanic ash can spread far
and wide; it is hard, highly abrasive, corrosive and conductive; and only millimetres
are needed to disrupt most essential lifeline services (Blong 1984; Barsotti et al.
2010; Wilson et al. 2011, 2012; Magill et al. 2013; Jenkins et al. 2014). Ash easily
infiltrates openings, clogs air-filtration systems and abrades surfaces (Jenkins et al.
2014). Air transportation, in particular, can be impacted by volcanic ash both on the
ground and in the air. Airline operations can be affected by ash falling on airport
runways, and if volcanic ash is erupted high enough into the atmosphere, it can
become a risk to flying aircraft (Casadevall 1994; Jenkins et al. 2015; Webley 2015).
The risk volcanic ash poses for modern aviation was brought to attention in
1982 when a British Airways flight flew through high concentrations of volcanic
ash produced by an eruption at Mount Galunggung in West Java. The Boeing 747
lost power to all four engines and lost over 12,000 feet of altitude before restoring
power and making an emergency landing in Jakarta (Lund and Benediktsson 2011;
Ellertsdottir 2014; Gislason et al. 2011). The 1989 Redoubt eruption in Alaska, and
1991 Mount Pinatubo eruption in the Philippines, also caused engine failure and
extensive damage to aircraft engines and windshields that came in contact with ash
clouds (Przedpelski and Casadevall 1994; Casadevall et al. 1996; O’Regan 2011;
Webley 2015). With the conclusion that volcanic ash can cause jet-engine failure,
great financial loss and potentially loss of life, a ‘no-threshold’ guideline was, at
the time of the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, universally adopted and no-fly zones
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were implementedwhenever volcanic ashwas detectable in airspace (O’Regan 2011;
Ellertsdottir 2014).
10.3.2 Event Overview
On 20 March 2010, fire-fountain activity started along a fissure at Fimmvörðuhálsi,
an ice-free area betweenEyjafjallajökull andMýrdalsjökull volcanic vents in Iceland,
and ended on 13 April, leading many to believe that it was the end of the eruption
(Donovan and Oppenheimer 2011; Þorkelsson et al. 2012). However, on 14 April,
the eruption resumed, this time at the summit of Eyjafjallajökull. The interaction of
ice and melt water with a more viscous batch of magma resulted in a more explosive
eruption than the first phase (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2011; Gislason et al. 2011;
Þorkelsson et al. 2012), sending ash up to 10 km in the atmosphere (Carlsen et al.
2012; Þorkelsson et al. 2012; Stevenson et al. 2012).
Ash fell to the South of the volcano impacting rural communities, causing impacts
to agriculture and local tourism (Adey et al. 2011; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2011;
Bird and Gísladóttir 2012; Bird et al. 2018). The eruption was accompanied by a
number of glacial outburst floods, which impacted roads and farmland and resulted in
the evacuation of ~800 residents (Þorkelsson et al. 2012). The majority of Iceland to
theNorth of the volcanowas relatively unaffected by the ash. Reykjavik, in particular,
saw limited impacts despite being less than 150 km away from the volcano, with the
airport being briefly closed on the 21April (Lund andBenediktsson 2011; Þorkelsson
et al. 2012). The most significant impact was caused by ash that remained in the
atmosphere. This airborne ash was rapidly blown to the South and East towards
mainland Europe and caused the largest shutdown of European airspace since World
War II (Budd et al. 2011; Ellertsdottir 2014).
As the volcanic ash cloud from Iceland made its way across Europe, the European
Aviation Authorities progressively closed sectors of airspace due to fears for public
safety (Ellertsdottir 2014). The airspace over Scotland and Norway was first to close
on the evening of 14 April. Irish, Dutch, Belgian and Swedish airspace also saw
restrictions as the ash spread further South and East. By 18 April, airspace over
Ireland, Ukraine, and Canary Islands was also closed (Budd et al. 2011). Flight
restrictions were lifted on 21 April with close to normal air traffic resuming the
next day (Ellertsdottir 2014). Over the seven-day period, more than 100,000 flights
in, out and around Europe were cancelled (Budd et al. 2011, IATA 2010, Oxford
and Economics 2010). The worst affected places were the United Kingdom, Ireland
and Finland, who experienced a 90% decrease in air traffic (Ellertsdottir 2014).
Maximum closure of airspace occurred on 18 April which grounded nearly 30 per
cent of the world’s scheduled flight capacity, costing the airline industry US1.7
billion in lost revenue (IATA 2010). This loss could not typically be claimed under
the airlines’ business interruption insurance since there was no ‘material damage’
(O’Regan 2011). It was reported that aviation companies risked being sent into
bankruptcy if the closure had lasted much longer (Ellertsdottir 2014).
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10.3.3 Flow-On Effects from Lifeline Disruption
The European airspace is one of the busiest in the world, used by 150 airlines
making 9.5 million flights every year across 150,000 air routes (O’Regan 2011).
The airspace and aircraft that occupy it form part of a large interconnected network
that provides private, military and economic mobility. The complex network of flight
paths, airways and control zones, navigated by flight crew, air traffic control, colli-
sion avoidance software and controlled by strict international regulations, is largely
unseen by passengers (Budd et al. 2011). It is a system often taken for granted until
flights are delayed, diverted or cancelled.
The impact of the closure of the European airspace in 2010 was far-reaching and
uncovered a vast dependence on global air travel for the mobility of people and
product. Air transport is relied upon by manufacturers to join spatially disaggregated
operations and enables time-sensitive and perishable freight to be carried over long
distances in a short time (Bowen and Leinbach 2006; Pedersen 2001; Button and
Yuan 2013; Mukkala and Tervo 2013; Rodrigue et al. 2017).
Shortages of imported flowers, fruits and electronic hardware were reported in
the immediate days after airspace closure. Pharmaceutical, automotive, transport
and delivery companies were also impacted. The hardest hit were those supply
chains that rely on airfreight for just-in-time deliveries and exporters of perishable
goods. Where some products could be delivered later, perishable goods could not
(Oxford Economics 2010). Flower and fruit growers in Africa were especially hard
hit, with fresh products due to be air-freighted to Europe being left to rot (Oxford
Economics 2010; Budd et al. 2011; Ellertsdottir 2014). The World Bank estimated
that the airspace shutdown cost African countries US$65 million in exports (Oxford
and Economics 2010). Kenya’s flower and vegetable industry, which contributes
over a fifth of the country’s GDP, employs tens of thousands of workers. During
the closure of the European airspace planes that were due to carry the produce to
Europe remained grounded at Nairobi’s international airport and the industry lost an
estimated $1.3 million per day (Wadhams 2010). The unmoveable produce had to
be thrown out or composted, and thousands of workers were temporarily laid off.
Although working conditions on Kenyan farms has improved since the formation of
the Kenya Flower Council in 1999, the majority of workers are paid below a living
wage and unable to amass any savings (Nowakowska 2015; Leipold and Morgante
2013). Therefore, being without paid work for any extended period of time would
vitally disadvantage people who depend on the farms for their livelihood.
The halt of air travel around Europe also led to shortages of air-freighted compo-
nents necessary for electrical and car manufacturing. For example, car production at
Nissan and BMWplants in the USA, Japan and Germanywas temporarily suspended
due to delays in the delivery of pressure sensors (Oxford and Economics 2010).
The estimated 10 million travellers that were stranded by this event faced signif-
icant delays and additional costs (Budd et al. 2011; Oxford and Economics 2010).
Those unable to afford alternative transportation or accommodation were stuck at
airports (Ellertsdottir 2014). Fortunately, many passengers were compensated for
10 Compounding Impacts of Lifeline Infrastructure Failure … 201
cancelled flights by the airlines, as required by the European Regulation 241/2004
(Ellertsdottir 2014). The low-cost airlines, which were hard hit by the event econom-
ically, contested passenger compensation requested by the European Commis-
sion arguing that the situation was outside of their control. However, the Euro-
pean Commission continued to hold the airlines responsible for their passengers
(Ellertsdottir 2014).
The week-long cessation of air travel over the United Kingdom and Europe
reduced global mobility, impeded economic activities and hindered social connec-
tions. Reducing transportation to land and sea, which is generally confined by
geographic barriers, dramatically increases travel time, disrupts supply chains and
results in the isolation of some populations and economies. Any extended halt to
a large portion of the world’s air transport capabilities would ultimately impact
on development, globally. It was fortunate that the 2010 eruption was relatively
short-lived, as past eruptions at Eyjafjallajökull—and other volcanoes around the
world—have lasted for months to years (Gertisser 2010).
10.3.4 Learnings
With around 60 volcanic eruptions occurring world-wide every year, volcanic ash, or
the potential for it, causes airspace restrictions on an almost daily basis (Donovan and
Oppenheimer 2011). Iceland’s volcanoes, in particular, produce around 20 eruptions
per century, many involving significant explosive activity (Langmann et al. 2012).
Tephra from numerous eruptions from Icelandic volcanoes over the past 7,000 years
were documented to have reached Europe (Swindles et al. 2011; Stevenson et al.
2012). The 2010 eruption at Eyjafjallajökull itself was not an extraordinary event.
However, the disruption it caused, to an industry that should have been prepared for
its occurrence, was.
Although the risk of volcanic ash was recognised by scientists, operational mete-
orological institutes and aviation authorities, it was considered a relatively low risk
and therefore had not penetrated into policy (Adey et al. 2011; Donovan and Oppen-
heimer 2011). Because of this, the relatively small eruption of 2010 required a hasty
and extreme response, which resulted in the reactive formation of advisory commit-
tees and meetings throughout Europe (Bonadonna and Folch 2011a, b; Donovan and
Oppenheimer 2011; Bonadonna et al. 2012).
The heavy reliance on the airline industry for world trade and transportation
resulted in the ‘no-threshold’ guideline, which was in place at the time of the 2010
eruption, being questioned. Decision-makers were caught between public safety
concerns and the demanding need for globalmobility (Lund andBenediktsson 2011).
The complete closure of European airspace was seen as an overreaction, and a review
of the normal procedures was demanded. A study by Gislason et al. (2011) on the
physical and chemical properties of the Eyjafjallajökull ash showed that very sharp,
hard and fine-grained particles could have put aircraft at risk from abrasion and
melting in jet engines. However, at the time, what constituted a safe concentration
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of volcanic ash was highly contested among international safety regulators, airlines,
aircraft engineers andmanufactures (Budd et al. 2011; Ellertsdottir 2014).As a result,
major airlines, including Lufthansa, KLM and British Airways, performed a series of
test flights and determined that 2,000 microg of ash per cubic metre was an accepted
threshold through which aircraft could fly (Budd et al. 2011; O’Regan 2011).
The response to the 2010 eruption and airspace closure was hindered by the lack
of data detailing ash tolerance of aircraft and engines and the inability of international
safety regulators, airlines, aircraft engineers and manufactures to agree on a ‘safe’
concentration of atmospheric ash (Budd et al. 2011). Budd et al. (2011) also high-
lighted that national policies were not aligned with other countries, such as the USA.
Had the creation of advisory groups occurred before the eruption, rather than a reac-
tive scramble, preparations could have been made both politically and financially,
and safe ash thresholds predetermined (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2011).
This event highlighted the dependency on global mobility and the need to recog-
nise that natural hazards and their impacts are not always confined to geographical or
political boarders. Globalisation turned an ordinary geological event into near world-
wide chaos. Economies around the world have been made more vulnerable to disrup-
tions to the normal flow of goods by increased globalisation in trade, outsourcing
and the advent of leaner global supply chains, focused on cutting costs (Besedeš
and Murshid 2017). In the aftermath of the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, there
was a call for increased supply chain flexibility through adaptive logistic capacities
and sourcing products from various locations. In their paper on the trade-effects of
airspace closures in the aftermath of Eyjafjallajökull Besedeš and Murshid (2017)
found that some supply chains were able to combat some of the disruptions. The
authors found that the USmarket, in particular, was able to form trading relationships
with countries outside of Europe to supplement some of the lost supplies.
TheAfrican flower and vegetable growers, on the other hand, did not have fallback
options. Theflowermarket inKenya depends almostwholly onEurope for its exports.
With a low domestic demand, the industry (Kenya’s top exchange earner) is at the
peril of fluctuating foreign demand and the availability of airfreight into Europe
(Leipold and Morgante 2013; Kargbo et al. 2010). At the time, Kenyan horticulture
was still recovering from previous impacts from domestic post-election violence in
2008/2009 (Justus 2015). These disruptive events resulted in the call for Kenya’s
flower and vegetable industry to reduce over-dependency on foreign global markets
and diversify into local and regional alternative market outlets to provide a short-
term market shock cushion (Justus 2015; Leipold and Morgante 2013). Once some
airports reopened tons of produce was flown to Spain and put on trucks to Northern
Europe (Gettlemen 2010).
The 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption was an expensive lesson to learn but, undoubt-
edly, it better prepared the airline industry and global businesses for future volcanic
eruptions. This was highlighted in 2011 when another Icelandic volcano, Grímsvötn,
began to erupt. At its peak, the eruption column reached a height of 20 km, compared
to approximately 10 km of Eyjafjallajökull’s and produced nearly twice as much
volcanic ash (Stevenson 2012). Although the 2011 eruption of Grímsvötn was nearly
100 times larger in magnitude than that of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010, it did not have
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the same impact. The situation was different, with different eruption parameters
and weather conditions, and prevailing winds prevented large amounts of ash from
entering international airspace. Ash that entered the airspace was better dealt with.
The new rules around safe ash concentrations meant the disruption in Europe was
relatively minor, with just 900 out of 90,000 scheduled flights cancelled during the
first three days of the eruption compared to 42,600 flights cancelled in the first three
days in 2010 (European Commission 2011; Parker 2015).
10.4 Discussion
The failure of lifeline networks during natural hazard events has the potential to
impact populations by exacerbating the hazard itself and/or hindering the ability
to respond to or recover from the event. The primary demographic impact seen in
the case of lifeline failure in 2009 in South-Eastern Australia was excess mortality,
particularly in older age groups. Lifeline failure can also propagate outside the reach
of the hazard footprint, causing disruption in regions not directly impacted by the
event. In the case of the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, one of the industries hardest
hit was the flower and fruit growers in Africa, ~8,500 kms away.
The outcomes of both these case study events were influenced by unpreparedness.
For South-Eastern Australia it was the magnitude of the event itself. South-Eastern
Australia has suffered from heatwave events previously (e.g. 1908 and 1939) but the
heatwave of 2009 was extraordinarily extensive, long-lasting and severe compared to
previous events (Chhetri et al. 2012). Meanwhile, potential impacts from Icelandic
volcanos for the United Kingdom/Europe were a scenario deemed unlikely and
hence previously ignored. Both events became the much needed wakeup call to
spark major reviews of management plans and policies. Implementation of various
recommendations has since proven to be beneficial, improving the management of
subsequent events.
The improvements made in each case study are commendable. However, partic-
ularly in the case of South-Eastern Australia, the approach to hazard mitigation was
disjointed with minimal sector cross-over. In their report on Australia’s response
and adaptation to major weather events, Chhetri et al. (2012) found that individual
post-event actions usually only result in small improvements in overall resilience. To
improve urban-wide resilience to natural hazard events, there is a need to improve
communication, information sharing, collaboration and coordination between all
sectors. The fragmented nature of critical infrastructure sectors, like transporta-
tion and electricity, and the spanning of lifeline infrastructure across local or state
government borders can make the development of coordinated policies and planning
frameworks a challenge, hindering a structured response to natural hazard shocks.
The world has never relied on lifelines as much as it does now, and our reliance
on lifeline services and technology will only continue to grow alongside increasing
urbanisation and ageingpopulations.The increasing concentrationof populations and
built environments in hazard-prone regions combined with the impacts of climate
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change are likely to increase the exposure of critical infrastructure and essential
services to natural hazard shocks. Future natural hazard events can almost always be
expected to result in lifeline disruption or failure. Not only is it important to make
lifeline infrastructure more resilient to disruption from future shocks, there is also
a need to increase resilience by preparing communities to better cope with service
outages.
Furthermore,with an increasingly connectedworld there is potential for the cost of
indirect disruption—both economic and social—to match, if not surpass, the cost of
direct damage fromhazard events and the case studies in this chapter showhow costly
it is to be caught unprepared. To be resilient to disruption in this globalised world,
we need to look ‘beyond our backyards’ and acknowledge that lifelines can often
span large geographic areas, with the ripple effects of disruption felt beyond regional
and national borders. The vulnerability of lifelines to disruption from disasters is
also dependent on the quality and management of infrastructure. The impacts of
lifeline failure on a population depend on the time it takes for the lifeline to return
to operation and who is responsible for the cost of repairs and resulting disruption.
Societal factors such as increasing disparities in wealth and health can contribute
to greater vulnerability of particular sections of the population (Cutter et al. 2000). It
has been demonstrated time and again how demographics—age, ethnicity, income,
gender and housing—can influence (amplify or reduce) overall vulnerability to
natural hazards (Donner and Rodríguez 2008; Wisner et al. 2004; Cutter et al. 2003,
2000). This chapter has shown that the ability to cope with lifeline failure is also
dependent on these factors. Therefore, in preparation for the true impacts of future
natural hazard events on modern society, we need to better understand the intercon-
nectedness and behaviour of lifeline networks and to identify vulnerable populations
that rely on their operation. Future disaster mitigation plans not only need to incor-
porate lifeline infrastructure systems but also take into account the ability of the
population to adapt or cope with lifeline disruption. To do this, more work needs to
be done in measuring the social impacts of lifeline failure. In their review on power
outages during extreme natural events, Klinger et al. (2014) found that power outages
resulted in health impacts by inhibiting people accessing healthcare but noted there
were few attempts to quantify health impacts in terms of morbidity, mortality or
quality of life in the literature. The authors note that this area of research can be
difficult but stress that more work needs to be done so we can learn from past events
and improve resilience for the future. It is not only the failings that we should look at
either but also successes, where communities manage to avoid lifeline failure during
extreme events or were able to come up with solutions for outages. More work is
needed in collating effective strategies so that these experiences and knowledge can
be shared and utilised (Klinger et al. 2014).
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11.1 Introduction
This chapter provides case studies on disaster recovery in the context of community
participation. It presents two cases that explore, compare and contrast the nuclear
disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima. Despite differences in the socio-economic
circumstances between the Soviet Union (Soviet–Ukraine) in 1986 and Japan in
2011, the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters provide an opportunity to discuss
power relations in disaster management and the role of local communities. These
large-scale nuclear disasters are amongst the most traumatic experiences for the
disaster-impacted communities worldwide (Josephson 2010).
This chapter discusses the implementationof relocation and resettlementmeasures
with socio-political power relationswithin and between the stakeholders. The combi-
nation of these is shown to significantly affect the everyday lives of those within
the communities throughout the recovery process. Along with government docu-
mentation, the interviews with evacuees, community leaders and decision-makers
conducted between 2012 and 2016 form the basis of the case studies discussed in
this chapter.
11.2 Community Participation in Disaster Recovery1
The organisational cultures of authorities in disaster management often follow a
top-down approach and downplay or ignore local people’s needs when managing
disaster recovery and risk reduction (Cannon 2015; Gaillard 2008; Manyena 2006;
McEntire et al. 2002). As a consequence, affected communities were excluded from
decision-making during disaster recovery.
Maintaining social network by maintaining relocated communities is necessary
for revitalisation for individuals along with the physical recovery and reconstruc-
tion. Even so, the importance of communities came to the fore just recently during
disaster mitigation and reconstruction (Oliver-Smith 2013). A community’s capacity
in disaster recovery assists its members to work together and solve problems leading
to collective actions and decision-making (Norris et al. 2008). Community capacity
builds up through the development of local knowledge, and it balances individual
and collective interests (Patterson et al. 2010). However, authorities holding socio-
political power often overlook or disregard the significance of local knowledge
and experiences imposing mainstream values with expertise developed outside the
disaster-affected communities (Bird et al. 2009; Haalboom andNatcher 2012; Howitt
et al. 2012). Organisations responsible for disaster management are often found to
implement policies using a top-down approach while downplaying or even ignoring
the local community’s needs and preferences in managing disaster recovery and risk
1Literature review included in this chapter was also included in the Ph.D. thesis (Okada 2017).
Material drawing on my research on the Fukushima (Namie) case study was included in the thesis
(Okada 2017) submitted to and accepted by Macquarie University in April 2017.
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reduction (Cannon 2015; Gaillard 2008; Manyena 2006; McEntire et al. 2002). As
a result, implemented measures and policies miss local needs, bring harmful conse-
quences and/or create excessive dependency in local communities, while parties with
power remain unaware or indifferent to these situations (Haalboom and Natcher
2012).
Centring communities within a risk reduction processes before a disaster
minimises risks, ensuring effective partnerships in the process while incorporating
local knowledge (Hayashi 2007; Ingram et al. 2006; Pandey and Okazaki 2005;
Patterson et al. 2010). By assigning clear roles and responsibilities, decision-makers
promote locally self-sustained recovery and risk reduction (Ahrens and Rudolph
2006). Community participation in disaster management develops a greater under-
standing among community members concerning their responsibility in recovery
and risk reduction processes (Aguirre 1994; Pearce 2003). Community participation
also facilitates a suitable balance in the interrelationship between all actors involved
(Berke et al. 1993; Davidson et al. 2007). All in all, community members should
play an active role in disaster recovery and risk reduction as key drivers, instead of
remaining as passive receivers of services and information provided by authorities
(Pearce 2003; Usamah and Haynes 2012; Bird et al. 2011; Haynes et al. 2008).
11.3 Data and Methods
In theChernobyl case,we investigated the process of community relocation and reset-
tlement in the post-disaster recovery, based on a series of integrated analyses from
two main information sources. The first source is the official historical documents,
including government policies collected from local governments and archives. These
documents allow us to focus on the regulations (resolutions and decisions) legislated
and implemented by the central Soviet and Soviet–Ukrainian governments. This is
because the actions to deal with the widespread consequences of the disaster were
mainly coordinated in Kiev (or Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine) due to the loca-
tion of Chernobyl inside Soviet–Ukraine. However, some neighbouring districts of
Belarus and Russia, which were at that time also part of the USSR, also received
high amounts of nuclear fallout.2
The second information source was based on 30 in-depth interviews with eyewit-
nesses of the relocation process. These interview sessions were conducted in
Zhytomyr and Kiev regions of Ukraine with families displaced from the contam-
inated areas, exclusively from villages. Most sessions were structured interviews
conducted with individuals and focus-groups between 2012 and 2015. The majority
were chosen based on availability and random criteria because of high mortality rate
of relocated persons during the previous decades and psychological distress among
them. The 30 interviewees represent a vast geographical diversity of settlements of
2The actual size of radioactively contaminated area is larger in Belarus than in Ukraine; the power
plant just located 8 km from the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.
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origins (Fig. 11.1). Most of the interviewees were in their productive age, with 80%
of respondents were in the 20–40 age cohort during the course of the disaster (1986).
The comparison of Soviet government documents with in-depth interviews of
evacuees enabled us to understand the power balances and community responses to
the recovery processes.
Fieldworks in Japan were conducted between 2011 and 2017 consisting of 49
interviews with evacuated individuals, community groups, support organisations and
government officials. Research participants were recruited through direct commu-
nication. This was largely developed with snowball sampling as residents in the
communities knew each other well and were interconnected, although their resi-
dences after the evacuation were spread across Fukushima Prefecture and beyond.
Fig. 11.1 Study area in Ukraine (Author Cholii, Karácsonyi, cartography by Karácsonyi)
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A wide variety of participants were involved who were impacted by the disaster and
the recovery process in different ways and extents.
The semi-structured interviews were conducted as qualitative in-depth research.
Hence, they were not intended to quantify responses or generalise across the commu-
nity. Instead, the interviews aimed to (and this book chapter aims to) understand and
explore some of the issues being experienced during the recovery process within the
Namie community in a qualitative manner.
11.4 Recovery Process After Chernobyl Disaster in Frame
of Gradual Democratisation and Increasing Public
Participation
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located in Ukraine, part of the Soviet Union
(hereafter USSR) at the time of the disaster (1986). From the mid-1980s, during the
Gorbachev era the USSR was undergoing gradual democratisation and marketisa-
tion processes (the so-called Perestroika, restructuring). The centralised and planned
command economy was in deep crisis already in mid-1980s. The economic reforms,
however, resulted in chaos and accelerated the decline. This affected the availability
of funds to deal with the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. The estimated costs
were enormous, which surpassed the economic benefits of the entire civil nuclear
power industry of the USSR since its establishment in the 1950s (Bekar 2014, p. 19;
Prister et al. 2013). The rise of Glasnost (openness, transparency)3 revealed a more
realistic and complete picture of the disaster, as one of the largest catastrophes in
world history. On the other hand, the changing societal, political and economic
circumstances also gradually influenced the community participation in the recovery
processes over time with more and more involvement of affected people.
11.4.1 An Overview of Chernobyl Evacuation
and Resettlement Measures
The central administration of USSR in Moscow envisioned the complete clean-up
of the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe as its main goal of the recovery efforts
(Leukhina 2010; Vendland 2011). However, at the same time, responsibility for
the recovery efforts was often imposed on local authorities in Kiev. Coordination
of mitigation measures between these local authorities was a political challenge.
According to general statistics (based on a document collection issued on the 18th
3Glasnost is a state-led policy of USSR during 1985–1991, aimed at gradual democratization of
society. Itsmainprinciplewasgradually lifting the limitationonbasic democratic rights of its citizens
such as freedom of speech, assembly, consciousness with simultaneous abolition of censorship and
organization of first (partly) democratic elections in the USSR (in 1989).
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anniversary of the disaster in 2004, referred hereafter as ‘18th anniversary 2004’), 164
thousand peoplewere relocated from the contaminated areas to 204 resettlement sites
across the country, where more than 29 thousand dwelling units were constructed.
An important feature of the relocation caused by the Chernobyl disaster was that
most of the affected population had lived in rural areas (except those evacuated from
Pripyat town, see Fig. 11.1). Many of these people were settled in rural communi-
ties such as Zhurivka district in Kiev region, which were set up exclusively to host
evacuees from the same villages. Many of them suffered from the fragmentation of
their community, lack of job opportunities and difficulties to adapt to the environ-
ment in the new place. The new settlements were created, sometimes hundreds of
kilometres away from the disaster-prone area mostly, using available lands adjacent
to already existing towns and villages. The new environment in these locations made
it difficult to integrate the newcomers into the already existing local communities.
Most of these resettlement measures were planned to complete in haste following
tight schedules based on the command economy practised in USSR to facilitate the
progress under the challenging situation. However, the economic crisis and polit-
ical collapse of the USSR coupled with the negative consequences from the disaster
(radiation risk, tremendous costs of reconstruction, relocation of a large number of
people) caused major delays. These delays stretched the schedules of the clean-up
and recovery measures, which eventually took several decades.
11.4.2 Evacuation and Resettlement Stages
The resettlement process consisted of three stages (TheHumanConsequences 2002).
The first was an immediate evacuation of people during April–May 1986, who lived
in the areas contaminated by the highest level of radiation mostly in the alien-
ation/exclusion zone (about zoning see Chap. 2). Alternative residential areas for
these people were arranged in Kiev and its surrounding areas (Belyakov 2003).
Evacuees were often provided with already occupied apartment units, sharing a unit
with other families for some time.4 Some industrial properties were also turned into
short-term residential facilities.
Although the evacuation order was made within 24 h after the explosion, only
Pripyat town (the nuclear power station worker’s city) responded to it quickly (27
April 1986). Villages in the alienation zone were evacuated later (e.g. Semykhody,
Shepelychi and Kopachi on 2–3 May), exposing their residents to high levels of
radiation due to failures of decision-making and because of political reasons (to
avoid panic and hide the real extent of the disaster). Evacuees had a very limited
4The apartments were owned by the state or city council in the USSR and they were rented out to
families or individuals. It was not because of the emergency situation to have more families in one
apartment, or in one detached house. The communal apartment, the so called kommunalka (one
family per one room and sharing kitchen and bathroom of the apartment) introduced in 1917 by the
Bolsheviks to overcome housing shortages, was still usual in large Soviet metropolises in the late
1980s.
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time to organise and carry necessary things and were forcibly evacuated. Along with
the alienation zone (10-km radius), the compulsory evacuation order was also issued
for other areas located further away but with radiation levels assessed as dangerous.
These areas included Chernobyl town, which was evacuated on May 6 (Belyakov
2003; Prister et al. 2013, pp. 66–78).
Prompt evacuation of the entire populationwithin the 30-km zonewas challenging
because of the very large area and population involved (see details in Chap. 2). This
resulted in delays and may have facilitated the political decision, later on, to send
those evacuees back home who were relocated from areas where the radiation levels
were less-severe.
Children and their mothers who had lived in the 30-km zone were temporary
evacuated from their place of residence. After a medical check-up, they were sent to
hospitals or sanatoriums distant from the contaminated zone and stayed at those facil-
ities for three months (until the end of summer 1986). By contrast, most males in the
contaminated areas stayed at home to continue agricultural work or look after stock in
the local collective farm (kolkhoz). This may have contributed to high mortality rates
of male population in the following decade of the disaster. This male-victimising
situation was created by the authorities’ order designed to avoid panic and aban-
donment of local agricultural production. As it was still under the Soviet command
economy, such emergency situation mixed with panic was concerned to shake the
Soviet system (Ioffe 2007; Romashko 2016), which the authorities apparentlywanted
to avoid disrupting at any cost.
The second wave of evacuations was the immediate resettlement (1986–1987)
after authorities recognised that evacuees could perhaps never return to their homes.
Preparation for relocation from the compulsory resettlement zone (30-km zone)
started in May 1986. This included investigation of possible construction sites for
housing the evacuees, planning different types of buildings, estimation of the number
of houses needed and planning construction works. The construction had to be
done in a very short period. For example, only three months were allocated for
the construction in Kolonshchyna and Novi Opachichi villages in the Kiev region
housing resettled people. This led to some people resettling in unfinished build-
ings and squeezing two or three families into one house. Some waited in nearby
villages until the construction works finished (but not necessarily completed). It
took approximately a year for the state to resolve these issues in early 1987.
In most cases in the immediate resettlement stage, whole communities were relo-
cated without breaking existing local social connections. Newly constructed settle-
ment sites of this stage were typically large-scale with a hundred or more houses in
each estate (Chornobyls’kyi posyolok). The first and second stages of resettlement
occurred within a short period, between April 1986 and by the end of 1987. Around
90 thousand residentswere involved in the relocation and the subsequent resettlement
just inside the territory of Ukraine.
The third stage was organised resettlement (1988–2002), which aimed to relocate
people who lived in the guaranteed voluntary resettlement zone (outside the 30-
km zone). In contrast to the quick implementation of the compulsory resettlements
between 1986 and 1987, therewas a debate onwhether the government should extend
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the resettlement efforts beyond the 30-km zone or not (Tykhyi 1998; Malko 1998).
This resettlement stage took a long time and exposed the local population in the
contaminated areas to radiation for a decade after the catastrophe. Themain reason for
such delaywas the deep crisis of the disintegratingUSSR and the economic problems
during the post-Soviet transformation in newly emerged independent countries, such
as Ukraine.
The organised resettlement stage consisted of two sub-stages, which were defined
by government regulations, the so-called Chernobyl construction programs. The first
sub-stage was based on government regulation No. 333 (1989), commencing on 30
December 1989. It included plans to construct 2318 houses, 18 blocks of flats with a
combined 1052 apartments, 17 kindergartens, 11 schools and 210kmof gas pipelines.
These works were in anticipation of 3370 families relocating fromNarodychi district
(rayon) of Zhytomyr region (oblast) and Polissky district of Kiev region. The second
sub-stage was based on regulation No. 228 (1990), commencing on 23 August 1990.
This included the construction of housing estates for another 14,700 families from the
guaranteed voluntary resettlement zone. The organised resettlement stage in Ukraine
continued until the early 2000s, when the government stopped constructing reset-
tlement estates and offered additional compensation money for those impacted by
disaster and who had not received government assistance (Baranovska 2011, p. 32;
regulations Nr. 333, 1989; Nr. 228 1990).
These resettlement processes allowed elderly people to return to their home
(Davies and Polese 2015). They were often referred to as samosely (self-settlers),
who lived and still live in their home town even inside the alienation zone. Other
residents repeatedly experienced relocation and resettlement.5
Many of those who resettled in apartment blocks in big cities such as Kiev were
also separated from their original communities (regulations Nr. 333, 1989; Nr. 228
1990). Many interviewees stated that their communities were often split and/or
destroyed through the resettlement processes in the organised resettlement stage.
Although the government tried to resettle communities as whole, each community
was often split into two or more (The Human Consequences 2002, p. 14) because of
their large population size. After relocating more than 90 thousand residents in the
evacuation and immediate resettlement stages, it was impossible for the government
to keep tailoring resettlement land for each community to fit its large population. In
other cases, people from different communities were transferred to and mixed in a
new settlement. These new settlers experienced challenges in various aspects of their
everyday lives. For example, in the case of Novosilky, a family relocated and lived in
5For example, a family, originated in Terehy village, firstly resettled in the neighbouring village
of Straholissya located outside the 30-km zone. After a while, the family returned to their original
home in Terehy. The next resettlement was conducted end of summer 1986, when all residents of
Terehy and Straholissya were transferred to the new housing estates built in Fastiv district of Kiev
region. But, this family among several others returned to Terehy by end of 1986. From 1986 to
1991, many of these families lobbied governments in Kiev and Moscow to stay in Terehy, but they,
including this family, were all forcibly transferred to different locations of Makariv district of Kiev
region.
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a new settlement with other evacuees from very different regions, experienced addi-
tional socialising problems on top of their psychological problems that they were
already suffering from settling in a totally new environment after a tragic event.
11.4.3 Resettlement and Community in the Context
of Changing Political Structures
The relationships between society and government in the late Soviet era also influ-
enced the resettlement processes. So-called Perestroika, a series of democratisation
processes in the Gorbachev-era of the Soviet Union, rapidly progressed in parallel
with the post-disaster relocation processes. This rise of democratisation may have
diminished the political influence of Soviet authorities (Lane 1992; Pickett 2016;
Plokhiy 2014). During the third organised resettlement stage, private and community
initiatives were increasingly established with government supervision, and private
industrieswere involved in constructionwork associatedwith the government’s reset-
tlement efforts. This situation is quite a contrast to the first two stages of relocation:
the evacuation and immediate resettlement stages.
However, this democratic stage was still influenced by some dichotomies and
contradictions. AlthoughUSSRgradually incorporated democratic ideas in its gover-
nance, its citizens’ democratic rights such as freedom of action were still limited
(Marples 1988). For example, although many resettled residents participated in
local governance activities like sending their representatives to their councils, the
centralised political system strictly limited the decision-making power of these
councils. While these local councils were only allowed to deal with local issues,
democratisation continued to be absent at higher levels of politics in the late 1980s.
Despite this, almost all interviewees recognised a high level of support from their new
local governments (village or collective farm administrations) such as integrating the
resettled people transferred from different areas, the new settlers were not entitled
to directly influence the state that retained a dominating power.
Communities were also divided by the rise of individual and collective initia-
tives around resettlement. Residents of the guaranteed voluntarily resettlement zone
continued discussions on their relocation and resettlement options. As the repeated
relocation and resettlement of mass population became increasingly challenging,
the state actively invested to (re-)develop local infrastructure and services inside the
guaranteed voluntary resettlement zone hoping that many local people would choose
to stay in their original areas (regulations Nr. 315, 1989; Nr. 1006–286 1986). This
would often divide local communities into twogroups—the conservative group (older
generations), whowerewilling to stay, and the opposition groupwhowanted to leave.
In particular, the opposition groups often formed by young people and/or families
with small children, as they feared radiation effects on their health (The Human
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Consequences 2002, p. 14).6 Communities were often informed about the levels of
radiation in their areas of the guaranteed voluntarily resettlement zone and this also
triggered arguments for or against relocation and resettlement. The state provided
options for the most active groups, especially families with pregnant women and
small children, to relocate and resettle quickly, but this support was provided incon-
sistently (regulations Nr. 115, 1990; Nr. 886, 1989). These debates ended around
1989 and 1990, when the government eventually decided to evacuate everyone from
the compulsory resettlement and guaranteed voluntarily resettlement zones.
11.5 Fukushima Recovery—Disintegrating Communities
Under Uncertainties
The second section of this chapter addresses the formation and transition of
communities of evacuees who were displaced by the nuclear accidents at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant following the magnitude 9.0 earthquake
off the Pacific coast of Tohoku occurred on 11 March 2011 (see also Chap. 2).
According to the website of Fukushima Prefecture (2013), approximately 154 thou-
sand residents of Fukushima Prefecture were evacuated, of which 109 thousand
were mandatorily evacuated by 19 February 2013. The number of evacuees of the
Prefecture as of January 2017was approximately 81 thousand (FukushimaPrefecture
2017).
In this section, we detail results of interviews and document analyses related to the
impacts brought by the relocation or resettlement processes on the disaster-impacted
people’s everyday lives. Semi-structured interviewswere conductedwith community
members and stakeholders from Namie, Naraha and Tomioka towns and Iwaki city
in Fukushima Prefecture (Fig. 11.2). Each of the semi-structured interviews focused
on the disaster and the recovery processes. Namie and Tomioka towns are different
in location and land size, but both were under evacuation order (which was partially
lifted in March and April 2017) and contain areas where residents will not be able to
return at least for five years7 (Cabinet Office 2013). Naraha town lifted its evacuation
order in September 2015. Iwaki city did not issue an evacuation order, but experienced
6Here we have symptomatic example of Zhovtneve area outside the 30-km zone that was divided
by resettlement into fractions of resettled in 1990–1991 to different locations, mostly in Makariv
district of Kiev region and the main cluster of population, resettled later to Mazinky village in
Pereyaslav district of Kiev region several years later. It demonstrates the situation when initiative
groups were exempted from the community and dispersed while the main part of community was
later resettled compact that partially ruined the community unity after resettlement.
7Areas under evacuation order were divided into three zones. Difficult-to-return zone contains the
annual integrated doses of more than 50 mSv, where residents cannot return to live at least for five
years. Restricted residence zone has the radiation level between 20 and 50 mSv, where daytime
business activities without overnight staying are generally permitted. Evacuation order cancellation
preparation zone’s radiation level is less than 20 mSv. These zones have been re-shaped along
with decontamination outcomes (see https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/site/portal-english/en03-08.
html).
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Fig. 11.2 Study area in Japan (Author/cartography by Karácsonyi)
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severe tsunami damage on the coastal areas and received influxof evacuees fromother
towns.
11.5.1 Formation of Residents’ Groups During First Year
After the Disaster
The neighbourhood councils called jichikai are a form of self-organised groups in
Japanwho are officially recognised by local governments and have a lobbying role for
the residents living in their respective neighbourhood. Evacuees also established their
neighbourhood councils at each temporary housing units (kasetsu in Japanese) where
they have been evacuated, to liaise between the residents of their unit and their local
government. Some interviewees highlighted that the effectiveness of these bottom-up
organised groups wasmore effective compared to individual voices when negotiating
andworkingwith authorities. For example, a temporary housing council leader stated
that he officially established the evacuee’s council in July 2011, which was the first
official group of evacuees from Namie. He recalled that his requests on temporary
housing conditions were all rejected by the local government when the requests
were made as individuals, but then, were mostly addressed after the establishment
of evacuee’s council. The official jichikai (neighbourhood council) status increased
the validity of the residents’ collective voices for the local government to recognise
the raised issues as more community-based rather than individually generated.
Temporary housing for evacuees from Naraha became available in July 2011.
However, initially, Naraha evacuees in some of the temporary housing units did not
establish their neighbourhood councils, because decisions on the establishment were
left to the residents. Eventually, each estate formed its evacuee’s councils once both
the town office and the residents recognised the necessity of an official liaison. In
Tomioka, the town office maximised its pre-existing ties with residents to estab-
lish temporary housing evacuee’s councils (kasetsu jichikai-s), consulting with local
leaders in the early stage of evacuation. Therefore, the establishment of such councils
in Tomioka (May 2011—only two months after the disaster) was quicker than that
in Naraha. This led to the outcome that the scattered Tomioka residents played a
leading role in establishing these evacuee’s councils. In any case, evacuee’s councils
were expected to process requests and announcements from both the government
and residents, although the focus was mostly on dealing with residents collectively
rather than individually. With the help of town office meeting venues for evacuee’s
councils, which became available from October 2012, extensive networks among
these councils were quickly and successfully enabled.
The evacuee’s council (jichikai) structure was also helpful for those who lived
outside temporary housing units, including evacuees who were living in rental
housing subsidised by local governments (kariage in Japanese).8 Namie set up
8Kariage housing means a rental apartment, where local government reimburse the rent for the
tenants regardless that it is a commercial property or public housing.
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evacuee’s councils for themselves in various locations following the series of estab-
lishments of temporary housing councils. Many interviewees highlighted the impor-
tance of looking after the evacuees outside the temporary housing units as much
as those inside. This is because, in general, people outside temporary housing
units attracted less attention than those inside due to their less visible presence.
Temporary housing units were physically visible and identifiable living as clus-
ters (see Chap. 2, Fig. 2.4), but subsidised rental accommodations (kariage) were
geographically woven into host communities. The situation of public housing evac-
uees from Naraha and Tomioka was similar to that of Namie evacuees. Evacuees
living in subsidised rental housing received services such as town magazines, rental
tablet devices and regular visits of social welfare council staff to maintain basic
communication.
Staff members of the social welfare council of Namie pointed out the challenges
of sharing information evenly and timely with evacuees scattered in subsidised rental
housing.Because of unfamiliar surroundings that these evacuees suddenly faced, they
often became reluctant to go out, and they eventually became isolated. According to
Shinmachi-Namie, a citizen-led support group of Namie, these kariage evacuees had
little opportunities to gather or interact with other Namie residents and share their
feelings and experiences. It was one of major challenges for Namie community in
the early stage of temporary settlements.
Retaining broader connections between evacuees was an important issue too,
because several residents evacuated to not only within the Fukushima region but also
across Japan and beyond. Shinmachi-Namie was established by some members of
the local merchants’ association of Namie. According to a leading staff member of
Shinmachi-Namie, the organisation adopted a form of NPO (Non-Profit Organisa-
tion) to maximise the social and financial opportunities in recovery such as grant
application. It held evacuees’ networking events and supported the establishment
of evacuee’s councils for those living in subsidised rental housing in the cities of
Nihonmatsu, Koriyama and Sukagawa and set-up of a community-based recovery
committee of Namie.
11.5.2 Emerging Communities and Issues
in Recovery—Second and Third Years Post Disaster
Many interviewees living in temporary housing units strongly valued the sense of
belonging to their new communities at each estate. These emerging communities
were the place where they could live together after being transferred from one place
to another many times. While this sense of community developed, various changes
kept widening gaps between individuals and communities despite that evacuees’
everyday lives seemed less chaotic than the initial phase of evacuation.
Staff members of the Namie social welfare council were concerned that some
residents at temporary housing units, particularly the most vulnerable, were feeling
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left behind. These residents often would have nowhere to go when, one day, their
units were closed, while others gradually started moving out from these estates.
Adding to this view, a staff member of Shinmachi-Namie warned that this does not
mean that those who moved out from the estates achieved their recovery because
moving out was simply one of several stages that they would still have to go through
in their recovery. Evacuees’ views on receiving external supports also varied. During
the interview sessions in 2012 in Naraha and Tomioka, evacuee’s council leaders
often focused on self-reliance in their management, anticipating their future lives
after moving out from temporary housing. However, some other temporary housing
residents demandedmore external supports. This shows that the views on their future
lives already varied between residents at this stage.
The Namie social welfare council staff achieved trustful relationships with many
evacuees through their long-term regular visits but also identified that some requests
from the evacuees were becoming overly reliant on external supports. For example,
some family members refused to take care of their elderly parents for nursing. This
was because they feared that theymight get too impatient and aggressive with parents
as a result of excessive stress from their recovery issues. Such problems previously
were dealtwith fromwithin local communities, but the former neighbourhoods disap-
peared. As a result, their mutual support at a micro-local scale did not function as
effectively as it once had.
Of course, some residents retained their sense of community both before and
after the disaster. They often kept community-ties having regular meetings and
events during the post-disaster. This seemed to ease residents’ uncertain feelings
over prolonged evacuation to some extent. Some of the evacuee’s councils developed
friendships with their host communities, co-organising socialising events and festi-
vals. Based on this development, new neighbourhood ties were established between
evacuees and host communities. Some other evacuee’s councils, such as Namie
So-So Jichikai participated in and facilitated cleaning activities in the local areas.
Aizu-Miyasato Jichikai joined local sporting events. Evacuees’ Namie Sasaya-Tobu
Jichikai and host communities’ Fukushima Kita-Nakajo Jichikai jointly held regular
socialising events.
However, in general, some of the evacuee’s councils maintained regular meetings
and gatheringswith their host communities. Tanaka et al. (2013) pointed out that local
communities existed but did not exist in Fukushima. This meant that although the
communities existed in local people’s post-disaster lives, pre-disaster personalisation
of people’s lifestyle continued to diminish their community lives.
Regarding the development of broader works on evacuees’ connections, the
citizen-based NPO Shinmachi-Namie further expanded its projects with other
support groups such as academics and businesses. For example, the NPO and a
research group at Waseda University, Tokyo, jointly introduced a semi-public trans-
port system for Namie evacuees in Fukushima Prefecture and beyond using large
passenger vehicles funded by external businesses.
At the same time, the NPO started experiencing a new difficulty in maintaining
the organisation as a result of the prolonged uncertainty in recovery. Between 2013
and 2015, the number of staff at the NPO dropped from ten to three. One main reason
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pointed by some of the members were that many evacuees could not settle in one
area to work for the NPO because of their unstable life circumstance. Prolonged
evacuation without certainty discouraged them working, when budget for personnel
costs was often unavailable due to the organisation’s status as NPO. Therefore, even
if the organisation won valuable project grants, they often could not work on those
projects due to staff shortages.
11.5.3 Return or No Return with Widening Gaps—Four
Years After the Disaster and Beyond
The unstable situation in recovery developed further, although reconstruction
progressed and lifting of evacuation orders came into affect (at least politically).
In addition, effects of a serious lack of sharing information, projects and goals
in recovery started unfolding between authorities, support groups and residents.
Political uncertainty further complicated to the situation.
A big gap in recognition of and expectation for the future between governments
and the residents of their jurisdiction emerged in case of Namie. Generally, two
major ideas of semi-permanent residence had been publicly discussed and shared in
parallel: (1) to collectively settle outside the disaster-impacted town and redevelop
evacuees’ everyday lives there; (2) to build public apartments inside and outside
the disaster-impacted areas and return (Namie Town 2012). However, in 2015, the
central government (and the local government) was almost solely focusing on the
latter idea of ‘return’ and the local government followed it, although this shift of
focus was not clearly announced. Namie and Tomioka lifted their evacuation orders
(except the difficult-to-return zones) on 31 March and 1 April 2017, respectively
(Namie Town 2017; Tomioka Town 2017).
This shift of focus also showed in Namie town office’s responses to residen-
tial developments. According to a Namie town officer interviewed, the town office
approvedNamie residents tomove into public disaster housing provided byKoriyama
andFukushima.Therewere also extension plans to buildmore public disaster housing
on the same site. However, Namie town office did not approve another extensive resi-
dential development plan, which was a non-governmental project but endorsed by
Fukushima city office. Possible factors that contributed to the difference in Namie
town office’s decisions were the driving factors of the projects (either government-
led or others), scale of the projects (about 20 houses in Koriyama, 400 blocks in
Fukushima) and items that they were dealing with (either public housing or land
blocks). This seemingly relates to the government’s current intention to lead Namie
residents to return in a coerced manner.
Regarding the residents’ view on returning or not returning, a member of the
NPO Shinmachi Namie pointed out that, in 2015, 80% of the recent government
survey respondents said that they would or could not return anytime soon for various
reasons such as safety and availability of social services (Reconstruction Authority
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et al. 2016). However, another town officer, during the interview, interpreted this
survey result differently; that 80% of non-returning did not necessarily mean giving
up on the town. The officer also explained that building Namie communities in other
cities and towns would have several difficulties such as taxation, public services and
facilities to use.
In Tomioka, the evacuation order (except for the difficult-to-return areas) was
lifted inMarch–April 2017. Public housings for returning evacuees were being built;
infrastructures such as medical and commercial facilities were being redeveloped.
However, similar toNamie,manyof the residents already secured their houses outside
the town. Therefore, it would be difficult to expect a high return rate.
In Naraha, the whole town evacuation order was lifted on 5 September 2015.
However, the return rate as of September 2016 was less than 10% of the pre-disaster
population.One of the potential reasons for this low return rate is that therewas no any
difficult-to-return area designated in Naraha (unlike Namie and Tomioka). Because
of the absence of the difficult-to-return areas, Naraha residents are not entitled to
the disaster public housings located outside the town, while utilities and essential
services have not been organised sufficiently. At the same time, approximately 80%
of the town’s population evacuated to the nearby Iwaki city, and they often live their
lives in Iwaki without too much inconvenience. These factors may have prompted
Naraha residents to individually secure their houses outside the town, which caused
low return rates (see Fukushima Minpo 2016).
Evacuees at subsidised rental housing also started accepting the reality and trying
to find ways to cope with challenging situations to settle in their current places of
living, although they often faced difficulties living in and with the host communi-
ties. For example, host community members reportedly criticised Namie evacuees
for daily issues (such as managing household waste dump sites). A leader of their
evacuee’s council explored, at their regular socialising occasions, with other evac-
uees how they would better deal with such situations so both the evacuees and host
communities could maintain and improve their lives rather than conflicting to each
other. Media have reported increasing cases of bullying and discrimination against
Fukushima evacuees across Japan (see Japan Times 2017; Asahi Shimbun 2017).
Conflicting relationships between evacuees and host communities in Iwaki city
were being moderated due to better mutual understanding brought by progress of
time and interaction, according to the interviewees. This moderation was also facil-
itated by the city’s recognition of an important challenge to restore its decreased
population after the disaster. Iwaki lost its large coastal population following the
severe impacts caused by the 2011 tsunami, similar to the coastal areas of Miyagi
and Iwate Prefectures in the Northern Tohoku region.
In exploring the evacuees’ connections, a number of interviewees (mainly resi-
dents) expressed their dilemma that they wanted to return, but knew practically that
they cannot. This was mainly because there would not be the everyday community
lives that they had become use to. Furthermore, some reported that those who were
determined to return often changed their minds at some points, because the evacu-
ation was going on for too long. They could not decide, because they didn’t know
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when or if they could return. They often could not help thinking about it and got
depressed, because there was no clear answer available.
A Namie interviewee stated that she was feeling guilty because realistically she
could not return. Another interviewee identified uncertainty as themost difficult issue
of Namie’s recovery, because local people’s recovery and re-establishment of lives
were heavily and repeatedly affected by the factors that were beyond their control.
These included environmental conditions that brought radiation to Namie and the
decisions and intentions of authorities at the time, whose information was often not
clearly announced to or shared with public, most importantly with the local residents.
In Naraha, where the evacuation order was lifted for the entire town in September
2015, interviewees’ attitudes varied roughly in three categories: (1) return, (2) do
not return and (3) have no means to return. The ‘do not return’ group often had
already bought houses outside the town such as Iwaki and secured foundations of
their everyday life including schools and jobs. The ‘have no means to return’ group
included those who ran out of compensation money and only hoped public disaster
housings in Naraha to be available (see Sect. 11.4.2). This group would likely stay
in the emergency housings as long as these are available, which is likely to become a
social issue later on. Considering these stories in this sub-section, lifting evacuation
order may also be a trigger point that divides residents into a greater number of
different groups and widens the gaps between them.
11.6 Differences, Commonalities and Lessons
Our two case studies demonstrated the importance of socio-political systems, finan-
cial capacity, mass migration and uncertainty, which affected local communities in
different and similar ways through the post-disaster times.
The political framework during the Chernobyl and Fukushima disaster recovery
cases were very different. The Chernobyl disaster occurred under the communist
system of former USSR, which rapidly collapsed and shifted towards democratic
directions in the early post-disaster period. The communist political system, despite
the rapid democratic changes, avoided or considerably limited the opportunities for
the disaster-impacted citizens to contribute to their recovery and relocation processes.
By contrast, the Fukushima disaster and its recovery and relocation processes have
been responded to by continuous government systems of Japan, which are generally
democratic and relatively stable compared to that of the Chernobyl disaster. This
at least provided the impacted citizens of the Fukushima disaster with rights to be
actively involved in the recovery process.
Financial capacities of the governments also varied between the two cases. Due to
the declining economy of the USSR and the down-scaled capacities of the new states,
the large-scale relocation and recovery efforts increasingly experienced financial
limitations over time. The Japanese economy was also not in a position to respond to
the scale of damages. The state’s economy had been stagnant for 20 years. However,
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the stable political system allowed Japan to sustain its capacity to provide funding
support and reconstruction.
Despite these differences in political–societal system and financial capacity, the
overwhelming uncertainty that was largely generated and amplified by governmental
and political responses without centring local communities further impacted the lives
of disaster-impacted citizens. The uneven policy-making, budget-availability and
implementation of the relocation in the formerUSSRwere affected by the progress of
democratisation destroyed pre-disaster local communities and continued restricting
emerging communities. The lack of foresight also exacerbated hardships in everyday
life and life-planning of the disaster-impacted local people of Fukushima, pushing
the most vulnerable groups into an even more vulnerable positions. The uncertainty
inhibited various stakeholders from sharing visions and efforts; the poor levels of
understanding between them increased the uncertainty as a vicious circle.
This uncertainty was further complicated by other factors. For example, the diffi-
culty of sudden, mass relocation and resettlement. Despite the initial speedy reloca-
tion and resettlement of 90 thousand citizens without damaging community struc-
tures, inhibited authorities of the Chernobyl case from continuing the same level of
service due to the reduced availability of land and resources, possibly affected by
the drastic political changes as well. The Fukushima case, Namie in particular, also
struggled with the limited availability of land and housing and had to utilise scat-
tered temporary shelters such as school gymnasiums and motels to accommodate
hundreds of thousands of evacuees all at once. This meant evacuees kept moving
until temporary housing and public housing arrangements become available and
brought some host communities surged property prices, reduced land availability and
strained public resources and services. Another example was the lack of knowledge
about the real scale of the radiation threat, which allowed the Chernobyl authorities
to expose citizens to high-level radiation. In Fukushima, although the stakeholders
were more aware of measurement and potential risks of radiation, the fundamental
lack of knowledge about radiation, such as long-term presence and health effects,
continues distressing the evacuees in their decision-making.
Uncertainty was commonly identified as a major challenge at a local-scale
recovery following the two nuclear disasters. In particular, the large scale of affected
areas and populations and several unknown and unresolved aspects of radiation
effects considerably increased the uncertainty such as inability to stay and work on-
site or nearby, varied effects of decontamination efforts, enormous amounts of human,
financial and land resources needed. In order to avoid exacerbating the uncertainty
and associated social damages among disaster-impacted citizens, it is important to
centre the impacted citizens in disaster management processes. These case studies
illuminated the importance of sharing ideas, issues, options and limitations between
all stakeholders centring disaster-impacted citizens so that the recovery processes
and outcomes gain communitymembers’ awareness of their community lives, reduce
vulnerability and increase resilience at individual and community scales.
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Abstract Having experienced firsthand the catastrophic Great East Japan Earth-
quake and Tsunami of 2011, Tohoku University founded the International Research
Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS) in 2012. IRIDeS staff, with a broad array
of relevant specializations, conducts world-class research on disaster science and
disaster mitigation in collaboration with organizations from many countries. As a
member of IRIDeS, Prof. Osamu Murao, the founder and manager of the Interna-
tional Strategy for Disaster Mitigation Laboratory (ISDM), has conducted several
international collaborative research projects. This chapter briefly reports on the activ-
ities of the IRIDeS and ISDM and highlights key factors for successful interna-
tional collaborative research and exchange experiences with other countries. The
author recounts his initial collaborative research experience in a long-term project
examining Taiwan’s recovery from the impact of the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake
which was the foundation of the international research collaboration at ISDM. The
chapter concludes with a summary of the valuable lessons learned from the author’s
participation in this research.
Keywords IRIDeS · Chi-Chi earthquake · Taiwan · Japan · Partnership · Local
communities
12.1 Introduction
Stories of natural calamities and misfortunes appear almost daily throughout the
world. In many cases, these are relatively minor events such as heavy rains or power
failure. However, occasionally a major disaster occurs so seriously that it affects
millions of people directly or indirectly, as happened with the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami or the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake or in case of 1999 Chi-Chi Earth-
quake. Damage conditions and post-disaster recovery situations affected by these
major events inevitably differ according to regional and social characteristics as well
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as the nature and severity of the hazard. However, similarities can be usefully exam-
ined. In fact, it is crucial that we learn from our experiences with urban and regional
disasters in order to develop and refine disaster risk reductionmeasures for the future.
This is particularly true for artificial environments such as cities.
When a manufacturer develops a product that might pose a risk to the consumer,
the maker carries out repeated tests until the safety and reliability of the product
can be assured. The development of a city is far different. The typical city is an
artificial environment that has formed and evolved rather than a product that has
been thoroughly planned, tested, and delivered with safety guarantees. In most cases,
serious safety weaknesses go unrecognized until the city faces a disaster (see also
Chap. 9 by Barnes on designing cities considering disaster and gender aspects). It is
for this reason that past disasters and recoveries need to be examined and analyzed
carefully and the lessons learned from the experience disseminated in order to reduce
urban disaster risks.
Japanese society has accumulated valuable knowledge and experiences from
past disasters. In recognition of this, the United Nations held influential interna-
tional events for disaster risk reduction in Japan at Yokohama in 1994, Kobe in
2005, and Sendai in 2015. Emanating from the 3rd World Conference on Disaster
Risk Reduction was the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030
(UNISDR 2015) (hereafter, the Sendai Framework), which describes the importance
of international cooperation to reduce disaster risk around the world:
It is necessary to continue strengthening good governance in disaster risk reduction strate-
gies at the national, regional and global levels and improving preparedness and national
coordination for disaster response, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to use post-disaster
recovery and reconstruction to “Build Back Better”, supported by strengthened modalities
of international cooperation.
The Sendai Framework, which succeeds the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–
2015, continues to provide global guidelines for disaster risk reduction from 2005
to 2015 (UNISDR 2005). The Sendai Framework suggests gaps exist “in addressing
the underlying disaster risk factors, in the formulation of goals and priorities for
action, in the need to foster disaster resilience at all levels and in ensuring adequate
means of implementation,” as well as identifying “a need to develop an action-
oriented framework” (seeUNISDR2015; p. 11). International cooperation and global
partnerships are seen as significant factors in the implementation of effective disaster
risk reduction measures.
The International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS) is designed to
address some of the gaps outlined in the Sendai Framework. The IRIDeSwas founded
in April 2012 by Tohoku University following the costly and catastrophic disaster of
the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011. The mission of the IRIDeS
has been to create a new academic area of disaster mitigation that subsumes the
lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the findings of world-
class researchers. It aims to establish social systems capable of responding promptly,
sensibly, and effectively to disasters, withstanding adversities with resiliency, and
passing on and extending the lessons learned to future disaster management.
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The IRIDeS is committed to assisting on-going recovery and reconstruction efforts
in affected areas, conducting action-oriented research, and pursuing effective disaster
management to build sustainable and resilient societies. Together with collabo-
rating organizations frommany countries and highly specialized experts, the IRIDeS
conducts world-class research on natural hazard science and disaster mitigation. The
following section describes the IRIDeS, its activities, and outcomes.
12.2 Activities at International Research Institute
of Disaster Science (IRIDeS)
The IRIDeS aims to become a world center for the study of disasters and disaster
mitigation, learning from and building on past lessons in disaster management from
Japan and around the world. To achieve this, the IRIDeS undertakes a range of
action-orientated research and collaborative activities.
In the frame of action-oriented research, the IRIDeS has been committed to
enhancing cooperation with local municipalities and governments in areas affected
by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami as part of its contribution
to recovery and reconstruction efforts. The IRIDeS established a number of agree-
mentswith local governments affected by the 2011 earthquake and seriously hit by the
following tsunami in Iwate (RikuzentakataCity) andMiyagi Prefectures (Kesennuma
City, Ishinomaki City, Higashi-Matsushima City, Tagajo City, Sendai City, Natori
City, Iwanuma City,Watari Town, and Yamamoto Town). The long-term objective of
these cooperations is to create disaster-resilient societies that canmanage the complex
and diverse challenges associated with disasters. Not only doing so by identifying
and implementing prevention measures but also by preparing and responding to the
challenges they present and achieving recovery and renovation. Broadly speaking,
the goal is to engender a culture of disaster-resiliency and incorporate it into our
social systems.
The action-oriented research from the IRIDeS (2012) focuses on:
1. Investigating the physics of global scale disasters such as mega-earthquakes,
tsunamis, and extreme weather.
2. Reconstructing disaster response and mitigation technologies based on the
lessons of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster.
3. Inventing “Affected Area Supportology” in the aftermath of disasters.
4. Enhancing the disaster-resiliency and performance of multiple fail-safe systems
in regional and urban areas.
5. Establishing disaster medicine and medical service systems for catastrophic
disasters.
6. Designing disaster-resilient societies and developing a digital archive system to
pass along the lessons of past disasters.
The partnerships with local governments have produced co-organized seminars
open to the public, tsunami evacuation drills, efforts to devise a post-tsunami recovery
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plan, educational activities related to disaster risk reduction, and an array of additional
activities. Based on its close relationships with local residents, the IRIDeS opened a
branch office in Kesennuma to organize periodic disaster risk reduction seminars.
The IRIDeS has prioritized partnerships with other academic organizations. Such
partnerships are crucial to the conduct of cutting-edge research and the collection of
pertinent information for disaster risk reduction. The IRIDeS has established inter-
national academic exchange agreements with the Center for Weather, Climate and
Disaster Research at the National Taiwan University, the German Aerospace Center,
the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute
of Japanese Studies at Harvard University (USA), Project NOAH at the Department
of Science and Technology, the Cabinet of the Philippines, the University of the
Philippines,Manila, theAngelesUniversity Foundation (Philippines), the Institute of
Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited (New Zealand), the United Nations Devel-
opment Program, the Global Risk Forum GRF Davos (Switzerland), the Tsunami
and Disaster Mitigation Research Center (TDMRC) and Syiah Kuala University
(Indonesia), the Aceh TsunamiMuseum (Indonesia), the Institute of Medicine, Trib-
huvan University (Nepal), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), and the
University of Moratuwa (Sri Lanka).
In collaboration with international and domestic organizations, the IRIDeS inves-
tigated damage conditions and recovery processes in areas affected such as the 2013
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), the 2015 Nepal Earthquake (Fig. 12.1), the 2014 Heavy
Rain in Japan, and the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake. The collaborative research on
Fig. 12.1 Report on 2013 Typhoon Yolanda (L) and 2015 Nepal Earthquake (R)
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the 2013 Typhoon Yolanda was the first big international research project for the
IRIDeS.
Using established networks, the IRIDeS embraces opportunities to share and
exchange knowledge, experience, and learnings from past disasters among practi-
tioners, government officers, researchers, and ordinary people from Japan and other
countries. The 3rd World Conference of Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai in
March 2015, mentioned earlier, was one of the most impactful events in the rela-
tively brief history of the IRIDeS. Tohoku University, as the most affected Japanese
national university by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, joined with Sendai
City and the Japanese Government to support and co-organize the main conference.
This resulted in two significant outputs. Firstly, the conference symposium enti-
tled Resilient Communities: Our Home, Our Communities, Our Recovery was orga-
nized by the IRIDeS in conjunction with UN-HABITAT members. The symposium
invited community leaders andmayors from several areas affected by the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami, the 2013 Typhoon Yolanda, and the 2011 Great East Japan Earth-
quake to discuss vulnerability reduction in local communities. Secondly, the IRIDeS
announced the establishment of its Global Center for Disaster Risk Reduction. The
Center was created to play an important coordinating role, collaborating with several
United Nations agencies, including United Nations Development Program and the
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), to help monitor progress on
the new global disaster risk reduction framework.
Triggered by this conference in 2015, the IRIDeS held the inaugural World Bosai
Forum in November 2017, the first of a series of biyearly International Disaster and
Risk Conferences developed in cooperation with the Global Risk Forum held in
Davos, the city of Sendai, and others. The word Bosai is a traditional Japanese term
implying a holistic approach to reducing human and economic losses from disasters.
It represents activities in all disaster phases, including prevention, recovery, response,
and mitigation. With 947 participants from 44 countries, the inaugural Bosai Forum
marked the successful beginning of what is likely to be a highly productive series of
conferences (Fig. 12.2).
12.2.1 International Collaborative Research Projects
at the International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation
Laboratory (ISDM)
The International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation Laboratory (ISDM), founded and
managed by the author, belongs to the Regional and Urban Reconstruction Research
Division at the IRIDeS since 2013. Before that it was part of Tsukuba University.
The ISDM seeks to provide practical international strategies for disaster mitigation
or post-disaster recovery as well as to develop international frameworks that enable
the realization of those strategies based on field surveys and data analysis. In order
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Fig. 12.2 Poster of World Bosai Forum 2017 (L) and the opening ceremony (R) (Sendai, 2017,
taken by Osamu Murao)
to clarify existing problems and make recommendations for future disaster reduc-
tion, the ISDM researches the relationship between disaster management and urban-
regional space through case studies of vulnerable areas, including disaster-affected
cities.
One of the ISDM’s most significant research areas is urban vulnerability evalua-
tion. After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, a research associate at the Institute of
Industrial Science within the University of Tokyo clarified the relationship between
seismic ground motion and building damage using actual damage data provided by
Kobe City. As a result, building vulnerability functions were formulated (Yamazaki
and Murao 2000) and a method for conducting building collapse risk evaluation
for Tokyo was proposed (Murao et al. 2000). Those research activities on urban
vulnerability evaluation continued for the research associate.
While the ISDML monitors urban recovery in areas affected by disasters across
the world, it quantitatively evaluates urban recovery processes for planning future
disaster risk reduction strategies. To date, international field research has taken
place in Taiwan, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, Peru, China, Hawaii, New
York, Bangladesh, andMyanmar (Fig. 12.3). Significant domestic field research sites
include Kobe, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and the Sanriku coastal areas affected by the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. These field experiences, which have
included extensive communication with local residents and negotiations to acquire
critical data, have produced significant lessons regarding the conduct of international
collaborative research.
The following section is a first-person summary of the author’s introduction to
international collaborative research in a project focused on urban recovery following
the 1999Chi-ChiEarthquake inTaiwanwhile amember of theUniversity ofTsukuba.
This experiencewith the project served as the foundation for the authors current work
in international research collaboration at ISDML.
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Fig. 12.3 ISDM (IRIDeS) research fields in the world (Author Murao, cartography by Karácsonyi)
12.3 Collaborative Research on Recovery Processes
from the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake in Taiwan
12.3.1 Chi-Chi Township and the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake
in Taiwan
Chi-Chi Township (shown in Fig. 12.4) is located inNantouCounty in the central part
of Taiwan. Early in the twentieth century during Japanese colonial rule, it prospered
as a center of traffic, commerce, and politics. This was largely due to the building
of the Chi-Chi railroad, the construction of the city hall, and a successful banana
industry. The township currently has a population of approximately 12,000 across
11 villages.
The Chi-Chi Earthquake, with its epicenter near Chi-Chi, occurred on September
21, 1999 (see Chap. 6, the case of Christchurch earthquake and its population impact
for comparison). It caused damage to more than 106,000 buildings and with an esti-
mated 2500 casualties throughout Taiwan. In Chi-Chi itself, 1736 buildings were
seriously damaged, 792 buildings were moderately damaged, and 42 people died. It
was among one of the most serious disasters in the history of Chi-Chi (and Taiwan).
It destroyed tourist attractions such as the traditional Japanese-style Chi-Chi station,
historical temples, traditional pottery, and various important public facilities. These
cultural resources, representing the area’s historically unique background, were
significant elements in Chi-Chi’s economic and industrial recovery.
An event of personal significance occurred on October 1, 1999, ten days after the
earthquake. My colleagues and I visited Chi-Chi to conduct a damage survey. It was
my first field survey outside Japan and the town was littered with collapsed buildings
(Fig. 12.5). Everywhere we looked, people were responding to emergencies. Because
of its close proximity to the epicenter of the earthquake, the town had been devastated.
This time in Chi-Chi was relatively brief, but deeply affecting. It was a wonder
how this town could ever recover. Just prior to this visit, I had finalized my doctoral
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Fig. 12.4 Location of Chi-Chi and the epicenter of 1999 Taiwan earthquake (Authors Murao,
Karacsonyi, cartography by Karácsonyi, population distribution based on census data)
Fig. 12.5 Collapsed buildings (L) and Wuchang temple (R) in Chi-Chi, Taiwan, due to the 1999
Chi-Chi Earthquake (Murao 1999)
12 Exchanging Disaster Science Expertise Between Countries … 241
thesis, “Study on Building Damage Estimation based on the Actual Damage Data
due to the 1995 Hyogoken Nanbu Earthquake,” and was looking for the next research
topic. As a researcher with a background in architecture and city planning, I became
immediately interested in the post-earthquake recovery of Chi-Chi. This experience
turned out to be the trigger for later post-disaster recovery research.
12.3.2 Continuous Surveys in Chi-Chi and Building Ties
At the beginning of 2000, the Research Committee on Urban Planning and Commu-
nity Development for Disaster Reduction (the Committee) was established within
the City Planning Institute of Japan (CPIJ). As member of the Committee, I met
many young like-minded Japanese researchers and a Taiwanese student, Hsueh-Wen
Wang, who were motivated to understand the process of urban recovery in Taiwan.
The importance of on-site field surveyswas advocated by this groupwho successfully
gained CPIJ’s support.
As a delegate member of the Committee, I visited Chi-Chi again in April 2000,
approximately six months after the earthquake and set about investigating recovery
conditions in the township, as well as other affected areas in Nantou County and
Taichung County. On this visit, we gathered materials and information on damage
(walk through surveys, photo recording, interviews, and collecting data on housing
stock) that would help in better understanding the recovery situation and the urban
recovery strategies that were being developed and implemented.
Numerous stakeholders and specialists affected by the tragedy or involved in the
recovery were engaged in the course of conducting the survey. The stakeholders
included faculty members of the National Taiwan University and Feng-Chia Univer-
sity, government officials, NPOmembers in charge of rebuilding communities in the
affected districts, architects, planners, and local residents. Among our many interac-
tions, meetings with Prof. Liang-Chun Chen of the National Taiwan University were
perhaps the most significant. They enabled us to maintain continuous contact with
the Taiwanese recovery situation over a number of years. These important meetings
were arranged by Ms. Wang, who played a critical role helping our study survey.
In April 2001, the Committee received a three-year research grant entitled A
Comparative Study on Disaster Management and Reconstruction Strategy among
Earthquake Disasters of Hanshin (Japan), Kocaeri (Turkey), and Chi-Chi (Taiwan),
from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). The 1999Kocaeri Earth-
quake, also known as the 1999 Izmit Earthquake, occurred in Turkey on August 17
1999, approximately one month before the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake. Our intention
was to compare the Kocaeri and Chi-Chi urban recovery processes to the 1995 Great
Kobe (Hanshin) Earthquake recovery.
Supported by the grant, frequent visits were made to affected areas in Turkey,
Taiwan, and Japan for surveys with particular research concerns and continued
to collect related materials and information through to March 2004. The research
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Fig. 12.6 Permanent housings (L) and childcare activities (R) in Kocaeli, Turkey (Murao 2001)
covered a wide range of topics that included urban recovery planning, tempo-
rary housing, permanent housing (Fig. 12.6, left), construction methods, economic
recovery, debris management, community building, childcare activities (Fig. 12.6,
right), and more. Given that the field of post-disaster urban recovery research in at
this timewas still in its infancy, the interviews and discussions with local government
officials and recovery specialists in Turkey and Taiwan were found to be extremely
helpful in shaping our thoughts regarding what is needed to conduct an insightful
comparative study of post-disaster urban recovery.
During this time, I visited Chi-Chi several more times meeting two key persons
who would be instrumental in advancing my research. An Internet search for an
interpreter who could translate from Chinese to English led us to Ms. Yayoi Mitsuda
(Yoyo), a multilingual Japanese student who was studying cultural anthropology
at National Tsing Hua University. It was my great fortune, for Yoyo became an
indispensable partner in conducting surveys.
Random good fortune also led us to a restaurant owner in Chi-Chi referred here
to as David. While out conducting field surveys, we stopped at David’s restaurant
for dinner. It was a small, unassuming restaurant of the type we would often see
along the streets of Taiwan. We quickly discovered that the restaurant operated as a
community hub. It turned out that David was a community leader in Chi-Chi, with
close relationships with the current and former mayors and other local people of
influence. Since that first night, David’s restaurant became my base for conducting
surveys in Chi-Chi. My time there yielded an exceptional amount of information on
the recoveryprocess, local history, keypersons, politics, culture, human relationships,
and much more.
Soon after the project ended in April 2004, I managed another JSPS grant to
pursue research in Chi-Chi entitled Architecture of Reconstruction Process of Chi-
Chi Area (Taiwan) and Archives Related to Urban Reconstruction in the World. This
meant that the research ideas, which had been forming sincemy first days in Chi-Chi,
would continue to develop and mature.
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12.3.3 Research on Post-earthquake Recovery in Chi-Chi
My research activity in Chi-Chi went on until 2008. It allowed for continuous surveys
and research activities over an extended ten year period, mostly in a trial-and-error
fashion. This work is published in several academic journals (e.g., Murao 2006a, b,
Murao et al. 2007) and international conference proceedings. Some of the research
findings are described below.
Through the field surveys, I was able to monitor and record the urban recovery
conditions of Chi-Chi, which were in a continuous state of change. In order to clearly
understand Chi-Chi’s transition, a proper town map was necessary. In 2000–2001
however, such amapwas difficult if not impossible to obtain. Consequently, I decided
to create my own digital base map. Walking around and surveying the town with lab
students using IKONOS (satellite) imagery, I continued to digitize the research area
until a suitable GIS base map was completed. The map functioned to chronologi-
cally record the building demolition and reconstruction conditions that I had been
monitoring since the earthquake struck. The recovery processes of Chi-Chi could be
representable visually, as illustrated by the maps in Fig. 12.7.
Through the studyof theHanshin (Japan),Kocaeri (Turkey), andChi-Chi (Taiwan)
earthquake disasters and recoveries, I compared post-disaster urban recovery
processes in cities with such different social backgrounds with my collaborators
in Taiwan, Turkey, and Japan. Based on this cooperation experience, I recognized
the need to develop a quantitative evaluation method but was yet to determine how
to assess the recovery process quantitatively. This became an important research
question during my time in Chi-Chi.
The question continued to taunt me, until one day, in a research meeting at the
National Taiwan University, I was struck with the idea to represent the progress
of the recovery by creating “recovery curves” based on building construction data.
This process is essentially counting the number of building completions of various
types over time. Later, with the support of Yoyo our translator and several officials,
I was able to obtain statistical data on post-earthquake construction from the Nanto
Government. From this data, I was able to create recovery curves for the various
building types (temporary houses, rebuilt buildings, and new buildings) that are
shown in Fig. 12.8.
The recovery curves show the reconstruction of buildings in Chi-Chi began
approximately six months after the earthquake and continued for a further three
years. The construction of new buildings began only after a delay of 1.5 years. This
component ofmy researchwas challenging, but themethod for constructing recovery
curves would later be applied to good effect to my other research cases in Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Japanese coastal areas affected by the 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake. The approach helped to conveniently compare recovery processes
in areas affected by disasters in the four countries under study.
Having the opportunity to monitor the reconstruction process over an extended
period and applying the idea of recovery curves contributed greatly to the research
outcomes in Chi-Chi. It should be noted that while the research was carried out to
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Fig. 12.7 Change of post-earthquake recovery conditions of Chi-Chi (Murao 2006a, cartography
by Murao and Karácsonyi)

































































Fig. 12.8 Recovery curves in terms of building types (Murao et al. 2007)
understand Chi-Chi’s recovery process, in terms of changes in the area’s physical
environment such as building reconstruction and the restoration of housing, we also
recognized that the observable recovery was the product of human activity. Accord-
ingly, I often sought out and interviewed key persons in the recovery effort. They
included mayors, local government officials, shop owners, and victims. They were
interviewed about Chi-Chi’s history and cultural background, the behavior of indi-
viduals from the initial emergency response stage to the reconstruction stage, and
the various recovery strategies that were being employed. Based on the opinions and
concerns expressed by residents in these interviews, I modeled the post-earthquake
recovery process by using the simplified model shown in Fig. 12.9. This systematic
model indicates the sequential process of recovery from the viewpoint of the victims,
from the early catastrophic moments until the time of resettlement in permanent
housing.
By 2006, I had monitored the ever-changing status of Chi-Chi Township and
spoken extensively with local residents for several years. I began to consider the
importance of producing a permanent record of Chi-Chi’s urban disaster recovery
processes. By this time, I had already gathered a great number of pictures, movies,
and considerable other data. From this, I conceived the idea of creating a digital
model of Chi-Chi Township to preserve at least a segment of the recovery process.
To this end, together with my laboratory students, I took pictures of every building
elevation in the area and ultimately completed the model called Digital Chi-Chi
City on the Google Earth platform. With information on the recovery conditions of
important facilities in the township, Fig. 12.10 illustrates the product of our efforts.
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Fig. 12.9 Structure of post-earthquake recovery process (Murao 2006b)
12.3.4 Lessons from Post-earthquake Recovery in Chi-Chi
The Chi-Chi experience provided a number of important lessons regarding long-term
post-disaster research in foreign countries. From the first visit to Chi-Chi in 1999,
it was clear that the support of others was needed to conduct effective surveys and
reach useful research outcomes. The support of Prof. Liang-Chun Chen, David, and
Yoyowas crucial. The following describes their contributions as away of underlining
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Fig. 12.10 Digital Chi-Chi City on Google Earth as recovery digital archives (Murao 2007)
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the importance of finding reliable local collaborators when conducting international
disaster research.
I. Seek out collaborative relationships with local specialists/researchers
I first met Prof. Lian-Chun Chen (2001) at the National Taiwan University during
the course of developing my survey for the Comparative Study on Disaster Manage-
ment and Reconstruction Strategy among Earthquake Disasters of Hanshin (Japan),
Kocaeri (Turkey), and Chi-Chi (Taiwan). Prof. Chen graduated fromWaseda Univer-
sity in Japan, which made it easy for us to communicate about the survey’s purpose
and subsequent information requests. Following our first meeting, we had many
more opportunities to exchange information and ideas on the recovery in Taiwan.
Prof. Chen generously provided all requested information.
Under the 2004 JSPS grant Architecture of Reconstruction Process of Chi-Chi
Area (Taiwan) and Archives Related to Urban Reconstruction in the World and
with the support of Prof. Chen, I spent three months in Taiwan (primarily in Chi-
Chi) during the summer of 2005 as a visiting researcher at the Graduate Institute of
Building andPlanning,National TaiwanUniversity. Throughout this time, Prof. Chen
was available to answer questions about the cities, building structures, or disaster
management systems of Taiwan. He would introduce helpful faculty members and
suggest suitable paths for this research.
His invaluable assistance made me realize that when traveling to affected areas
after a disaster, and especially in thefield of urban recovery, it is difficult for foreigners
to successfully conduct field surveys using suitable research questions without solid
knowledge of the social context. Thus, it is extremely important to have a specialist
or local researcher in the same research field who can provide critical support.
II. Be a friend and build good relationships with the local community
Whenever I returned toChi-Chi,David’s restaurantwas always thefirst place I visited.
There I would have dinner and get the latest information on Chi-Chi Township, the
recovery situation, politics, the new mayor, new restaurants, business conditions,
visitors to Chi-Chi, and the current circumstances of individual residents. Because
of his numerous connections, I was able to conduct interviews with many of the local
people, which would eventually lead to my structural model of the post-earthquake
recovery process (Murao 2006b). His contacts opened the door to much of the data
and materials needed in this research.
As noted earlier, meeting David was by sheer accident, yet he became precious
to my research. It was important to continue to visit David’s restaurant, particularly
in the early stages of my long-term work in Chi-Chi. With each visit, exchanging
stories about our families and ourselves, drinking together, or singing loudly brought
our relationship closer. The rapport that we built led David to introduce me to many
of Chi-Chi’s stakeholders and played a key role in my ability to finalize my research
there.
When a disaster occurs, the temptation for disaster recovery researchers is to
immediately survey those affected by the tragedy. However, essential information
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for comprehensive recovery research, including knowledge of the social context,
cannot be acquired without taking the time to establish a strong rapport with the
local people.
III. Find the best partner possible
Yoyo was a doctoral student at the Institute of Anthropology, Tsing Hua University,
who was conducting research on the survival strategies of the Thao people living
near Sun Moon Lake in Nantou County, Taiwan. She became critical to my research
in Chi-Chi. I have an engineering background with a focus on architecture and city
planning. However, post-disaster urban recovery activities are, in a sense, compre-
hensive phenomena of society as a whole. Given this conception, I intended to take
an interdisciplinary approach to my research in Chi-Chi—an approach that included
sociology and anthropology. Yoyo fully understood my intention and advised me on
the most appropriate ways to conduct my local surveys.
In her capacity as interpreter, noting that I cannot speak or understand Chinese,
Yoyo would often pose more questions to the interviewee than I had requested in
order to gather the kind of information that she knew I needed. This ability arose
from her sense of anthropology and intimate knowledge of society in central Taiwan,
as well as her deep understanding of my long-term research goals. As a young
anthropologist whose doctoral thesis focused on the indigenous people of Taiwan,
Yoyo’s complementary knowledge and instincts were indispensable to my work. I
met her in 2002 quite by accident, but the successful outcomes of my research could
not have been produced without her advice and support.
I can easily say, no one could replace her. Good research in overseas fields can
sometimes come down to one happy chance encounter. Such continuous surveys are
basic activities to obtain proper datasets for the demography of disasters.
12.4 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter describes theSendai Framework forDisasterRiskReduction, introduced
the ISDML within IRIDeS at the Tohoku University, and highlighted their interna-
tional collaborative activities. It discussed some of the research activities overseen
by the author and took a personal lense through this experience. The importance of
international collaboration and harnessing opportunities for effective partnerships
has been stressed throughout. The author’s extensive recovery research in Chi-Chi,
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Chapter 13
The Ontological Praxis Between Disaster
Studies and Demography—Extension
of the Scope
Dávid Karácsonyi and Andrew Taylor
Abstract This chapter serves as a summary of the learnings from the present
volume and an extension of the scope on disaster-demography nexus. We outline
the benefits of exploring the disaster-demography nexus and develop a categori-
sation summarising seven different approaches to the interlink of disasters with
demography from examinations of existing literature. These are: disaster impacts on
population, measuring vulnerability, mass displacement, spatial-regional approach,
climate change, urbanisation and an applied approach. These seven approaches are
our attempt to highlight the complex and multifarious nexus between demography
and disasters which may not simply be linked to vulnerability. It is recognised that
others may separate or merge some of these approaches in different ways.
Keywords Disaster-demography nexus · Climate change · Urban vulnerability ·
Geographic possibilism ·Mass displacement
13.1 Introduction
This chapter serves as a summary of the learnings from the cases presented in this
volume and an extension of the scope on disaster-demography nexus.We overviewed
in Chap. 1 the two perspectives on a disaster; the vulnerability school (social embed-
dedness) and the holistic school (non-routineness). While we stressed in Chap. 1 that
the disaster-demography nexus should immanently be part of the ‘social embedded-
ness’ perspective, themajority of existingdemography studies has a’non-routineness’
outlook on disaster, and feature the disaster-demography nexus through popula-
tion change as a consequence to disaster. Even the term ‘demography of disasters’
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reflected demographic outcomes when it (according to our knowledge) first appeared
as the title of the work by Smith (1996); Demography of Disasters: Population
estimates after Hurricane Andrew.
The nexus was also observed by Schultz and Elliott (2012) in a literature summary
of studies of local demographic consequences of disasters in the USA dating back to
the early 1980s. In addition, the edited volumebyKurosu et al. (2010) provided awide
range of case studies on demographic responses to environmental crises in the past,
such as famines and weather fluctuations in rural societies and epidemic diseases
(including smallpox and Spanish flu). However, this volume failed to summarise
findings from the cases and provide their theoretical implications for the disaster-
demography nexus. There are a plethora of case studies on the disaster-demography
nexus in developing countries, especially those concerned with climate change-
induced mass relocations. The summarising works, however, are mostly policy-
oriented documents with a few exceptions (see for instance Martine and Schensul
2013). This gap in the literature on summarising the multifarious approaches on the
demography-disaster nexus was partially filled by two theoretical papers by Donner
and Rodríguez (2008) and Hugo (2011) which focused on vulnerability, migration
and climate change.
On that basis, the present book and this chapter are not the first attempt to provide
a framework on the disaster-demography nexus. Still, our ambition is to traverse
the disaster-demography nexus from both ‘non-routineness’ (holistic) and ‘social
embeddedness’ (vulnerability) perspectives. These two perspectives cover various
forms of the disaster-demography nexus, and, based on the existing literature, we
could discern seven different subthemes which are summarised in the following
paragraphs and in Table 13.1.
13.2 Seven Approaches of Disaster-Demography Nexus
The first and the most commonly used approach to the disaster-demography nexus
focuses exclusively on the consequences from disasters. The demography of disas-
ters by Frankenberg et al. (2014) defined how demographers should study disasters
and the essay gives a summary on the various ways disasters affect demographic
processes. For instance, a simple demographic technique of measuring disaster
impacts is the enumeration of the casualties. Lindell (2013, p. 4) provided the
demographic balance equation for this enumeration, basically using the population
number before and after the disaster event, subtracting natural population increase
and migration to obtain the difference to approximate the impact from the disaster.
More complex methods are elaborated by Nobles et al. (2015) to investigate the
fertility and natural reproduction response, in particular for baby booms and replace-
ment fertility after disasters. In Bourque’s et al. (2007), understanding a disaster is
an unanticipated mortality shock; hence, the subject of demographic analysis is the
response to mortality within the community where births represent renewal and the
return to ‘normal’. It is important to add that, according to Naik et al. (2007), studies
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Table 13.1 Demographical approaches of disasters

















Frankenberg et al. (2014)
Nobles et al. (2015)
Oliver-Smith (2013)
Lindell (2013)
Bourque et al. (2007)
Veenema et al. (2017)
Lechat (1979))
Noji (1995)
Briere and Elliott (2000)
Krug et al. (1999)
2, 3, 5, 7
Measuring vulnerability
(demography is a root
cause)
Age, gender, ethnic and





elderly people or people
on move, refugees,
tourists




Flangan et al. (2011)
Fothergill et al. (1999),
Fothergill and Peek (2004)
Wisner et al. (2004)
Bolin (2007)
Enarson et al. (2007)




Jia et al. (2010)
Stough and Mayhorn
(2013)
Peacock et al. (1997)
Zhou et al. (2014))
4, 8, 6









Gray and Mueller (2012)







Schultz and Elliott (2012)
World Bank (2005)
Naik et al. (2007)
2, 4, 11




Lavell et al. (2012)
Lavell and Ginnetti (2013)






254 D. Karácsonyi and A. Taylor
Table 13.1 (continued)
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such as these mostly focus on developing countries because usually there are higher
death tolls during disasters compared to developed ones.
Disaster epidemiology can be also understood as part of ‘consequences from
disasters’, we discussed in the previous paragraph. It should be added that disaster
epidemiology and its demographic consequences have been well discussed in the
literature (see Lechat 1979; Noji 1995). Recently, Veenema et al. (2017) provided
a systematic review on studies related to the climate change-induced hydrological
and meteorological hazard events which caused epidemics through lack of access to
drinking water. According to Bissel (1983), epidemic diseases appear several months
after hazard events because of crowded and inappropriate temporary housing orwater
transmitted pathogens. These ‘delayed’ deaths are often excluded from the disaster
death toll. In addition to post-disaster epidemics, increased suicide rates are also
apparent 3–4 years after disaster events and are related to the post-traumatic stress
(Krug et al. 1999), distorted life courses or failed, delayed post-disaster recovery.
By extension, demographic consequences from epidemics can be considered as
part of a wider disaster-demography nexus, for example, HIV altered demographic
trajectories in southern African countries (Nicoll et al. 1994; Gould 2005). The
presence of infectious diseases such as HIV, plague, cholera and Ebola (see the
2014 Ebola emergency in Western Africa, Briand et al. 2014) can be explained
by poor governance, education, low living standards and lack of modern medicine
in the developing world and hence by global social and spatial inequalities. Still
antibiotic resistance (WHO 2018), and changing social attitudes (for example, anti-
vaccinationism) challenge and may impact demography of developed nations in the
future (Kata 2010; Casey 2015).
Text Box 13.1 the Relationship of Violent Conflicts
to the Disaster-Demography Nexus
Some may think about a third angle of the ‘consequences from disaster’
approach aswell, which, instead of being part of the holistic school, is related to
the social vulnerability paradigm. This third angle may be related to the demo-
graphic consequences of malfunctions in society, particularly to economic
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crises, violence and ‘bad governance’ (Moore 2001). In Wisner’s and his
colleague’s (2004) radical embeddedness perspective, all disasters have a root
cause in societal failures related to inequalities and spatial exclusion, and hence,
violent conflicts are also considered as disasters. But we argue these crises
(ethnic cleansings, genocides, sabotages, terrorist actions and violent crimes)
are not immanently part of the disaster-demography nexus. As an illustration
for the reason for this position, we take the example of outmigration from
urban crime hotspots (Foote 2015) which in the Wisnerian logic would be
considered as part of disaster-demography nexus since violent crime is a kind
of malfunction in society. But studies on crime are indeed far from the disaster
study field and likely to be related to social sciences other than disaster studies,
particularly to criminology, sociology and urban studies. The notion ‘famine
demography’ by Dyson and Ó Gráda (2002) does not reflect a direct link to
disaster. Study of famines has a much stronger link to other fields such as
history and economics.
It should be added however that there are often interactions between a
violent societal downturn and a coincident natural hazard event which increase
population impact which reflects the complexness of a disaster (Robinson
2003; Barton 2005; Cutter 2005). For instance, theGortaMór (The Great Irish
Famine) killed around one million people and caused mass emigration of the
Irish population from Ireland to North America during 1845–1849 (Dyson and
Ó Gráda 2002) where the British laissez-faire capitalism, the dependence on
one food source and the land rent system interacted with the potato blight.
Disasters other than famine are also likely to occur because of violence and
war, such as the 1918–1920 Spanish flu pandemic following World War One
which caused more death than the war itself (Johnson and Mueller 2002). The
1953 North Sea flood in the Netherlands caused more than 2 000 deaths and
was a result of dilapidated state of physical flood defence and warning systems
due to the consequences of World War Two and coinciding with an extreme
high spring tide and storm surge (Hall 2013).
In some cases, natural hazard events interacting with violent societal down-
turns are (and were) used to cover up responsibilities for these events (Smith
2014). This is illustrated by the scientific dispute on the causes of high death
tolls among indigenous peoples during the colonisation era in several coun-
tries, when ethnic compositions of entire continents have been changed. While
Crosby (1976) and McNeil (1976) considered a decisive role of the effects
of ‘virgin soil epidemics’ for these high death tolls due to lack of immu-
nity of indigenous people to the infectious diseases introduced by Europeans,
their view is now strongly disputed (Jones 2003). Recently, most of authors
explaining death tolls through genocide (see Lemkin 2012; Curthoys 2005;
Jones 2017) and indigenous population decline through loss of livelihoods
during colonisation (Smith 1989).
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The applied demography approach is also strongly affiliated with the ‘conse-
quences from disaster’ paradigm, but, in contrast to disaster epidemics and societal
downturns, we conceptualise it as a separate theme (the second one among the seven
approaches of disaster-demography nexus summarised in Table 13.1). The applied
approach was emphasised by Robinson et al. (2003) who summarised the demo-
graphic means in relation to disaster mitigation in their work Principles and uses
of demography in emergency assessment. The applied demographic techniques in
disaster situations can help to measure a disaster’s impact on the affected population.
Moreover, according to Lindell (2013), applied demographic methods can be used
in every stage of the disaster cycle. Despite the widespread use of demographic tech-
niques to study disasters, Frankenberg et al. (2014) have emphasised that, due to a
lack of adequate, spatially and timely detailed data, there are not many studies which
would interrelate demography and disasters throughmortality and fertility changes to
provide an integrated analysis. Hence, Robinson et al. (2003) provided an overview
of substitutional procedures to be used for disaster assessment where there is not
an adequate dataset. To fill the immediate knowledge gap about the size of affected
populations, the area sampling method is usually applied to estimate the numbers
impacted in developing countries (Brown et al. 2001). In developed nations, mobile
phone location data can also substitute for adequate datasets for disaster impact
assessment for population, as it is discussed in Chap. 2 and by Wilson et al. (2016).
Among administrative data, school enrolments can provide an estimate on popula-
tion displacement (Plyer et al. 2010) as it also presented in Chap. 3. Longitudinal
practices and the application of supplementary data on disaster impacts, for example,
housing damages, are also introduced in Chap. 12.
While the assessment of the demographical consequences of disasters in the
previous paragraph has strong links to the non-routineness (holistic) school, the
third approach which addresses demography as root cause of the disaster is clearly
part of the ‘social embeddedness’ perspective. As an illustration for social, or more
precisely ‘demographic embeddedness’,Malone (2009) called attention to the impor-
tance of using demographic analysis tomeasure vulnerability. In fact, socially created
vulnerabilities are difficult to quantify (James 2012) because they are a combination
of different factors (Wisner et al. 2004). Furthermore, Malone (2009, p. 13) provided
a method and a group of indicators, including demographic data to measure vulnera-
bility and resilience in the formof a vulnerability-resilience indicatorsmodel.Malone
suggested to use detailed socio-demographic analysis, for example, population distri-
bution and density, births and mortality in different areas characterised by different
livelihoods. These demographic analyses throw light on the social context that allows
analysts to see how households are constituted, the elements that affect their func-
tioning and disrupts them. Other similar indexes have been developed recently to
measure social vulnerability (see Flanaganet al. 2011; James 2012). As an example,
by using a combination of multivariable and spatial analysis in vulnerability assess-
ment, Zhou et al. (2014) used factor analysis to create a complex disaster vulnerability
index at a county level for China (2361 units in total) based on population census data.
Zhou and his co-authors analysed also the spatial variation of index values obtained
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from factor analysis by using local and global autocorrelations which helped them
to identify vulnerability hotspots to hazard events.
Vulnerability assessment is often part of planning for large industrial investments.
As an illustration, Orum et al. (2014) provided an estimate of vulnerability using
demographic data of people living in the zones around more than three thousand
chemical plants in the USA. They focused primary on social status and ethnicity
and found that residents of chemical facility vulnerability zones belong mostly to
minority groups (African Americans or Latinos). These populations have higher
rates of poverty and cheaper housing, lower incomes, and education levels than the
national average. The case ofHurricaneKatrina (2005,NewOrleans, USA) also drew
attention to race and ethnic inequalities in the USA (Bolin 2007 p. 113, or Chap. 6),
because the lower laying flood-prone areas were mostly inhabited by poorer African
Americans. According to Peacock et al. (1997), ethnic segregation also occurred
during the post-Hurricane Andrew relocation (1992, Florida) which caused social
change and put African American communities into a more vulnerable position.
AsPeacock’s study suggests, demographic vulnerabilities are not only root causes,
they can deteriorate disaster consequences as well. For instance, along with ethnicity
(Fothergill et al. 1999; Fothergill and Peek 2004), gender (see Enarson 2000; Enarson
et al. 2007, or Chap. 9) and age composition canmake communities more vulnerable.
In particular, population ageing in developed countries is establishing age-related
vulnerable population enclaves (Fernandez et al. 2002). As an illustration, Isoda
(2011) pointed out that, during the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami,
the death toll was higher among the elderly who typically stayed at home when the
tsunami hit and were not able to escape. This is because the tsunami hit Japan during
working hours, and in contrast to schools and job places, private homes were neither
designed to resist the tsunami nor provided with shelters. Consequently, the death
toll was in general higher in those rural communities on the coastal areas where the
proportion of elderly people in the population were higher. A high death toll among
the elderly was also observed in the case of 2008 Sichuan earthquake (Jia et al. 2010).
Friedsam (1960) in his early literature review on disasters in the USA and on impacts
of World War Two bombings in Europe distinguished direct (older people are more
likely to be hit since they have limited mobility) and indirect or secondary effects
(lack or poor level of medical treatment for people in need during the emergency).
Furthermore, indirect effects include a shortening of life expectancy for people living
with diabetes (Fonseca et al. 2009) or for those requiring any kind of regular medical
treatments such as haemodialysis. Ironically, despite the higher death tolls among
elderly, they are the most likely to be ‘post-disaster returners’ to an area because of
their stronger attachment to place through their longer life experience (see Chaps. 2
and 10).
Along with static demographic aspects such as age, race and sex composition,
we summarised in the previous two paragraphs, dynamic demographic aspects, in
particular migration, should be also considered when discussing vulnerabilities. For
instance, people onmove, such as refugees, internally displaced or tourists are partic-
ularly vulnerable to hazards (Robinson 2003; Donner and Rodríguez 2008). Large
numbers of tourists were impacted during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, since they
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had a high concentration in coastal areas during the Christmas high season (Becken
et al. 2014). Of course, refugees are generally more vulnerable when compared to
tourists because of their social status. According to Naik et al. (2007) excess popu-
lations, such as visitors can easily become the ‘forgotten group’ in the course of a
disaster because of a lack of response planning (ibid. p. 57).
The vulnerability of people on the move links us to the fourth meta-approach to
the disaster-demography nexus which focuses on migration and mass displacement.
According to Hugo (2008), migration has always been one of the most important
survival strategies adopted by people facing disasters. As an illustration to Hugo’s
point, King and Gunter in Chap. 6 highlighted population loss due to post-disaster
outmigration in case of New Orleans (Hurricane Katrina), Christchurch (2011 earth-
quake) and Innisfail (2006 and 2011 cyclones). Lavell and Ginnetti (2013) suggest,
the demographic profile of entire regions can be altered over a long period of
time as consequence of disaster-induced mass displacements. Furthermore, these
mass displacements can be short or long distance, temporary or permanent (Cernea
and Guggenheim 1993; Cernea 2004). Regarding research on long-term and long-
distance displacements after disasters, Levine et al. (2007) pointed out a gap in the
literature due to lack of data and the difficulty to follow up such migration.
Furthermore, the non-spontaneous character of mass displacement is stressed by
Oliver-Smith (1996); the relocation or resettlement of disaster-stricken populations
is a common strategy pursued by planners in post-disaster reconstruction efforts.
Displacement is also selective based on vulnerabilities and the connection between
migration and hazard impact is not always clear. As an illustration, Gray andMueller
(2012) brought to the fore that those families impacted directly by a disaster are less
likely to move out compared to those in the disaster-prone area not impacted directly.
This is because the latter group has the means to fund their move, while the former,
who may have lost everything, are ‘stuck’ in the disaster-prone area. It is important
to add that displacement is not only related to disaster, it is a broader and more
common phenomenon. That is, displacement could take place because of occurrence
of a disaster, climate change inducted environmental change (see Chap. 8), violent
conflict or a development project (Oliver-Smith 2013). Furthermore, Oliver-Smith
(ibid.) as well as Scudder and Colson (1982) highlighted that development projects
cause much more displacements than all disasters combined.
Disaster-induced spatial movement brings the fifth approach to the fore which
is the disaster-demography nexus in the spatial-geographical context. The spatial-
geographical approach has roots in disaster studies in the first half of twentieth
century (seeWhite 1945) through the theory of environmental adaptation (Alexander
2001). Environmental adaptation reflects the conviction of geographic possibilism, a
dominant paradigmof humangeography in thefirst half of twentieth century and itself
rooted in the French regional geography (seeVidal de laBlache 1911). The concept of
geographic possibilism means that the diversity of the natural environment provides
different opportunities and constraints where people react to their environment and
make their own choices. These choices, their ways of life (genres de vie), are the
manifestation of their culture in the Vidalian regional geography.
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Geography and space also play an important role in the social embeddedness
perspective on disasters as well. But instead of the now outdated geographic possi-
bilism, it is connected to the neo-Marxist critical geography paradigm (see Harvey
1996). Within the embeddness viewpoint, space is understood to be an uneavenly
distributed resource because of uneaven population distributions, and hence, the
uneaven allocation of resources within societies. Wisner et al. (2004, p. 5) described
this as follows: ‘People live in adverse economic situations that oblige them to inhabit
regions and places that can be affected by natural hazards’. Wisner et al. (2004)
stressed that different groups take risks for advantages voluntarily or involuntarily
because of their economic needs. For example, they take risk of landslide to have
a house on a slope for a better panorama or they live in a poorly built informal
settlement on a slope in an urban area to access better job opportunities. The former
highlights increases risks from voluntary actions, while the latter demonstrates the
‘forced’ acceptance of risk for (economic) survival.
Furthermore, according to Cutter (2005, p. 42), the global extent of risks is
not equally distributed among all places or among all social groups. This spatial
inequality approach is highlighted by Carson and his colleagues in Chap. 5 that the
Great Deprivation (the Swedish famine of 1867–1868) ‘…is seen as the last of the
European famines to result from natural events’. However, Carson and his colleagues
also highlight that Northern Sweden was a territory for Swedish northern settlement
advances encouraged by the vast mineral and forest resources there at that time.
Crop failure triggered by the cold summer of 1867 hit especially those northern
advance settlements and caused famine there. Wisner’s interpretation would suggest
the famine to be a result of northern advance into sparsely populated areas rather
than the cold summer (the natural element in the disaster). But Carson also stressed
that improving food supply chains and reducing reliance on local food production
helped northern sparsely populated territories to avoid famines later on; hence, the
famine was the result of unfavourable economic patterns at the time.
According to Lavell and Ginnetti (2013), economic development, better tech-
nologies and improving living standards are reducing vulnerability on a global basis.
Alexander (2005, p. 32) stressed, however, there is an endless resurgence of vulner-
ability, because of growing socio-economic inequalities and polarisation throughout
the world. Alexander’s perspective was also echoed by Naik et al. (2007). Accord-
ingly, disasters have a disproportionate effect on developing countries because of
poor quality of construction and less compliance with building codes, and absence
or non-application of land registration and other regulatory mechanisms (ibid. p. 19).
Furthermore, according to Naik et al. (2007), there is a significant difference in the
impact of disasters on developing and developed countries in terms of the type of
loss: data show a higher death toll in developing countries compared to developed
countries, but absolute economic losses are greater in developed countries because
of higher concentration of economic assets in the area. This was also supported
by Robinson (2003 p. 5), who stated, that between 1991 and 2000, 3 million people
were killed by disasters, while only 2%of themwere fromhighly developed countries
while 60% were from Africa.
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The examples on spatial-geographical context we highlighted in the previous
paragraphs showed that space allocation has a slightly different meaning depending
on its ‘local’ or ‘global’ connotation. But Cutter andWisner have tended to use these
interchangeably in their arguments when explaining the role of space allocation in
vulnerabilities. But the scale is important, because the former brings to the fore local
social inequalities, the latter features global geographical diversity and inequalities
among nations. Hence, the size of areal unit under consideration can influence the
phenomenon we are observing (see Chap. 5 and Koch and Carson 2012 on the
modifiable areal unit problem).
On a global scale, spatial variety of the natural environment provides different
types of environmental opportunities and risks; hence, global assessment on natural
hazard hotspots has a high priority for development and aid agencies (Nadim et al.
2006; Strömberg 2007). For example, the World Bank (2005) conducted a study on
natural hazard hotspots to estimate GDP losses and mortality as a consequence of
disasters in various countries. The study distinguished and analysed eight types of
disasters based on their ‘natural’ characteristics; drought, storm, flood, earthquake,
volcano, heat wave, landslide and wildfire. Accordingly, the World Bank used the
terms single hazard hotspots and multiple hazard hotspots and investigated the expo-
sure to these risks and vulnerabilities for different countries. Another example is the
work by Schultz and Elliott (2012) which used census and hazards database to esti-
mate the demographic consequences of disasters at a county level in the USA. They
found a positive correlation between cumulative hazard impact during the 1990s and
changes in local population numbers. Further examples of hazard risk assessments
are the estimates of global flood risk (Winsemius et al. 2013), global landslide and
avalanche risk (Nadim et al. 2006), tropical cyclone risk (Peduzzi et al. 2012) and
their effects on population and GDP.
Despite the demand for natural hazard hotspot assessments, there are a relatively
small number of such studies and they are absent in sociology based disaster studies.
This is likely because the ‘social embeddedness’ disaster school denies the concept
of geographic possibilism discussed earlier. Despite this, the spatial-environmental
diversity is important especially in the course of emerging climate change (or more
explicitly the, climate emergency faced globally) which highlights the low resilience
of our political, social and technical systems, constraints and limitations of human
society when coping with ‘nature’.
Indeed, the impact of and adaptation to climate change requires special atten-
tion, which forms the sixth approach of demography-disaster nexus. Climate change
connects disasters, spatial-geographical diversity and migration. As an illustration,
according to de Sherbinin and his co-authors (2011), climate change-induced mass
relocation is a politically disputed and socially sensitive adaptation strategy but seems
to be unavoidable in the very near future. Adding to this, Oliver-Smith (2013)
summarised the potential forces which could lead to mass displacement during
climate change impacts; such as evacuation because of rapid onset events (typhoons,
floods), slowonset drivers for forcedmigration (drought, desertification), or displace-
ment from climate change mitigation projects (resettlement from coastal areas, large
constructions as reservoirs or coastal defence dams).
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While climate change may have extensive impacts through forced migration,
the international dimensions of this relationship have been neglected until recently
(Hansen et al. 2012; Jankó et al. 2018). Hugo (2008) suggests this is because such
events have affectedmostly developingnations.Adding to this,Bouwer’s (2011) liter-
ature review spotlighted that losses caused by climate change are not significant so
far but will be significant in the near future. Extending this, Zander and her colleagues
suggest climate change adaptation-induced migration (intention to migrate because
of climate change related heatwaves) is also present within developed nations, such
as Australia (see Chap. 7). However, others (McLeman and Hunter 2010; Carson
et al. 2016) have stressed that weather-induced mass migration in developed coun-
tries is mostly seasonal-temporal. These include the snowbirds in North America and
the grey nomads in Australia, who seasonally move between the tropical–subtropical
and temperate zones of their respective continents.
Lavell and Ginnetti (2013) and Hugo (2011) draw attention to the fact that to
date most climate change migration caused by environmental change has occurred
within national boundaries. According toMcLeman andHunter (2010), these climate
change-induced internal and intra-regional moves (within a region of one country)
were up to now temporary. Hugo (2011) stressed that the occurrence of climate
change-induced extreme weather events is just one factor among several others influ-
encingmigration decisions.Hence, a natural hazard alone does not lead automatically
to displacement (Piguet et al. 2011 p. 23).
Furthermore, according to IOM (2012), climate change-induced migration can be
both a challenge and a solution for the problems, as peoplemove to less affected areas.
According toPiguet et al. (2011),migration is an adaptation strategywhich should not
be considered as a negative outcome to be avoided. For example, according to Naik
et al. (2007), environmental migration can affect development not only negatively
(through the exodus of highly skilled people, loss of workforce, brain drain and so
on), but emigration can ease pressure on the environment, while remittances and
returning experienced people can also boost the economy and promote development
goals. Additionally, Naik et al. (2007) focused on how migratory flows and migrant
communities are impacted by disasters, and how kinship and support from diaspora
affected migrant communities in the aftermath of disasters (through, for example,
aid and technical assistance).
As an illustration of the potential scale of climate change-induced migration,
Lavell and Ginnetti (2013) estimated the likelihood of disaster-induced displacement
and quantified the number of people at displacement risk using a probabilistic risk
model. Their estimate showed that almost 3 thousand permillion people are displaced
annually inCentral America and theCaribbean as a result of climate change, equating
to 300 thousand per year. In fact, the potential scale of future environmental-induced
migration is the subject of debate and its impacts will be very different around the
world (Piguet et al. 2011) because impacts are determined not just by the absolute
exposure and the size of exposed population but by their conditions of resilience
and vulnerability as well (Oliver-Smith 2012). Based on these complex interactions,
Oliver-Smith (2012) questionedwhether canwe really speak aboutmigration directly
induced by climate change? Probably the direct connection is present in the case of
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small nations of the Pacific suffering from direct effects of sea level rise and consid-
ered as first victims to climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). But according
to Hugo (2011), demographic hotspots (places, countries with population booms)
and climate change hotspots overlap in space (these hotspots are in Africa, in South
and Southeast Asia and in Central America and the Caribbean), which is generating
a complex interactions with migration and will cause increased mobility in future
affecting developed nations as destinations as well (Reuveny 2007).
The interaction of climate change, population booms and spatial inequalities has
fuelled rural to urban migration and the urbanisation boom in developing coun-
tries (Hugo 2011). Hence, according to Gencer (2013), disaster studies should pay
special attention to urban vulnerability and disaster risk reduction, linking disasters,
the global trend of urbanisation (Clark 1996; Seto et al. 2011) and climate change. So,
the seventh approach to the disaster-demography nexus is related to urban vulnera-
bility. Donner and Rodríguez (2008) stressed that increasing urban vulnerabilities are
particularly evident in rapidly growing coastal megacities of developing countries
such as Jakarta, Dhaka and Lagos (see Tacoli et al. 2015; Di Roucco et al. 2015).
More generally, rural to urban migration means that people arriving to high hazard
risk urban areas from rural areas are generally characterised by low economic oppor-
tunities but also a lower probability of hazard impacts (Hugo 2011). For example,
empirical evidence suggests per capita death tolls are higher from earthquakes in
urban areas compared to rural regions (Donner and Rodríguez 2008). Wisner and
colleagues (2004) suggest urbanisation as major factor in the growth of vulnerability,
particularly for low-income families living within squatter settlements in developing
countries. These informal settlements are exposed to physical vulnerabilities due to
their construction practices or location in hazard risk areas. In these informal settle-
ments, social vulnerability and exclusion are strongly related to hazard risk exposures
such as floods (Amoako et al. 2018) or landslides (Chardon 1999; Alves and Ojima
2013). As a result, urbanisation and rapid population growth together have led to the
concentration of population in hazard prone urban areas and hence put more people
at risk.
While it seems obvious that the urban vulnerability context is related primarily
to developing countries, that is not exclusively the case. For example, pandemics
can spread rapidly across global cities of developed nations as well (Alirol et al.
2010; Grais et al. 2003) such as during the 2002–2003 SARS coronavirus (in East
Asia) and during the 2009H1N1 flu virus (in North America) epidemics (McLafferty
2010). Armenakis andNirupama (2013) highlighted that risks of technological disas-
ters related to certain industries (nuclear, chemical or biotech facilities, gas supply
systems) are high in urban zones of developed countries as well. To cope with these
hazard risks, properly designed rapid evacuation systems are needed based on geog-
raphy, population sizes, distributions, compositions and vulnerabilities (Kendra et al.
2008). Adding to this, Singh in Chap. 10 has emphasised there are more complex
and interlinked (and hence vulnerable) lifeline networks under risks with growing
urbanisation (see also Tielidze et al. 2019). Furthermore Murao in Chap. 12 pointed
out that cities can be considered as engineering ‘products’; however, unlike other
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products, they have never been tested before people start using them during their
everyday life. In Chap. 9, Barnes argued that urban landscape, engineering, social
and community aspects are linked together in urban disaster resilience and that has
different outcome for females. Additionally, there is a need to develop ‘age-friendly
cities’ (Buffel et al. 2012), because of the growing number of elderly in urban areas
of developed countries representing a highly vulnerable group to disaster risk as well
(Donner and Rodríguez 2008). Based on the various aspects, we featured here on
urban vulnerability it is clear that this approach of disaster-demography nexus is
strongly linked to other approaches such as demographic vulnerability and climate
change as well.
13.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have laid-out the links between disasters and demography evident
in the field of disaster studies and plotted major historical paradigm changes in the
field. Of course, this classification is subjective and others may separate or merge
some of these approaches in different ways. The collective case studies in this volume
further expand the links by highlighting the complex andmultifarious nexus between
demography and disasters which may not simply be linked to vulnerability. While,
for example, demographic conditions prior to a disaster may be the reason for high
impacts (for example, loss of life); it may also reflect longer-term and more localised
structural changes in the demography of towns or regions. In terms of demographic
consequences for disasters, as somechapters in this booknoted (for example,Chaps. 2
and 5), disasters may be an agent for speeding up pre-existing demographic trends,
such as rural to urban migration. The demographic profile ‘left behind’ may conse-
quently be quite different to pre-disaster but, without detailed examination of pre-
disaster demography, it would be easy to suggest that the disaster fundamentally
‘caused’ a new demographic structure at the local level of impacts.
Taking a wider perspective of demography, which goes beyond the statistical
analysis of populations, enables us to depart from the classical scope of demograph-
ically rooted disaster studies in which the disaster is traditionally singularised as a
root cause for demographic shifts (the non-routine event approach). In this volume,
we attempted a broader demographic purview in order to extend disaster science
research.
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